FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-085
Wednesday
1 May 1996

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Daily Report
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FBIS-EEU-96-085 *1 May 1996*

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Albania: Incidents Suggest Opening of Road to Violence at Elections

AU3004131196 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by M. Leka: Stop the Violence at the Elections]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election campaign has only just gotten into gear. The parties have decided on their candidates and have started the marathon leading to 26 May. Although the campaign has just started, it is already being undermined. It has been reported that police forces in Cerrik removed the posters of opposition parties from private shops and detained two people. Two days ago, one of the escorts of the Socialist Party [PS] leaders was detained for the umpteenth time on the road to the rally in Durres. Another electoral wonder has occurred. Fatos Nano, chairman of the PS, could be said to have been arrested in Devoll: The police chief did not allow PS activists and supporters to post portraits of their leader Fatos Nano. Also in the district of Devoll, adolescent schoolchildren were instructed by their adolescent teachers to tear down the electoral posters of the political parties.

Yesterday's incident in Tepelene was a serious omen for the freedom of the elections: The flag of a party put the police chief's nose out of joint and he demanded its removal. He even chose the most vulgar way of securing its removal—by breaking down the office door, removing the flag from the balcony, and destroying it.

All these things happened yesterday, at the very beginning of the election campaign. This is a bad sign, suggesting that the road to violence at the elections is open. It is open because violence starts whenever anybody breaks the law. It is all the more open when the law is broken by those whose duty is to uphold it, as in the case of the Tepelene police chief. In the last few days, the walls of Tirana have been disfigured by scrawls of Front Lives, National Front Will Win, and Tirana for the PR [Republican Party], but nobody has erased the graffiti. There is no reason why they should, now that we have started the electoral game. Otherwise, there would be no reason for us to hold elections, and we could appoint deputies, just like five and 50 years ago.

It is the duty of all political forces and especially of the state itself to enforce the law and keep order, avoiding incidents during the campaign. The appeal of civilized Albanian citizens is clear: Never again another 2 April! [reference to deaths of anticommunist demonstrators in Shkoder in 1991]

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Bulgaria: Zhelev Links NATO, EU Membership

AU2604084496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 26 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by correspondent Purvoleta Tsvetkova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Montana—If it shows the will, Bulgaria can become a NATO member as early as next year, President Zhelyu Zhelev declared yesterday at a meeting with the political forces in Montana [northwestern Bulgaria].

According to Zhelev, the procedure for joining NATO is simpler than joining the European Union, which requires the harmonization of legislation and improvement of the economy's standard. Again, no one would think of discussing accession to the EU with a country that did not want to join NATO, the president explained.

The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] government's vacillation between East and West, between NATO and a second edition of the USSR, is dangerous for Bulgaria and its national security, the president said, adding that NATO is the only chance for small countries like ours.

In the president's view, party interests have prevailed over the interests of the country's security. For this reason, he said, the evolution of the BSP to a state in which it advocates joining NATO is in the interest of the nation as well as of the party.

Zhelev will appeal to the parties that support him in the primaries to support whichever candidate wins them in the actual presidential elections. However, he said that he could not guarantee that they will do this.

Bulgaria: Videnov Meets Vrantizky, Klestil in Vienna

AU3004101396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Report by special correspondent Bilyana Mikhaylova from Vienna]

[FBIS Translated Text] As part of his visit to Vienna, this morning Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov met with Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. Later on, he also met the Austrian President Thomas Klestil. After their meeting, the two government leaders gave a news conference. Here is a report on the conference from our special correspondent Bilyana Mikhaylova.

[Mikhaylova] We are very interested in expanding cooperation with Bulgaria, especially in the economic sphere, Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky declared, and added that it has been agreed for working groups of experts from both countries to start discussing the possible relaxation of bilateral visa conditions. In addition, during his conversation with Prime Minister Videnov, the federal chancellor proposed cooperation in the field of seeking alternative energy sources; he also suggested that the two countries should conclude an agreement on informing one another of nuclear incidents.

Prime Minister Videnov pointed out that our relations with Austria are traditionally good and said that Bulgaria is particularly interested in Austria's experience in the European integration processes. Videnov described as not intensive enough the political contacts between Bulgaria and Austria, especially at the highest level, and said that it therefore gave him great satisfaction that Federal Chancellor Vranitzky had confirmed his readiness to visit Bulgaria in the very near future.

In response to a question from an Austrian Television correspondent concerning the financial difficulties that our country is experiencing at the moment, the Bulgarian prime minister replied that the main task this year is to stabilize the financial system, and that Bulgaria is in a position to make its foreign debt payments this year. However, to ensure that financial stability is not upset, the prime minister said, it is necessary to close down loss-making enterprises in the state sector and to sign an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank this summer.

Bulgaria: Greek Ambassador Discusses Pipeline, Trade

AU2904111696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 29 Apr 96 p 9

[Interview with Yeoryios Dudumis, Greek ambassador to Bulgaria, by Yordan Yordanov and Evgeniy Tatarov; place and date not given: "Burgas-Alexandroupolis Puts an End to the Monopoly on Oil Transportation Through the Bosporus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [STANDART NEWS] Mr. Dudumis, what do you think is the importance of the Novorossiysk-Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline?

[Dudumis] The oil pipeline is 275-km long, and the construction will cost $650 million. Its full capacity is 30 million metric tons per year. This will put an end to the monopoly on transporting oil through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, while the Aegean port of Alexandroupolis will become a "huge oil tank" for the Mediterranean countries. The project will link Bulgaria and Greece in a uniform energy space.

[STANDART NEWS] How do you assess economic relations between Bulgaria and Greece?

[Dudumis] I must definitely say that I am an optimist. Some five years ago, Greece's exports to Bulgaria

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hardly exceeded $50 million. Now this figure is 10 times greater. The Bulgarian export for Greece is also developing, albeit not at the same pace. Now it stands at $400 million.

[STANDART NEWS] What is the structure of the mutual trade exchange?

[Dudumis] It is difficult to enumerate the long list of goods we exchange. Generally, the list includes foodstuffs, citrus fruit, concentrates, paints, ready-made clothes, and car spare parts. We import mainly raw materials—metals and timber. More than 600 Greek companies are active in Bulgaria, and this number will grow. Indeed, your country is a unique economic bridge between Greece on the one part, and central Europe, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia on the other. More than 11 percent of the foreign investments in your country come from Greece.

[STANDART NEWS] What other forms of economic cooperation between Bulgaria and Greece do you see?

[Dudumis] The organization of "Greek weeks" in Bulgaria, participation in Plovdiv's spring fairs, and the working meetings with businessmen in Varna require special attention. Remarkable results have indeed been achieved in the area of tourism. Every third or fourth tourist who visits your country comes from Greece. About 3,500 Greek students are studying at the Universities of Sofia, Plovdiv, and Varna. On the other hand, Greece, with its rich historical past, offers broad opportunities for Bulgarian tourists.

Bulgaria: FRY Envoy Says Relations 'Developing Well'

AU2904083896 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 27 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with Yugoslav Ambassador Rados Smiljkovic by Ventseslav Karaivanov; place and date not given: "DUMA Interviews Yugoslav Ambassador Professor Rados Smiljkovic"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Karaivanov] Have you already noted changes in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations since the recent visit of Prime Minister Videnov to Belgrade and Podgorica and the restoral of the level of our diplomatic missions? Could we expect a high-level Yugoslav delegation soon?

[Smiljkovic] The exchange of delegations in both directions intensified after the recent visit of Prime Minister Videnov to Yugoslavia. This gave an impetus to developing cooperation between our nations. To our, and I also think, your, satisfaction, our relations are developing well. Our relations are contributing to developing a positive atmosphere in the Balkans and southeastern Europe. Yugoslavia is supporting Bulgaria's Balkan cooperation initiative and the initiative on holding a meeting of the Balkan states' foreign ministers. As far as our diplomatic relations are concerned, I would like to stress that they were very good even during the period of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, despite the fact that our countries' charges d'affaires acted only within the framework of the possibilities and the reality that was imposed on us.

As far as high-level visits are concerned, such visits always are welcome between two friendly and neighboring states because they strengthen the processes of good relations and cooperation. Now we are preparing for the visit of our Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic to Bulgaria. The visit will take place prior to the meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers.

[Karaivanov] Could we expect positive changes in economic and cultural cooperation, greater freedom of movement between the two states, and decreasing road and border taxes after the intensified exchange of delegations at various levels?

[Smiljkovic] Those are topical issues that are being resolved now. After Videnov's visit, and even earlier after the visit of our Prime Minister Kontic, actions were initiated leading toward improving economic cooperation and beginning talks on creating mixed enterprises. It is in this context that the talks on opening new border checkpoints must be viewed. We view the Bulgarian national minority in Yugoslavia as a bridge between our nations. Now we must implement what has been decided at the highest level. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Efforts To Restore Lost Markets in Russia

AU2904104796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 29 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Rumyana Emanuilidu: "It Is Difficult To Restore Lost Markets in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The press in St. Petersburg described the "Bulgaria in Russia" Days in the city as the greatest Bulgarian action in recent years along the banks of the Neva River. The Bulgarian organizers in the other 10 cities where the "Bulgaria in Russia" Days are taking place hope for the same success.

A willingness to restore mutual contacts was expressed during visits to St. Petersburg municipal and oblast administrations and at roundtables with businessmen and public figures.

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The Bulgarian delegation included Environment Minister Georgi Georgiev; Zakhari Zakhariev, chairman of the Federation for Friendship With the People's of Russia and the CIS; Vladimir Kurpachev, deputy minister of trade and foreign economic cooperation; Mariya Lazarova, deputy minister of agriculture and food industry, and others.

It is difficult to restore markets after you have turned your back on them, said Minister Georgiev, summarizing the results of the visit. In the last five years, we have lost markets in which other companies and producers have set foot. The Bulgarian goods used to enjoy a good reputation in Russia, a country with which we are linked by traditional and fraternal feelings. Now, our relations will be placed on a completely new foundation of equality and economic interest, Minister Georgiev said.

Bulgaria: Finance Minister Says Budget Needs Correction

AU3004121396 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 1

[Interview with Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov by Todor Varchev; place and date not given: "Dimitur Kostov: So Far No One Has Requested My Resignation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Varchev] Minister, how do you view the claims that your resignation has been requested?

[Kostov] You know the popular saying—every minister has his resignation in his pocket. I have carried it with me from my first day in office. So far no one has criticized me openly and clearly.

[Varchev] Usually, finance ministers are asked to resign for failing to implement the budget. If you fail in this respect, are you prepared to resign without being asked first?

[Kostov] It depends on what you understand by a "failure." For me, a failure means a deficit our economy cannot live with. The problem at present is that the deficit of the losing enterprises is greater than the shortage in our national treasury. Not everything is thus under the control of the budget. I therefore think that changes in the budget are necessary as a price we must pay for cutting the deficit in the real sector.

[Varchev] At what figure are you prepared to admit that the budget has cracked?

[Kostov] I know precisely the figure, but I prefer to keep it secret.

[Varchev] Prime Minister Videnov says that the 1996 budget will not be changed. Do you share his opinion?

[Kostov] If we want to accelerate the structural reform, we must make certain corrections. As far as the macroeconomy is concerned, for the time being we are analyzing various things, and later we will understand whether changes must be put into effect there.

[Varchev] What happens with the special group on implementing and controlling the strategic plan?

[Kostov] This is not a special group, but rather people from the government and other departments. Indeed, the work on those problems has never stopped.

[Varchev] Mr. Videnov claims that the current basic interest is too high, and that pressure must be applied on the Bulgarian National Bank to reduce it.

[Kostov] As I understand this statement, we are not going to call the National Bank and tell the people there to "reduce the interest," but rather try to do everything possible to tighten financial discipline in the enterprises.

Bulgaria: Defense Plant Chief Views Union Pay Demands

AU3004130196 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 30 Apr 96 p 8

[Interview with Ivan Gunchev, president of Metalchim Holdings, by Svetlana Popova; place and date not given: "The Trade Unions Are Forcing Us To Shed Jobs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Popova] Mr. Gunchev, you recently held five consultative meetings with the trade union in the Sopot defense plants. In Sofia, the union leaders continue to talk about a strike in the defense industry sector, while last night negotiations were going on in your office. What is actually happening in the plants that you control?

[Gunchev] Of our 13,000 workers, some may be on strike, but others are still working so that the VMZ [Military Engineering Plants, controlled by Metalchim Holdings] will not shut down. We have no backlog in our wage payments. Now some of the unions that are represented in our plants (there are five of them in all) want a new collective labor contract. They are demanding a 40-percent pay rise over the 1995 rates, while we expect our sales volume to rise by only 7 percent. In this way, they are definitely forcing us to violate the state regulation concerning the relationship between profits and wages. If we accept their demands, we will have to pay tens of millions of leva into the state budget as a fine. As a result, we will be unable to develop our house-building program, the education grants for our staff, and the mechanisms through which we help those of our workers who are socially deprived. VMZ is one of the few structures that allowed itself to

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do such things because we are continuing to do a decent job selling our products.

[Popova] However, the unions' demands are connected with inflation.

[Gunchev] Since December last year, we have raised the average monthly wages at our plants by 20 percent. According to the company auditors' report, last year our sales rose 8 percent as compared with the previous year. The minimum wage at VMZ is now 4,800 leva, as compared with 3,000 leva for the country as a whole. The average monthly pay in our company is 9,100 leva. In this situation, the unions now demand a further rise of 40 percent from 1 April, which we cannot accept. The demand shows a lack of economic logic in the management of the wages funds.

[Popova] People accuse you of not wanting to negotiate.

[Gunchev] You contradict yourself. You just said that we have had five consultative meetings with the trade unions. As regards the statements by the trade union leaders in Sofia, I will tell you that soon one of them will recommend the following social mechanism: You dismiss 4,000 or 5,000 workers, then raise the wages of those left to 18,000-20,000 leva. I suggested to him that he should make a recommendation in writing on behalf of his trade union, which is the one with the most members, but I do not know how many of my workers will really support such logic. Our proposal is to agree to compensate wages every three months in line with the inflation figures announced by the National Statistical Institute.

[Popova] Against the background of the situation at Arsenal, where workers are already being sent on compulsory leave and some of the trade unions even accept this, so as to prevent redundancies and plant closures, your assertion that you are managing to market your production is extremely interesting.

[Gunchev] I will tell you that last year, our exports rose by 1.3 billion leva as compared with 1994. What is happening in the Bulgarian arms industry is largely inspired by the interests of foreign competitors. A ship with a cargo of Bulgarian weapons has been detained in the Suez Canal for eight months now because Madeleine Albright, the U.S. representative at the United Nations, has plunged us into another fabricated scandal regarding exports to an embargo country. The truth is that the cargo was consigned to Kuwait, but Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have to pay $26 million for an old delivery, and the issue boils down to who will collect the money from the Kuwaitis first. Up to last year, we exported light weapons to one of our traditional customers, to whom we used to sell $40-50 million of our products every year. Since 1 January this year, we have been driven out of his market. The Bulgarian president's advisers recently warned us that that another similar incident lies ahead....

[Popova] In the last two weeks, people have again started talking about closing down Metalchim Holdings. You managed the group for a long time, then were dismissed, but now you have been put back in charge. Why is someone always putting forward ideas for converting the firm?

[Gunchev] Since 1991, all kinds of politicians have either made proposals to close down the holding company or suggested various restructuring schemes. Filip Dimitrov and ex-Minister Rumen Bikov had the strongest views on the issue. It is not for me to say what has happened to similar structures in other branches of industry, but you can see that Pharmachim is now being restored, for example. The merger between a group of technologically interdependent producers and a foreign trade organization makes the unit a partner of equal standing in the eyes of potential investors in the privatization process. Look at the cases of Topenergy and the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company: Only by combining the assets is it possible for the state to preserve our national priorities, while allowing the entry of foreign interests due to the need for fresh money. In a poor country, you have to combine capital assets as much as possible so as to retain at least a blocking quote of shares against the foreign presence. This is the logic of the prospects lying ahead for Metalchim Holdings. As for what will happen to it, I cannot tell you, because in our state everything is possible, as I have found out by personal experience.

[Popova] Informed persons claim that at his meeting with the chiefs of the arms plants in Lyaskovets, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev recommended that each should try to save his own skin.

[Gunchev] I was at this meeting. In one way or another, the Industry Ministry acted as the middleman for the military plants in obtaining loans from the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development. However, one cannot always be asking for things from the state. For this reason, representatives of four commercial organizations also attended the meeting. The minister's recommendation was to do everything possible to promote constructive contacts between producers and traders, because the latter are the people who can really help us to market our products. The state's role is to guarantee the normal background for marketing our products and to define the rules of the game. Everything else lies in our hands.

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[Popova] It is asserted that, despite the crisis in the arms industry, the minister was in a particularly cheerful mood at the meeting.

[Gunchev] He simply showed that he knows how to handle the goods that the arms plants produce. All of us who were at the meeting fired automatic weapons and pistols at a miniature shooting range that had been set up inside a truck parked outside the fuse manufacturing plant in Lyaskovets.

Bulgaria: Energy Official Denies Belene Being Built

AU2404153996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Apr 96 p 6

[Interview with Plamen Denchev, chairman of National Assembly Commission on Power Supply, by Angel Bonev; place and date not given: "I Do Not Accept Self-Seeking Statements Regarding the Belene Nuclear Power Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Bonev] Has the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant been resumed, as highranking power supply officials reported recently?

[Denchev] Those are the personal opinions of individual leaders of the Committee on Power Supply. A nuclear power plant is constructed on the basis of a decision of the government, approved by parliament. This is so because the construction is linked not only to the power supply sector, but also to the entire economic system and our national security. The construction of a nuclear power plant requires huge capital investment, whose return must be guaranteed.

[Bonev] Does our country have the necessary means?

[Denchev] At present, we do not have so much money. We will need foreign loans and the World Bank and the Eurobank are not inclined to finance the construction of nuclear power plants. However, there are international companies prepared to invest in the construction of nuclear power plants in the developing countries and in the East European countries that are conducting reforms.

[Bonev] It has been said that Russian trade organizations are already offering money for the construction of Belene.

[Denchev] Every loan represents a financial commitment. No one gives so much money without a guaranteed return.

[Bonev] Is it justified to sink so much money in the construction of the controversial 1,000-megawatt reactor?

[Denchev] We already have two 1,000-megawatt reactors and our power supply system does not need a third such reactor, because the load on our power supply system during the summer is only 3-4,000 megawatts. We cannot guarantee the full utilization of such a capacity and, when a nuclear power plant produces less than 5-6,000 kilowatt/hours of energy per year, it is simply not efficient.

[Bonev] Then how do you explain the stubborn insistence of the power supply officials, who demand that construction resumes of Belene's 1,000-megawatt reactor?

[Denchev] They think that after five or six years, which is a short term for a power supply system, our economy could require additional capacities. It is normal to construct the Belene Nuclear Power Plant, because in four or five years the first two reactors of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant will be shut down and it is prudent to replace them with a new reactor. The question is what reactor it should be. The most recent studies carried out by leading companies show that it is expedient to construct a 600-megawatt reactor with facilities for controlling the loading that are not available at Kozloduy. At present, we need full information on what is available in the world. Russia and the United states are leading states in this respect. We should not relinquish abandon cooperation with Russia, but let us also utilize the experience of other developed states. However, in any event the final decision on the construction of the Belene Nuclear Power Plant must be made by the government on the basis of a very serious analysis. Therefore, I do not accept the self-seeking statements of certain leaders of the Committee on Power Supply, which sound like a decision of their department.

[Bonev] They claim that they are supported by the members of the Power Supply Commission.

[Denchev] We support the government's power supply policy, but it has been pointed out there that Belene will be constructed after 2005. We may need this power plant even earlier. However, at present the National Assembly Commission on Power Supply supports the cabinet's concept, namely, to give priority to the development of "Maritsa-East." The government's power supply policy is prudent and well balanced, and it does not create a conflict between power produced by coal and power produced by nuclear fuel. This policy must be implemented, particularly in anything related to investment.

[Bonev] What is the most important thing now?

[Denchev] This year, we must clarify the problems of Kozloduy's first reactor: How much longer it will function; under what conditions; and what means are

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necessary. This reactor must not remain outside our country's energy balance next winter. If we do not solve its problems this year, next year we will have on top of the first reactor also the second, and then the third and the fourth. It is very difficult to break such a vicious circle. It is no accident that, despite the financial difficulties, the budget allocates 900 million leva for the reconstruction of Kozloduy's first four reactors.

[Bonev] Our power supply system needs not only money but also laws.

[Denchev] Unfortunately, the Power Supply Draft Bill has not yet been passed, but we expect it to enter the National Assembly hall this summer, together with the Power Supply Efficiency Bill. Next week, we will be organizing a seminar with the Committee on Power Supply and the German Agency on Nuclear Legislation. The goal is to prepare two important draft bills, which will allow the sector to function under market economy conditions.

Bulgaria: Energy Official Excludes Importing Electricity

AU2504130196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 25 Apr 96 p 16

[Interview with Rumen Ovcharov, deputy chairman of the Energy Industry Committee, by Irina Kuneva; place and date not given: "We Have Not Reached the Point of Having To Import Electricity From Romania and Greece"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kuneva] Mr. Ovcharov, does a plot exist against the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant? The Greek newspapers have been saying that a new European attack on our nuclear plant is expected, while Greenpeace members in Greece have been demanding that it be closed down because it is dangerous.

[Ovcharov] Certain circles in some countries may have economic interests that they want to force through at our expense, but there are no grounds for speaking of an EU campaign at the political level. We are about to sign a memorandum of understanding with the European Commission that will finally settle the problems of the No. 1 Reactor Unit at Kozloduy. I do not see why a new campaign is being whipped up against the Bulgarian nuclear energy industry at such a juncture. As for the operation of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, our own position is clear. We are not considering shutting down its reactors.

[Kuneva] Last week, the Italian company Ansaldo, which is a partner in the construction of Romania's Cernavoda Nuclear Plant, and Greece, which intends to build a gas-fired power station near our border, offered to export electricity to us if we closed down Kozloduy. Are these offers serious?

[Ovcharov] We have not reached the point of having to import electricity from Romania and Greece. I cannot imagine that the Italian Ansaldo company seriously thinks that we will buy electricity from Romania. Last year, Romania had a 1,000-megawatt shortfall in electricity. The situation there cannot be compared to the position in Bulgaria. Their next reactor units are at such an early stage of construction that they will not be commissioned before the end of the century.

As for the construction of the Greek gas-fired power station, we first have to see how Greece will get the Russian gas needed for it. In any event, this gas will pass through Bulgaria. It is ridiculous to link the building of the Greek gas-fired plant with an attack against the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant.

[Kuneva] Is there any competition in the energy industry between Bulgaria and Greece? Athens is making preparations to become a distributor of Russian gas in the Balkans.

[Ovcharov] The strategy of Topenergy and Bulgargaz regarding gas distribution in the Balkans has already been defined. Does it not provide for the gas distribution network to pass through Bulgaria? This decision may not be to the liking of certain individuals and groups with different economic interests, but state policy is another matter altogether. The project is bound up with very large investments and the most advantageous version is being adopted. Apart from this, a Greek representative attended the talks and approved the setting up of a Balkan energy center in Bulgaria.

[Kuneva] How will you ensure our energy balance if the No. 1 Reactor Unit has to shut down, while electricity demand continues to rise?

[Ovcharov] The Energy Industry Committee is able to respond to a big jump in consumption. First, we will solve the problem of the No. 1 Reactor. The results of the analyses completed to date are very good and I hope that the reactor will be in operation this winter. We will certainly rely on the Varna Thermoelectric Power Plant and the other power stations that use imported coal. In addition, we have a five-year contract on importing electricity from Russia. During the winter, at the time of the miners' strike, when we had a shortage, we imported Russian electricity for 2.75 cents per kilowatt-hour. There is no other such market. Even if we have to import electricity, we will not pay 5 cents per kilowatt-hour for electricity from a gas-fired plant that in any case is just a pipe dream at the moment. We have no problems in meeting our electricity demand.

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[Kuneva] Is it possible that the EU may use its financial muscle to force us to close down reactors at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant?

[Ovcharov] The amounts of money that we receive from the EU are in no way sufficient to exert such pressure. Under the PHARE [Economic and Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program we are receiving about ECU 10 million per year, not billions for research. Last year, the memorandum concerning Bulgaria was suspended following the G-7's demarche against Kozloduy's No. 1 Reactor. They were supposed to give us ECU 7 million. However, the memorandum will be signed in the near future and we will receive this money, plus ECU 10 million in additional aid for completing the analysis of Kozloduy's No. 1 Reactor.

[Kuneva] How much will it cost us to close down one reactor, if we have to?

[Ovcharov] It depends on which alternative we choose for closing one down. At the moment we have no intention of closing down the WWER-440 reactors [water-moderated water-cooled power reactors], so we have not made any precise estimate of the cost. In principle, however, it all depends on whether the plant will be completely closed down, to the extent of restoring the site to its original condition (a so-called "green field" site) or whether the plant is just put temporarily into mothballs. The assessment depends on the project and on which solution should be chosen. The cheapest alternative is to remove the nuclear fuel and store it in locations where there is no danger of nuclear chain reactions and to maintain the reactor unit in conditions that preclude the risk of emissions of radioactive waste. The maximum cost of this is around $200-300 million. This is about 30 percent of the cost of the installation itself.

Bulgaria: Weaknesses in Left's Agrarian Policy Revealed

AU2304123096 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 23 Apr 96 p 12

[Article by Rumyana Penkova: "Shivarov Is Replacing His Officials and Looking for Obedient Party Yes-Men"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The conflicts in the implementation of the agrarian reform between the executive and the political force that appointed it are becoming ever more obvious. Voices are being raised increasingly often in the Agriculture Ministry, alleging that faults in the drafting of the laws are halting the reform. According to National Assembly deputies, the erroneous personnel policy of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union has caused an administrative crisis in the implementation of the Left's strategy. For more than three months now, Shivarov [minister of agriculture] has been seeking out loyal fellow party members and appointing them to official posts. However, the lack of any lively link between the executive and the agricultural producers is becoming increasingly more evident. The participants in the joint meeting of the Democratic Left's leading bodies and the Agriculture Ministry leadership that was held in Sofia on 21 April decided that agriculture must guarantee the national stocks of the principal foods goods and products in 1996-97. Does this mean that someone else has been doing this until now?

The issue of returning 85 percent of the farmland to its owners by December 1996 was somehow relegated to the background. This is due to the fact that agriculture boss Shivarov rather overreached himself when he asserted that he would return the whole of the farmland, except for the villa zones, to the owners before the year's end. Other important problems to be addressed this year are privatization, the creation of conditions for raising the incomes of the agricultural producers, and improving living standards in the countryside.

At the expanded plenum on 21 April, no one ever mentioned a word about the fact that one-tenth of spring crops have not been sown, although the time doing so is long past. No one mentioned that not a single bank is offering credits for the risky agricultural production, that the flour mills are shutting down, and the price of bread continues to rise.

The Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry showed the participants some programs for developing agriculture and the food industry in 1996 and for restoring the ownership of farmland, despite the fact that the government failed to approve them at the end of last week. The party forum instructed Minister Shivarov to bring his directives into line with party requirements.

The agriculture minister admitted that BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] activists are imposing outdated concepts in the administration of agriculture. In the minister's view, agriculture is in deep crisis; it is in a catastrophic condition. However, this situation was not due to the government's inaction and the stalling of the reform during the last 14 months of the Left's administration, but resulted from the hopeless policy followed from 1992 to 1994, when the SDS [Union of Democratic Froces] was implementing its anti-Bulgarian and decadent pseudo-policies.

Compared with 1990, last year overall agricultural production fell by 32.5 percent; the cattle herds declined by 57 percent, poultry by 38 percent, milk production by 44 percent, grain production by 38 percent, and

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industrial crops by 48 percent. Thousands of farm workers are unemployed.

According to Shivarov, last year money grants were made to agricultural producers for the first time. The Agriculture Fund distributed 2.5 billion leva for 8.92 million decares of wheat crops.

Shivarov has issued a directive transforming the Zhitomel enterprise into the Cereal Products Company, merging into its structure two agricultural bases in Veliko Turnovo and Stara Zagora, some of the large Bulgarian flour mills, the grain and animal feed inspectorate, and certain other state stores and grain companies.

We will combat speculation and trading swindles by passing the grain act, the agriculture minister assured his audience. However, no such law exists; it has not even been drafted yet.

According to Shivarov, the Democratic Left administration has lost control of the administration of agriculture. For this reason, a new Financial Control Department is being formed at the Agriculture Ministry. Shivarov is prohibiting deputy ministers and department chiefs from joining the boards of state and private companies. He said that 14 unprofitable enterprises will be put into liquidation in the first instance, and others will follow.

In the Left's view land ownership is neither the most important nor the most decisive element for farming. However, 30 percent of farm land is uncultivated. In the Left's opinion, land reallotment and support of the cooperatives are priority tasks. The system of administration is being expanded to implement the agrarian strategy. The oblast agricultural services are being reorganized into departments, each with 10 officials. After this, 18 new regional services will be set up, each consisting of four officials, followed by municipal agricultural services. The existing land commissions will be subordinated to the latter.

Some 684,000 persons earn their livings in agriculture, over 49 percent of whom are engaged in production. The executive continues to announce findings on the subject of agriculture, but waits for someone else to do the work.

Boncho Rashkov, chairman of the Parliamentary Agricultural Commission, said that confidence in the Left has been severely shaken and that people harbor doubts, believing that the government lacks the political will to apply the agrarian reform and fulfill its promises.

The rate of restitution of titles to farmland is not satisfactory, in Rashkov's view. He said that the May 1995 amendments to the Land Act were confused, especially as regards voluntary divisions of land, an area in which there is an eight-month backlog. In his view, the elimination of the liquidation councils was a correct step, but it has led to fresh chaos in the villages and allowed criminal liquidators to escape scot-free.

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Czech Republic: Havel on Russia's Opposition to NATO Growth

BR3004143796 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 30 Apr 96 p 13

[Article by Czech President Vaclav Havel: "The West and NATO's Crisis With Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is known only too well that Russia has been intensifying its disapproval of NATO's enlargement. Just a few years ago, Russia was not opposed to the idea of enlargement because it was aware that, if the alliance approached its borders, it would bring closer to it an area of stability and democracy that would benefit it as well. What has happened since that time?

An important answer to that question is the fact that, when it came to considering this issue, the West showed some hesitation or indecision. In Russia, many people interpreted this hesitation as acknowledgment of a remnant of the Iron Curtain, as reluctance to enter a territory that until recently was Russian-dominated, and as an indirect indication that Russia's interests in this territory could still be legitimate. The Russians wonder why they should not demand their rights if they believe that they see signs of acceptance that those rights exist. Hence, it is not just a matter of the West hesitating out of fear of arousing Russia's disapproval. It also works the other way around: Russia's disapproval is encouraged by the West's hesitation.

The origin of those two interpretations is the same: the unacknowledged or unconscious remnants of the Cold War mentality—that is, thinking in terms of the big powers' spheres of influence. That implies an absolute lack of understanding of the new situation and its challenges. The West represents no threat to Russia; hence, Russia has nothing to fear. Russia represents no threat to the West, so neither does the West have cause for concern. It is simply necessary to say quite clearly and unambiguously that NATO is a regional grouping of those who deem themselves a part of the world and its values, interested in cooperating with other parts for the good of world peace.

For its part, Russia is a vast Eurasian power with enormous power of attraction. It has a right to maintain its identity and to create regional links, something it is already doing right now. The West's policy with respect to Russia and Russia's policy with respect to the West should be based on the idea of a good association between those two great entities. That would not isolate Russia from Europe but quite the contrary.

A really genuine and friendly coexistence between Russia and an increasingly integrated Europe is possible and conceivable only if both partners know and respect their respective identities, pursue values that unite them, and try to deepen their relationship on this basis. I occasionally hear questions about whether this state or that should belong to the West or the East. These are very misconceived questions for at least two reasons. The first is that the state in question is the one that has the right to decide where it belongs and to do so in practice through its political conduct—for instance, by choosing whether it will try to join NATO or the Commonwealth of Independent States, or to seek good relations with both organizations without joining either of them. Nobody has a right to say to which class a state should belong without taking that state's opinion into account.

The second reason these questions are misconceived is a matter of tone because they seem to imply tacitly that the West is of a better class than the East and that what must be decided is who can join the better and who will stay in the other. This perception is again a path that leads nowhere. Nobody is worse or better by nature. We are simply different in different ways.

Latin America, which is increasingly moving toward integration, the ASEAN countries, China, the Near East, the NATO countries, Russia, and other post-Soviet states that want strong security, political, and economic links to the Russian Federation—all of these different regions, because of common interest and in the spirit of certain universal values, should work together on the basis of equality. In that cooperation, nobody should be considered better than the others, nobody should have any reason to suspect that the others have bad intentions, and nobody should claim the right to decide for others who should be allowed to join one structure or another and who should not.

The best alternative for civilization's future development is the emergence and consolidation of these broader regional groupings and cooperation between them. That is the only way to combine the two contradictory tendencies existing in our civilization—on the one hand, the pressure of progressive uniformity and, on the other, the desire of several smaller worlds to preserve their identity.

If the world is going to follow this path, the individual groupings must have a clear idea of what they are, how they define themselves, and where their borders lie. Confused entities lacking a clear definition can hardly become involved in creative cooperation with other entities. Rather, they have a tendency toward disputes. Only those that know their identity and respect it can also respect different identities.

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As long as one sphere of our civilization regards other spheres as their opponents, enemies, or rivals, as inferiors or as threats to it, or simply as entities whose influence should be under control to strengthen its own influence, we will achieve nothing good. The variety of negative alternatives that could result from this approach is quite extensive: They range from the possibility of the worldwide Cold War's being replaced by many cold wars between different parts of the world to the worst course of all, that which the experts on politics would call a conflict of civilizations. The bipolar division of the world belongs to the past. We are unmistakably entering a multipolar world and should build it responsibly as such.

Czech Republic: Comment: Joining NATO Will Warm Relations With Russia

AU3004182296 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 29 Apr 96 p 6

[Commentary by Lubos Palata: "Joining NATO Will Improve Prague's Relations With Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NATO's expansion eastward could warm up the currently cool relations between the Central European states and the Russian Federation.

The not very favorable attitude toward Moscow stems mostly from insecurity among the population of the postcommunist countries due to a feeling that there is a lack of security guarantees and the fear of a possible reversal of past developments. Russia's opposition to NATO expansion and the occasional threats of reprisals are to a certain degrere counterproductive because they strengthen the case of those who claim that the Kremlin has not completely given up its imperialist tendencies. Some governments of countries hoping to join NATO could use Russian threats or threats of chaos in the East in general as arguments for rapid NATO expansion.

This is not the case with Czech foreign policy, which emphasizes, above all, its part in the democratic world, as well as in defending the values of European civilization. Nevertheless, joining NATO should bring about a positive change, even in relations between Prague and Moscow.

The Czech authorities are now concentrating on firmly anchoring themselves in North Atlantic structures; almost anything else is considered a division of forces and means. Close and "overfriendly" relations with Russia are even understood as a threat to the most essential national interests. NATO membership would ease relations with the East and allow the weathervane of relations that previously pointed to the West to move a little more toward Moscow.

The geopolitical position of the new members will also change upon entry. They are trying to become border countries within NATO, largely irrespective of whether it worsens relations with Russia. Upon entry, however, their main interest will be, like Germany today, in not remaining on an unstable border of a stable Europe. Therefore, these countries will be hoping to create a situation in which they will not be on a hostile border but rather one of conflict-free cooperation. Therefore, the new member countries will try to develop the best possible relations with their eastern neighbors, which includes the Russian Federation. The view of Russia's internal situation will also change. Upon joining NATO, the new member countries will have a vital interest in peaceful and progressive developments in Russia, just as the EU countries have. It is precisely from these countries that Moscow can expect pressure for continuing assistance.

The psychological level should not be forgotten when ordinary people's perceptions of Russia rid themselves of the legacy of the Soviet occupation. This will free the hands of those forces that feel a certain empathy toward the Russians, which, in the Czech case, are also found within the right-wing parties, even though electoral considerations and the general atmosphere force them to curb their expressions of fellowship.

The strained relations between the Central Europeans and Moscow will also change when they, having a better understanding of the situation there, show less tolerance and kindness than the West, which is less qualified to understand Russia today.

For all of these reasons, the admission of the Central European countries to NATO should not threaten Moscow with an increased number of adversaries but, rather, can provide it with many new, better inclined partners.

Czech Republic: Parliament Passes Law on Access to Former StB Files

AU3004124796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by Andrea Kabelova and Sabina Slonkova: "People Will Be Able To Find Out Who Informed on Them"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—As of December, people will have the opportunity to examine—for a small fee—the files of the former State Security [StB] and will thus be able to find out who informed on them under the former regime. According to the law on opening the files of the former communist secret police, which the Chamber of Deputies approved yesterday following arguments lasting several years, people will also find out the names of the StB officers who monitored them.

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"I am pleased that this law provides the last symbolic full stop to the electoral term; it is directed most of all toward the moral cleansing of society," said Oldrich Kuzilek (Civic Democratic Alliance), deputy chairman of the Defense and Security Committee. Anyone who was a citizen of the Czech Republic or the former Czechoslovakia at any time between 1948 and 1990 can request the Interior Ministry to examine a file.

People will be able to copy their files and show them to anyone. "However, personal details on other people—that is, for example, details on their private and family life, health, property, and criminal activity—will be blacked out in the document," explained Kuzilek.

The deputies also decided that survivors will not discover from the StB documents extremely private information about their dead relatives. "We did not want, for example, children to find out what the State Security was rummaging about for in their father's private life," declared Kuzilek.

The Interior Ministry reckons that 60,000 people could examine their files. However, it will not be possible to accommodate the same number because their files no longer exist.

Making the StB's files accessible will cost the state roughly 15 million korunas—namely, the Interior Ministry will have to develop an information system for the files of the former communist police in which the documents will be registered. It will also be necessary to establish a new office at the ministry to expedite the citizens' requests.

At the same time, however, the ministry is concerned that, following the approval of the new legal norm, the number of screenings disputes, which, so far, the department has mostly lost, will increase. That is, people will discover the names of the StB collaborators and officers, and they may then seek a court ruling that they had nothing to do with the communist secret police. At the same time, the Interior Ministry will vouch for the veracity of the material. "It is to be expected that the law will provoke further legal disputes. The courts are only willing in a few cases to accept the copy of a file as reliable evidence. Of course, there are virtually no originals because the files were transferred onto microfiche," said Jan Ruml [interior minister] previously.

Czech Republic: Parliament Approves Amendment to Citizenship Law

AU3004130396 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(nak)" and CTK: "The Chamber Has Abolished the Condition of a Five-Year Clean Record for Acquiring Citizenship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The amendment to the law on acquiring and relinquishing state citizenship, which the Chamber of Deputies approved yesterday, will enable the Interior Ministry to exempt from the condition of having to have a clean criminal record for a period of five years those Slovak citizens who have been living in the Republic permanently since the end of 1992 and who are applying for Czech citizenship.

The original version of the law, which prescribed a clean criminal record, had been described by some humanitarian organizations as racist, and the U.S. Congress's Helsinki Commission had also protested against it.

The draft amendment had envisaged originally that the ministry could only exempt from the condition of a five-year clean record those Slovak applicants for citizenship who had not been expelled [from the country] or sentenced to imprisonment for more than two years. After the draft was discussed in the parliamentary committees, however, this restriction was deleted.

The amendment also abolishes the possibility of a person renouncing his citizenship without having obtained different citizenship. At the same time, acquiring different citizenship means automatically forfeiting Czech citizenship.

Only four deputies from the Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Center and Gerta Mazalova (nonaligned) voted against the adoption of the amendment. It was supported by 130 of the 136 deputies present.

Czech Republic: Parliament Approves Amendment to Refugees Law

AU3004152696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(nak)": "Refugees Are To Have a Guarantee That They Will Not Forfeit Their Statute in Five Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Refugees who have been granted this statute by the Czech authorities are to have a guarantee that they will not forfeit this status after five years. Namely, the deputies yesterday approved a draft amendment to the law on refugees that had been criticized by humanitarian organizations because of the five-year deadline and deleted from it the stipulation of a time limit.

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Moreover, the inconsistency with the international Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees, which states unequivocally that a time limit for the statute is impossible, has been eradicated by the amendment to the law. The Chamber also expanded the stipulation according to which refugees have a right to health insurance and social security by the right to acquire Czech state citizenship under legal conditions.

The Chamber of Deputies also approved an amendment to the law on the residence of foreigners that extends the authority of the Foreign Nationals Police Office. It will be able, for example, to take and keep a record of the fingerprints of a foreigner who has been prohibited from residing in the country. Moreover, foreigners will have to report the loss or theft of their passports so that the police can keep an up-to-date record. The plenum also supported a proposal ensuring that children who are entrusted to foster or institutional care can acquire permanent residence in the Republic. This is intended, in particular, to deal with the situation of the so-called children from the E-55 highway.

Czech Republic: Communists Triumph in Last Test Before Election

AU3004154996 Prague PRAVO in Czech 29 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "(ke, SR)": "The KSCM Has Won in Blansko Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Blansko—The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] won Saturday's [27 April] extraordinary local elections in Blansko when it gained seven of the 25 mandates. It has thus repeated its success of the fall of 1994, when it also won seven seats in the local representative body.

According to the election commission, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] won four seats; the Czech Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party each won three; the Civic Democratic Alliance and the independents each won two; and the Pensioners for a Secure Life, the Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia-Moravian National Party, the Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party, and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia each won one seat.

The Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Center did not get into the representative body. Former Mayor Bohuslav Fic (ODS) was not elected. Fifty-nine percent of the electorate took part.

Independents won in the other six local elections held in the Czech Republic.

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Slovakia: Solana Says No Country 'Ruled Out' From NATO

LD3004180996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has concluded his official visit to Slovakia today by attending a news conference. [passage omitted]

Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk was also present at the news conference with Javier Solana. Jan Baranek reports:

[Begin recording] [Baranek] At the opening of the news conference, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana thanked Slovak President Michal Kovac, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, and Parliament Speaker Ivan Gasparovic for open talks. [passage omitted]

Solana then went on to say:

[Solana, in English fading into superimposed Slovak translation] I would like to say that your country's Sappers Battallion has done a great job first in Bosnia and now in Slavonia, and we will never forget this.

We are finding ourselves in a very important time when the security structures on our continent are being stabilized. In 1996 we have begun an individualized dialogue with individual partners. This dialogue should clarify some issues between individual countries, in this case between your country and NATO. I would like to say that we will help you as best we can within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program. I would also like to thank you for your participation in this program.

The year 1996 will be used for an exchange of views also on the activity of the North Atlantic alliance in the whole process of coming together.

I would like to thank you again for your participation in the Partnership for Peace. I have said this to the president, prime minister, and other ministers. Without Partnership for Peace, the cooperation of the countries participating in the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be possible.

[Baranek] Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk said about Javier Solana's visit to Slovakia:

[Schenk] After my talks with Javier Solana, as well as after the talks he had with other officials, we can express our great satisfaction with the course of the talks, which were very matter-of-fact, very constructive, and dealt with very real issues of Slovakia's getting closer to one of its main priorities—its membership of NATO.

Let me express my (?deep) conviction that this dialogue of ours and our very constructive cooperation will continue also in the future so that we, the Slovak Republic, could achieve this priority of ours in a foreseeable future.

[Baranek] After that, the two officials, particularly Javier Solana, answered journalists' questions. Asked what he would recommend to our officials so that they could get rid of the feeling that we are an underrated country in the process of integration into the alliance, Javier Solana replied:

[Solana] NATO is a democratic organization. It associates countries that respect democratic values, the values of respecting human rights, that respect differences between ethnic minorities. All these values are the fundamental values of their cultures. From the very beginning, NATO's aim was to associate countries that respect these values. At this moment, no country from among the candidates for NATO membership has been excluded. No country has been ruled out and no country has been ruled in.

[Baranek] Javier Solana went on to say that all 16 member countries of the Alliance would decide and vote on each candidate for NATO membership.

Asked about the possibility of deploying nuclear arms on the territory of central and eastern Europe, the NATO secretary general said that at the moment there was no agreement that there should be any weapons of mass destruction deployed in these countries.

Asked about the chances of Slovakia and other countries of being admitted to NATO, Javier Solana replied that a more concrete answer might be known at the end of the year.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has today ended his official visit to the Slovak Republic. He left Bratislava in the afternoon. [end recording]

Slovakia: Solana Promises More on NATO Admission at End of 1996

LD3004193196 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Shortly before his departure, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana granted an exclusive interview to Slovak Television.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Secretary General, democracy and political stability will be the main conditions for admitting new members to NATO. How do you evaluate them in Slovakia after meeting our senior officials.

[Solana, in English fading into superimposed Slovak translation] I had the opportunity of talking to your senior officials. In our talks we exchanged ideas about our

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relations. Probably the most important issue concerning political stability that we talked about was how to reach an agreement between different political forces if your country wants to become part of Euro-Atlantic institutions, of NATO. For me, it was very important to hear that top Slovak officials agree on this issue.

[Correspondent] Some political parties in Slovakia are sceptical about Slovakia's membership of NATO. They talk about neutrality. Have you talked about that with Slovak officials?

[Solana] Well, I talked about many issues, but I did not hear this viewpoint during any of my official talks, neither with the president, the prime minister, members of his cabinet I met, nor among Slovak members of parliament. All of them have told me that you wanted to become part of the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

[Correspondent] In this context, is there any other realistic alternative that would guarantee Slovakia's security than membership of NATO or some other security structure?

[Solana] Well, up to this moment, your country has shown the wish to begin an individualized bilateral dialogue with the Alliance. This dialogue will continue until the end of 1996. Then we will have an evaluation of how to continue the process and what further steps should be taken. That is what I cannot tell you now. Perhaps we will have an opportunity to discuss this at the end of the year again. [end recording]

Slovakia: UK's Major Concerned About Penal Code Amendment

LD2904135996 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1200 GMT 29 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] British Prime Minister John Major sent a written reply to the letter sent to him by Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Party, concerning the amendment to the penal code.

Major writes, among other things, that the British Government welcomes ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty [by the Slovak parliament]. However, there is concern about some articles of the amendment to the penal code. John Major confirms that there is great interest by Britain and its EU partners in developments in Slovakia and expresses continuing willingness to offer our country help in the process of European integration.

Slovakia: Poll on Necessity of Screening Certificates

AU2904140696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Apr 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Iveta Geclerova: "Citizens of Slovakia About Screenings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In late March, the Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM] operating under the Slovak Statistical Office asked 1,164 citizens of Slovakia above 18 to express their opinion on whether it was necessary to issue screening certificates [concerning past collaboration with the communist secret police]. The prevalent view is that such certificates are not needed. This is the opinion of 44 percent of respondents (16 percent: rather unnecessary, 28 percent: completely superfluous). A total of 33 percent are convinced of the need to issue screening certificates (12 percent: much needed, 22 percent: rather necessary). The view that the issuing of screening certificates is unnecessary was expressed most distinctly by university graduates, 65 percent of whom hold this view, compared with 37 percent of respondents among people with only primary education.

In March 1996, Christian Democratic Movement and Democratic Party deputies submitted to the National Council the Slovak Republic the draft of a law on making accessible the files of the former StB [communist-era secret police], which should give citizens the opportunity to obtain information on the data that the StB had collected about them. This draft was endorsed by 52 percent of respondents, while 27 percent of those polled disagree with it.

Again, it is interesting to consider negative replies from the viewpoint of the respondents' level of education. Disagreement with the draft was expressed by 23 percent of respondents with primary education, 26 percent of respondents with secondary education without a high school diploma, 31 percent of respondents with secondary education with a high school diploma, and by 41 percent of university graduates.

Do you agree with making the files of the former StB accessible to the public?

Agree	37 percent
Agree more than disagree	15 percent
Disagree more than agree	11 percent
Disagree	16 percent
Not interested in the subject	21 percent

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Slovakia: New SDL Chairman on Party Situation, Future Plans

AU3004074496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 2

[Interview with newly elected SDL Chairman Jozef Migas by Martin Krno; place and date not given: "After Petty Wars, It Is Time for Real Work"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krno] Since last weekend, the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] has a new chairman, but many members of the previous Executive Committee remain. It has been observed both in the precongress debate and by the delegates at the congress that although your party has prominent personalities, their cooperation with one another leaves something to be desired. What are you planning to do to make the new leadership pull together?

[Migas] My job will be to display the managerial and political ability to unite the strong political personalities in the current leadership that have developed in the SDL over the past few years. The task is to ensure that their abilities yield joint benefits for the party rather than weaken it. I came back to Slovakia mainly to put together a team that will get the party going and prepare it properly for the elections. I am convinced that after the complicated debates of the petty war the situation will now ease somewhat. I believe that we will manage to concentrate on real work with a keen sense of responsibility, for this is the work that is the best medicine for the ailments that afflict the SDL.

[Krno] How should the image of the party, which recently lost many of its supporters and members, change under your leadership?

[Migas] I consider it of utmost importance that it demonstrates itself to be an understandable, clearly left-wing party that is aware of the kind of values it should represent. Our delegates and the foreign guests at the congress frequently emphasized that we should be an unequivocally socially oriented opposition party with an independent policy. Of course, we will also communicate with other political entities, which I consider quite normal. Regarding the left-wing spectrum, the SDL must first find its own feet so it can help other entities operating in the left-wing spectrum of the political scene in Slovakia.

[Krno] What will happen with your career as ambassador of the Slovak Republic to Ukraine?

[Migas] First of all, I must officially notify our constitutional representatives—the president, prime minister, foreign minister—as soon as possible that I have been elected SDL chairman. I will ask to be released from my diplomatic post in accordance with professional practice so I may fulfill my duty in Kiev and then return home to dedicate myself fully to work in the SDL.

Slovakia: SDL Chairman Discusses Party's Future Affiliation

AU3004073896 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 1

[Interview with newly elected SDL Chairman Jozef Migas by Ivan Rajecky and Frantisek Melis; place and date not given: "The Main Goal—Preparation for the Coming Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [PRAVDA] It has been voiced several times at the congress that the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] will practice independent politics. It will enter the elections alone, and it remains an opposition party. Does it mean that you will not return into the "corral" of the present opposition parties, and whom do you consider your closest political partner?

[Migas] The entities on the left side of the political spectrum are the ones closest to us. This means the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, the Farmers' Movement, and the Party of Greens in Slovakia. The agreements within the framework of the Common Choice remain in effect. I would like to emphasize, however, that at this stage we intend to practice clearly independent left-wing politics so the party and its name grow stronger in public awareness. We want to enter the elections on our own to be able to help other left-wing countries by our pronounced success. We do not want to operate in some bloc of opposition parties; we want to practice independent opposition politics oriented, above all, toward social problems of the workers and farmers, as well as teachers, physicians, and scholars. The present opposition bloc often focuses only on so-called burning issues like abductions, and that is not our cup of tea. We must be useful, above all, to ordinary people.

[PRAVDA] You will apparently attempt to maintain contacts with chairmen of all political entities. Are you planning to meet Vladimir Meciar, for instance, in the near future?

[Migas] We are ready for talks with all political partners. Nevertheless, we are not going to rush the party meeting with Vladimir Meciar.

First of all, as an employee of the Foreign Ministry, I must settle my work-related matters. I will visit the supreme constitutional officials and the sector minister, and ask them to release me from the post of ambassador. After my diplomatic mission is concluded, the problems of the internal work of the SDL, and the revival of its

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work will be the priority. Only then, will I consider with which political parties and when are we going to talk.

[PRAVDA] Is it detrimental to the party when its chairman is not a deputy of the National Council of the Slovak Republic?

[Migas] I believe at this time it does not harm anything. We have many tasks ahead of us, and therefore it is necessary to fully concentrate on the work within the party.

Slovakia: SDL Chairman on Joining Government Coalition

AU3004090596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 3

[Interview with newly elected SDL Chairman Jozef Migas by Pavel Kapusta; place and date not given: "We Are Not Going To Burn Bridges"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kapusta] Your unequivocal stand regarding the question of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left Party of the Democratic Left] joining the present government coalition, and that you are in favor of independent opposition politics is well known....

[Migas] The I do not consider the possibility of our party joining the government realistic. First of all, the coalition and the government are going to start the second stage of their work soon, and in just a year every political entity will look toward the approaching 1998 elections. We would have been only briefly in the government, and could possibly collect some "black marks." The SDL must not enter government coalitions thoughtlessly as it did in 1994. Another strong argument is the fact that we are not prepared in program, organization, or personnel for work in the government cabinet. Moreover, our influence is not strong enough to be able to push through our program and political goals. Of course, also within the framework of the independent left-wing policy, we are going to conduct talks and debates with other political entities from the opposition spectrum as well as from the coalition. Nevertheless, it must always be for the benefit of Slovakia. We are not going to practice any extremely confrontational politics because if trenches are dug in politics, bridges are burned.

Slovakia: New SDL Chairman To Remain Ambassador Until 1 Jul

AU3004124696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by "bog, jo": "SDL Chairman Jozef Migas Asked Juraj Schenk To Be Released from the Post of Ambassador to Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—New Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Chairman Jozef Migas met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk yesterday and asked him to be released from the post of ambassador of the Slovak Republic to Ukraine, which he has held since 1995. As Jozef Migas told SME, the minister will propose to the government that he should be released from the ambassadorial post as of 1 July 1996. Jozef Migas expects the government to meet his request. The government should then acquaint the president of the Republic with the proposal, who will recall Jozef Migas from the post. Asked what he would do if the government did not agree with his request, Jozef Migas replied: "The minister, that is, a cabinet member, will say that it is at my own request and such requests are usually granted. I have discussed the matter with Minister Schenk, who asked for my departure take place within the framework of protocol conventions, so that it is not a sudden flight."

Minister Schenk told TASR that the ministry respects Jozef Migas's decision to leave the diplomatic post, and that the relevant material will be put on the government's agenda; the government will decide the matter. According to the minister, it will also be necessary in the near future to deal intensively with the question of his successor. Juraj Schenk said that Slovakia was interested in being represented at the highest level in the neighboring country.

Slovakia: New SDL Head Registered in StB Files as Collaborator

AU3004154696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Apr 96 p 2

[Report by "bog, jo": "SDL Chairman's Name Features in List of StB Collaborators, but He Denies Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The newly elected top Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] leadership includes two persons who are featured in the list of collaborators of the former StB [communist-era secret police], published by the periodical RUDE KRAVO, as confidential collaborators [dovernik]. Their codenames are Mig (date of birth 7 January 1954) and Brezina (date of birth 29 July 1945). Next to the codename Mig in the

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periodical is the name Josef Migas (other sources refer to him as Jozef Migas) and registration Nos. 21,006 and 6,899; alongside the codename Brezina is registration No. 10,598. The codename Brezina appeared in public for the first time in 1994, after the installation of Jozef Moravcik's government, in conjunction with the minister of economy, who had been delegated to this post by the SDL [reference to Peter Magvasi, former minister of economy and newly elected SDL deputy chairman]. Both codenames are listed by RUDE KRAVO in the category "D"—confidential collaborator.

Asked whether he could tell us anything about this piece of information, Jozef Migas, the new SDL chairman, said: "I know absolutely nothing about these things, and when it appeared there.... I simply was not a collaborator. When such things appear and reference is made to RUDE KRAVO, it runs counter to norms and regulations." Asked whether this reply means he never collaborated with the StB, Jozef Migas replied: "I worked and studied abroad, but I was not a collaborator."

According to a directive issued by former CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] Interior Minister Jaromir Obzina, confidential collaborators were to be selected from among reliable Czechoslovak citizens ready to report to the counterintelligence partial findings of relevance to state security or to provide to it necessary help and services. In its ruling of 1992, the CSFR [Czechoslovak Federal Republic] Constitutional Court deleted the category "D" from the so-called screening law because of incompatibility with the Constitution and the Charter of Basic Rights and Freedoms. As CSFR Federal Assembly deputies did not bring this part of the screening law into harmony with the Constitution within the set period of six months, the category "D" does not feature in the current wording of the screening law.

[Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 30 April on page 10 carries a 300-word report by Karol Wolf, the paper's Bratislava correspondent, entitled "New SDL Chief Probably Collaborated With StB." Wolf sees the possibility of Migas's collaboration with the StB corroborated by his biography. As he points out, "Migas studied at the Kiev State University and, subsequently, lectured at the Advanced School of Politics in Bratislava. In the 1970's he was a typical apparatchik in the central bodies of the Communist Party of Slovakia." Wolf believes that "a possible confirmation of Migas's collaboration with the StB would trigger no scandal because the screening law, though still valid, has not been respected in Slovakia for two years."]

Slovakia: FNM President Discusses Bank Privatization

AU3004163296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 4

[Interview with Stefan Gavornik, president of the Slovak National Property Fund Presidium, by Frantisek Raslavsky; place and date not given: "Bank Privatization and Economic Stability Are Connected"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Within the transformation process, it is privatization that attracts the greatest interest. Approving privatization projects and everything therewith connected is concentrated in the National Property Fund (FNM), which is under a constant barrage from the opposition critics. We discussed the most burning issues of the day with Stefan Gavornik, president of the FNM Presidium:

[Raslavsky] R. Kovac and T. Sagat, deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic for the Democratic Union, indicated that unless you provide them with information on privatization of the Biotika Co. and health-care facilities very quickly, they would proceed according to the Penal Code and file charges for the abuse of powers of a public official.

[Gavornik] I have passed on the letter from T. Sagat to the Executive Committee so its staff can provide him with the required information. I am not acquainted with the level of information to which a deputy is to have access. For myself, I am willing to provide any information I have to the deputies. I believe that one should accommodate them. It is questionable, however, whether the deputy should ask for the required information through the appropriate parliamentary committee. In the relevant instance, it would be through the Committee for the Economy, Business, and Privatization.

[Raslavsky] Why are you passing the responsibility on to the FNM Executive Committee?

[Gavornik] The FNM Executive Committee are statutory representatives [statutari] who are responsible, as the name implies, for the execution of privatization processes within the framework of the FNM. I, myself, am not an employee of this fund, even cannot be according to law, just like any other Presidium member with the single exception of Deputy President J. Rehak. I represent the fund on the outside. I am not even one of the 11 statutory representatives.

[Raslavsky] Mikulas Trstensky, director general of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company, SP], was recalled from the SP board of directors but he remains in the post of director. The FNM has 50.5

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percent stake in this insurance company. What was the reason for the change?

[Gavornik] The decision was made without any input from the FNM. No one submitted any changes in either the supervisory board or the board of directors. The power regulations clearly state that such matters should be decided in the Presidium. [passage omitted]

[Raslavsky] There is a difficult task before the FNM—privatization of the banking sector. At what stage of preparations is it?

[Gavornik] It is a matter of 350 billion [currency not specified] worth of chattels and real estate. Privatization of the banks is not easy because it is directly connected with the stability of the economy. The government has been very successful in the economic sphere, and therefore it is apparently considering steps in this direction. The banks should be privatized but I believe experts should be invited from the national economic sphere and from other areas, and then make the decision.

[Raslavsky] Speculations emerged about your conceivable dismissal....

[Gavornik] I do not know whether horses should be changed while galloping. There are some 180-200 enterprises left to privatize. The parliament approved me but I am ready to accept the parliament's decision if it wishes to dismisses me. That is its right, and everybody must bow to it.

Slovakia: Poll: Citizens Content With New Territorial Arrangement

AU3004160096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Apr 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Most Citizens Approve of Slovakia's New Image"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Republic's new territorial and administrative arrangement has brough: along changes in the assignment of individual communities and dwellings to districts and, subsequently, regions. According to a survey conducted from 25 March to 4 April by the Institute for Public Opinion Research (UVVM) of the Slovak Statistical Office, the problems connected with Slovakia's new territorial and administrative arrangement were consistently followed by 25 percent of the 1,164 citizens participating in the survey. A total of 1,061 of them also responded to the question of whether they are content with including the place of their permanent residence in the appropriate district.

The results show that more than three-quarters (77 percent) of the respondents basically agree with the new territorial and administrative arrangement—most of them were from large towns (50,000-100,000 people), 89 percent. Fourteen percent are unhappy about including their permanent residence in the relevant district. The dissatisfied respondents were mostly from small towns. A total of 83 percent are happy that the district was not changed, 8 percent are unhappy about it, and 9 percent do not care. A total of 64 percent are content that the district did change, 27 percent are unhappy about it, and 9 percent do not care.

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Hungary: No Plan To Conclude Basic Treaty With Yugoslavia

LD3004163396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] For the time being, Hungary is not planning to conclude a basic treaty with Yugoslavia, Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs told the Hungarian parliament today, to avoid possible misunderstanding. Andras Kerekes reports from the parliament building.

[Kerekes] In his reply to Miklos Csapody of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Hungarian foreign minister said that, although the conclusion of a basic treaty would not be against Hungarian foreign policy, so far neither Hungary nor Yugoslavia has initiated this. Csapody raised this matter in connection with an incident that happened with Hungarian doctors who were to travel to celebrate the centenary of the millennium [of the Hungarian conquest] together with the Zenta [Senta, in Vojvodina] organization of the Hungarian Health Society and were sent back from the Yugoslav border.

Laszlo Kovacs said the incident could indeed be considered an unfriendly step, and this was raised by Hungary's charge d'affaires in the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade last Thursday, and today the interim Yugoslav charge d'affaires was called to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry to give an explanation about this. The Yugoslav diplomat was told that this kind of incident does not serve the development of relations, although now, after the end of the Yugoslav war, there is a real opportunity for such development.

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B-H: Ganic Addresses May Day Rally in Sarajevo

AU0105125796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1005 GMT 1 May 96

[Speech by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Presidency member, at a May Day rally in Sarajevo—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed citizens and dear guests:

On behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina's state authorities, I wish all working people who live from their work a happy international holiday, May Day. Moreover, we greet all leaders from the International Labor Confederation and the European Trade Union Confederation who are present here today. In this war, their memberships, amounting to 200 million workers worldwide, were on the side of freedom. They were with us. We say to them: Fascism could not win in Bosnia [words indistinct]. The sons of mostly workers and farmers formed ranks and saved Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the bloody liberation war, the Bosnian Army and people defended a Bosnia of tolerance and purity of the human soul, a Bosnia that symbolizes and is symbolized by the snow white flag with golden lilies. This Bosnia, which we have always known and which cannot and does not know how to be any different, was primarily defended by Bosnia's poor, workers, and farmers.

Those who had the least lost the most and those who worked the most gained the least. Together, we are the moral victors in this liberation war. We have survived because we have an army comprised of people who have always lived from their work and honesty, good hosts, workers, and farmers. In this century, our labor helped build more some other parts of the former Yugoslavia than Bosnia itself. Sadly, we were fated to be attacked by those whom we fed and who lived of our work, sweat, and sacrifices, primarily the former Yugoslav People's Army. One thing is certain: Bosnia will never again labor for anyone else and against its own interests. [applause] They destroyed our factories, robbed our workshops, destroyed bridges, and torched our homes. They have destroyed conditions that would enable us to immediately go back to work and employment. Today, dear citizens, after everything, we ask ourselves: Where is this country going? Can we do better, faster? Veterans and workers fear that we are about to enter a (?period) of [words indistinct], that we are becoming a country for storing toxic waste, that we shall be a market of the cheapest labor available in Europe. People fear for their children's prospects. They are discouraged by various actions that are far from humane. Injustice hurts more than poverty.

Are we capable of resisting this peacetime offensive, [word indistinct] of human waste that the war pushed to the surface of our brutal reality. I say: We will, we can, and we must. [applause] Unarmed and without an organized state and army, we have overcome all aggressors, and now, in peacetime, with this experience and united with mother Bosnia, we shall find the strength to go forward. We have managed to preserve the majority of people in the war, and now in peace, we have to secure the minimum for a dignified existence. That is why both governments, the republican and federation one, are undertaking serious measures—you will judge how good they are—to go forward.

Each day, more people are employed. Productive employment is our main goal. Large-scale public works, particularly on the infrastructure, should alleviate unemployment and create conditions for a normal economy. With this idea we went to Brussels, to the donors' conference, which secured and promised funds, significant funds. We have received great promises, but the results are still meager on the ground. Some sort of new economy is also developing. The state cannot do everything. Private initiative must do something, too. It is still burdened by the market bench mentality, black marketeering, and tax evasion. This will not do, taxes must be paid. There is no production; the state must take steps to launch production, to launch small plants, and employ people. Entrepreneurship opens employment opportunities. The passing of a democratic and modern labor legislation is the job of the state and trade unions, who should create conditions for economic development and humanization of labor. We must take care of our veterans, we must secure the minimum for everyone; each child must have a pencil and notebook, good food; teachers must have good salaries; the sick must have medicine, free injections, treatment, and operations; doctors must have salaries worthy of them. We need to secure (?small) social security and aid for the unemployed, and a regular pension for pensioners. [applause] If we fail to do this, if we fail to employ people and raise the living standard, then peace will be as bitter as the war. Freedom and democracy can be easily threatened by social unrest, anarchy, and demagogy of irresponsible politicians. We shall ask for help for workers. We shall ask everyone to help employ workers, because they are Bosnia's best investment. We shall appeal for help to the Islamic world, Europe, and the United States. We have friends worldwide who understand us and who can help. It is up to us to make use of this. Our foreign policy must be in the function of good for Bosnia, good for each worker, student, and veteran.

We emerged naked and barefoot, wounded and sick, from this war, dear citizens, but ready for reconciliation

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and granting forgiveness to the innocent and misled. We are more decisive than ever not to allow Bosnia's fate to slip through our hands. We greet all honest workers, pensioners, and school children in the Serb entity. We are fighting for their future, too, with the hope that after the elections, they too will see the light of day and freedom, and not only blackmarketeering, misery, and robbery.

Dear Sarajevo citizens, dear citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia has a future, Bosnia is defended with wisdom, Bosnia is now being defended with wisdom; I repeat: Bosnia is not defended with demagogic or radical statements; let us look for Bosnia's success in Bosnia. Thank you and long may you live!

B-H: HDZ Chairman Interviewed on Federation Relations

AU2604135596 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 19 Apr 96 pp 11-13

[Interview with Bozo Rajic, HDZ chairman for Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Ivica Rados in Mostar; date not given: "We Do Not Consider Darijo Kordic, Ivica Rajic, and Other Croats Charged With Crimes War Criminals: 'I Would Like To Inform Sarajevo Not To Try To Send Agents of the AID Secret Police, Which Is Made According to the OZNA Model, to Herzeg-Bosnia!'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bozo Rajic, HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] chairman for Bosnia-Herzegovina, seldom gives interviews. When he gives them, the following two conditions must be fulfilled: There must be no linguistic interventions in his interviews for Sarajevo newspapers, and no sensationalist equipping of the text for Zagreb newspapers. This 53-year old politician from Kupres has recently become the most influential Croatian politician in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he has his Bugojno high school teacher of Croatian—Mr. Grgo Pejnovic, who now lives in Zagreb—to thank for his brilliant eloquence. He was ready to give open answers to all the questions when I talked to him in his Mostar office. His seriousness is a result of a strict Catholic education and numerous family tragedies: His father was killed by communists in Bleiburg, and many of his relatives died during and after World War II. He said that they were killed by communists too. Bozo Rajic claims that he was never a communist, pointing out at the same time that he cannot stand rightist extremism.

He claims that the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have a serious competitor: "Only marginal groups constitute the opposition." He says that he rarely sees Mate Boban, as he is in Zagreb and does not want to move to Sarajevo, because—according to what he says—he has no accommodations there.

Rajic told us that the Croatian Radio should soon open in Sarajevo, and Croatian television in Mostar.

[Rados] Judging by Sarajevo media, Muslim politicians support the return of all refugees to their homes. Does this not suit the Croats?

[Rajic] The Muslim-Bosniak media and political leaders tried to convince the population and certain centers of political influence for a long time that the Croats did not want the Federation. The latest events—especially those in connection with the establishment of transitory communal councils within county authorities, the refugee issue, and the events in the Federation Assembly (where the president and the vice president of the Federation were sharply attacked)—show who practically does not want the Federation. The Muslim side is now confronted with the fact that it has to explain to its people that the Dayton agreement does not correspond to their interpretation. The Dayton agreement has its spirit, its text, and its contents. When they had to implement the obligations taken on by the Dayton agreement, when they came into the situation in which they could not cheat on the Croats before the international community any longer—if this may be expressed in this way—confusion spread among them, and I would not be surprised if they made radical moves toward the project of the Federation.

Their statement that the Croats do not want the refugees to return is senseless. Even not very well-informed people know that the number of the Croats displaced in the Muslim-Croatian war is four times higher that the number of Bosniaks expelled from the same region. It is, in other words, in our political and human interest to enable these people to return, according to the principle that everyone should be able to return, without any selection.... Our present experiences in talks with our partner show, however, that they are not very much interested in that problem, except for the lower Neretva River region. [passage omitted]

The Dominant Nation and Reserve Home Countries

[Rados] Haris Silajdzic established the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in spite of that he signed the joint declaration with the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] with Alija Izebegovic.

[Rajic] The idea behind it is not the preservation of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its identity as a state, the protection of its outer borders, or its unity. This is an attempt to propagate the formula of the unity in the sense in which it can never been accepted.

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The state may be unitary, it may be defined as a state toward its internal structure and its neighboring countries, but the unitary state they support—the state of citizens, that is, minority groups assimilated into political "projects" of larger groups—is something that will never be materialized. The message from the constituent assembly of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina is: Either a unitary, multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina, or war! Bosnia-Herzegovina can, however, survive as a state only with the consent of its three constituent, sovereign peoples. Any other solution will sooner or later lead to controversies that do not necessarily have to escalate into war, but certainly lead to some other elements and solutions. [passage omitted]

Liberation of Complexes From the Past

[Rados] The HDZ has been claiming recently that the political interest of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Federation. Until recently it was claimed, however, that it was the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

[Rajic] We had to establish the elements of the state leadership in the liberated territory, as the leadership in Sarajevo had collapsed. Following international initiatives and peace agreements, especially the plan for the creation of a union of republics, which was accepted by both the Croats and the Bosniaks, we proclaimed the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. We said that it was, just like the union, a transitory form for the organization of relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would be effective until a final solution was reached. Now, after Dayton, we belong to the party that supports real politics.

The HDZ is the party that has always supported real politics, and this is not the politics of wishes or fantasies, but the politics of real confrontation with the balance of powers within the country and toward the international community. After a solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina was reached through the influence of international politics, the international community, and especially through very active U.S. involvement, we as real politicians accepted that aim, knowing that our requirements were not lost: that we are a constituent and a sovereign people, and that the federal units-cantons have been created according to the principle of the majority of one of the two constituent nations. The elements of power of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia are being introduced into the Federation now, but it must also come to a complete dissolution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the apple that got stuck in Izetbegovic's throat. In other words, the system of power of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is not being dismissed; it is only being transferred to something new. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is transferring its powers to the Federation, but the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina also must cease to exist as a state, and this is the problem that makes the Muslims upset.

[Rados] The role of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been minimized lately.

[Rajic] We have no inferiority complexes; the Croatian people have liberated themselves of their complexes from the past, they have liberated itself of the historical guilt imposed on them. I said in a conference: I am coming to Sarajevo with a clean conscience, I am not afraid of anybody, neither of you in Sarajevo nor of those in Pale.... The whole world knows that the HVO saved the substance of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only Sarajevo is bothered by that fact. At the beginning of the war we were alone; the HVO fought by itself until the poorly organized and led Muslim people organized themselves. I do not deny the results of their struggle and their victims, as this would not be correct, but if there had not been the HVO at the beginning of the war, Bosnia-Herzegovina would have fallen with a whisper, and no one in Sarajevo or New York would have been able to talk about its reintegration....

End of Mutual Accusations

[Rados] Izetbegovic recently stated that HVO members, in contrast to the soldiers of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will not be given their wages retroactively, as the HVO allegedly received wages from their own funds.

[Rajic] This statement issued by Alija Izetbegovic is problematic and surprising if we take into consideration his experience. It does not deserve a serious commentary, as it is politically defective. Izetbegovic will not decide on what the HVO and the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina will get.

[Rados] The Law on Defense is exceptionally controversial in the process of the implementation of the Federation.

[Rajic] Two issues from that law were controversial: the right of conscripts to choose in which army they want to serve, that is, either in the HVO or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the command of some parts of the army. We offered the only possible compromise, and the SDA accepted it: Every recruit, regardless of nationality and religion, is entitled to select in which of the two federal army components he will serve. Alija Izetbegovic will temporarily take over the command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Federation, will command the HVO.... [passage omitted]

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No Selective Approach

[Rados] General Blaskic voluntarily went to The Hague in order to prove his innocence. The remaining Croats from the list of war crime suspects live in places controlled by the HVO. What will happen if they are found by the members of the Agency for Documentation and Research (AID)?

[Rajic] Our political attitude is clear: In a democratic society no one can be accused until his guilt has been proven. The prosecutor has to prove the guilt. If it is proven that someone is responsible for a certain thing, we will accept that fact and treat him accordingly.

Until then, these people are innocent. Because of the Dayton agreement spirit, we have taken on the obligation before the international community that the people who are charged with war crimes, regardless of whether it is justified or not, will be treated according to the international law code in the same way as others—with the aim to improve the political relations with our partners. There can be no selective approach: Croats cannot be charged with crimes and arrested if others walk freely around.... Regarding the AID, I have already expressed my attitude on behalf of the party: For us, it is the reincarnation of the notorious OZNA [Department for the Security of the People]; it is illegal for us, and will never be accepted. It cannot act here, except as a terrorist organization if it so decides.

The AID has no work to perform here, it is a nonexistent fact for us. Unfortunately, the information that has reached us from Croatia so far, after this group of terrorists were arrested, show the spirit and the intentions of the Agency: It is a monstrous organization.

[Rados] Ivica Rajic, a war crime suspect from the Hague list, stated recently that Gen. Blaskic made a big mistake in going voluntarily to The Hague.

[Rajic] This is Ivica Rajic's personal opinion, and I do not want to comment on it. Gen. Blaskic made the decision to go to The Hague himself. I personally did not contact with him at that time, and I do not know any details. This is an act of personal courage and civilized politeness, through which he wants to prove that he is Gen. Blaskic, who has come as a Croatian officer to defend his honor and dignity!

[Rados] You are also being made responsible for the Croatian-Muslim conflict because of a statement you made before. As the defense minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina you required that Muslims submit themselves to the HVO command in the areas it controlled, and vice versa.

[Rajic] It is politically petty to try to explain the Croatian-Muslim conflict as if it had been caused by my command as the then defense minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That command could have resulted in an incident at the most if its materialization had been insisted on, which was not the case. The war between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out because of the conflict between the political concepts in which the Croats wanted to become a political subject, and the other side a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The war broke out because of the conflict of these political concepts, and I would repeat the same command in the same situation again, as its intention was to prevent the war.

B-H: Ganic Assails IFOR, Stresses Freedom of Movement

LD3004212796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text]] The behavior of IFOR [Implementation Force] near Gracanica yesterday and in many similar situations was basically an attempt to prevent Bosniaks from carrying out their visits and amounted to passive observation of orchestrated attacks by the Serb population. Let us recall that one of IFOR's main tasks is to ensure freedom of movement, as Dr. Ejup Ganic, Republic Presidency member and vice president of the federation, says in a special interview for this news bulletin. He stressed the very important fact that by preventing the people's return, the Serb authorities want to directly obstruct the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sabina Batvic talked to Dr. Ganic:

[Begin recording] [Ganic] This is an attempt to turn IFOR into UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force]. This is an attempt to freeze the situation on the ground and an attempt by Karadzic and Mladic to take matters into their own hands. So we expect Karadzic and Mladic to be removed, otherwise the Dayton agreement cannot be implemented.

[Batvic] What specific demands will be made of the IFOR forces and international police?

[Ganic] Freedom of movement. That is IFOR's task, its fundamental commitment.

[Batvic] Are these events likely to delay the next attempts by Bosniaks to enter and visit their homes?

[Ganic] Absolutely not. We have to go on, we must return to our properties, visit our homes. We must return, each to his own. Another important thing is that this is an attempt to prevent the elections, because without freedom of movement there cannot be elections. Without elections there will not be a change of government

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in the Serb entity, in other words, the fascists will remain on the scene, and this is an attempt to undermine the activities of Frowick and all the others who are implementing, attempting to organize the elections. [end recording]

B-H: Ganic Notes 'Positive Shifts' in Mostar

AU3004194696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After attending a ceremony to open the Customs Bridge in Mostar today, Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation and member of the Presidency of the Republic, and Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs, this afternoon met with Fatima Leho, governor of the Neretva Canton, and Safet Orucevic, mayor of eastern Mostar. Mirsad Behram has the details:

[Behram] Mostar is one of the key objectives of the Federation. The opening of the bridge today is a very important step toward the integration of the town. This was stated by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation, after meeting with Fatima Leho, governor of the Neretva Canton. Mr. Ganic said that work on improving the situation in Mostar is being done in conjunction with the international community.

[Begin Ganic recording] Today we analyzed with Governor Fatima Leho the situation in the canton and the inauguration of the authorities and we fully support the efforts made to complete all this within a week. We also wanted to see what the situation was like after the conclusion of the Rome agreement, whether the agreement signed in Rome was being implemented, and whether the situation in Mostar was better following the signing of the Rome agreement. Certain shifts, positive shifts have been made, but we must carry on. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Dutch Foreign Minister: No Peace Without Arrests

BR2904140596 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 29 Apr 96 p 7

[Article by Bart Rijs: "Soldiers Alone Will Not Bring Peace to Bosnia—Minister Van Mierlo Faced With Continuing Division Between Population Groups During Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sisava—Thinking aloud, Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo, who is on a three-day visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, came to the conclusion that the soldiers of NATO's IFOR (Implementation Force) alone are perhaps not enough to keep the peace. "Is overcoming the mutual fear which the population groups have of one another not really our most important mission?" he wondered. "Perhaps we should send psychiatrists."

Driving along the demarcation line between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation in the rough mountains of central Bosnia Van Mierlo was able to see that the military side of the peace process is happening quickly. Serb, Bosnian, and Croat troops could no longer be seen anywhere. The imposing Leopard tanks of the regiment of Limburg Sharpshooters, who monitor this part of the dividing line, leave the base only to exercise.

"Our part of the peace agreement is running like a railway timetable," says Lieutenant Colonel Winckelman, the acting contingent commander, during a briefing of the minister at a winter sports hotel damaged by the war. "Our intervention is starting to become routine." The logistics battalion has as little to do, some of the Netherlands soldiers are getting bored behind the barbed wire.

But although the front line has disappeared, the divisions between the population groups are just as strict as during the fighting. The minister and his group travelled from Muslim to Serb territory on a road which was repaired by Netherlands soldiers and cleared of mines. There was no other traffic: The population does not dare cross the demarcation line. The local authorities are doing nothing about it. There were police on both sides of the demarcation line to keep out unwanted visitors.

The express objective of Netherlands Bosnia policy—the formation of an integrated multiethnic state—is therefore a long way off. After talks with his Bosnian colleague Prlic in Sarajevo, Van Mierlo expressed his concern that there are signs that the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation are actually drifting further apart. "Then all hell will break loose," said the Netherlands minister.

With 190 million guilders the Netherlands is in relative terms the most generous donor of reconstruction aid to Bosnia. Van Mierlo would like to see this aid used to reduce thinking in ethnic categories and to keep Bosnia together. The Bosnian economy has to be got going quickly to offer work to the 300,000 demobilized soldiers.

In any case, little Netherlands aid is going to the Bosnian Serbs as long as their leaders Karadzic and Mladic have not been extradited to the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague. Van Mierlo asked the Netherlands commanders about their possible arrest. Although IFOR soldiers officially have the task of arresting war criminals if they happen to encounter them, the Netherlanders turned out

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to have heard from their sector commander that arrests are not desirable for the time being.

The minister could imagine that this was "a wise decision under the present circumstances." But, he commented, "without arrests the peace process could fail—therefore, in that case, something else would be necessary, a supplementary operation."

B-H: Refugee Issue 'Likely To Paralyze' Peace Process

BR3004144296 Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by Remy Ourdan: "Bosnian Serbs Prevent Return of Muslims Chased Out During War"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo—Incidents aimed at refugees wanting to return to their villages, or even just to make a short visit to glimpse their former homes and lay flowers on graves, are growing in number. Neither the diplomats nor the staff of the Implementation Force [IFOR]—NATO's multinational force—can apparently find the means to cope with a crisis that is likely to paralyze the peace process.

To prevent its soldiers from carrying out a peacekeeping mission that could deteriorate disastrously, IFOR is determined to prevent certain convoys of refugees from crossing the former front line. This measure puts the NATO troops in a very uncomfortable position, since it means that they have to do exactly the opposite of what was signed in Dayton: ensuring the freedom of movement of Bosnian citizens and the return of refugees to their homes.

It is all the more uncomfortable since the announcement by IFOR Headquarters was made on Saturday [27 April], the day after a message sent to it by General Ratko Mladic warning the international force about the risks it is running by allowing Muslims to enter areas controlled by the Serbian Army. IFOR failed to convince the Bosnians that it had not simply lost face to the demands of Gen. Mladic, who was indicted for war crimes by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. [passage omitted]

IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith said: "I am not at all satisfied with the freedom of movement. The former warring factions have still not really understood what this freedom means." IFOR did, however, make an astonishing choice by including its troops in the restrictions imposed by the local chiefs. According to one officer, the decision was made following the "orchestrated provocation" of the Bosnian Government, which supposedly deliberately sent the refugees along Serbian roads in order to create incidents. Nevertheless, the return of the refugees is a crucial point in the peace process.

The military strand of the Dayton agreement has been applied virtually in full (a cease-fire, withdrawal 2 km back from the front line, a return to barracks for the troops, and demobilization). Those behind the peace plan are therefore currently trying to breathe new life into the civilian aspects of the treaty, especially where the preparation of elections is concerned. The refugee question cannot at the same time simply remain up in the air when almost 3 million people were forced to leave their homes during the conflict. [passage omitted]

B-H: Commentary: SDP, SDA Fighting for Different Bosnias

AU2604154796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 21 Apr 96 p 2

[Commentary by Slavko Santic: "Preelection Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite recent disease and cold (bad) weather, Alija Izetbegovic did not cancel his party's meeting in Zenica, which could be an indicator of the seriousness of the situation in which he finds himself at the moment. In a short period, namely, he has faced several big challenges, to which he has had to spontaneously react. First, he was trying to leave the impression that he did not care much about the split with Silajdzic. However, during the period of his illness, he was obviously thinking about that very much, and tried to draw the appropriate consequences from it. As a kind of political sensation he prepared (with Silajdzic himself!) the Declaration on the Integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which really was kind of a shock to all those who had had hopes that a (possible) split in the all-ruling party of SDA [Party of Democratic Action] could start the process of true democratization on the eve of the approaching elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, the whole spectacle lost its appeal, like a soap bubble, because those without whom one cannot imagine the Federation, let alone the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina, did not want to participate in it.

The second challenge for Izetbegovic was the constituent conference of Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was a political spectacle with much more seriousness, and with long-reaching consequences. He answered as early as the day after with the meeting in Zenica, which had the very transparent manifesto of "SDA for Bosnia-Herzegovina," by which he wanted to annul the very political doctrine of Silajdzic's only just founded party. However, at the same time he wanted to "pay his debt" to the opposition because it not only

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did not want to support his declaration, but even more is showing more and more "arrogance" and "disobedience" toward his totalitarian party and political and state ambitions.

Both in its form and purpose it was a traditional preelection political meeting, directed in the best manner of the usual populist manifestations, with recognizable iconography, characteristic of any euphoric and irrationally "enthusiastic" mass. All those who listened and watched the speech on television could hear the sound background, recognizable to his most faithful (and most extreme) followers. And the meeting—one has to point out—wanted to present itself as an invitation to conciliation. Was that it, really?

Like any populist leader with charisma, he has also put himself under some kind of glass cover, defending himself from any guilt or responsibility for the situation in which the "state" and its inhabitants find themselves at this moment. Besides, of course, he has also used this opportunity to lay his and his party's claim to all the credit, if there are any credits in reality. On Izetbegovic's list of the "culprits," the international community takes first place because of its indecisiveness and weakness toward Karadzic and his extremists. However, the main opponent is the opposition over there. Even looking as it is (weak, divided, and anemic), it is a thorn in his eye, and he attacks it in an unusually arrogant way. And the second thorn in Izetbegovic's eye is Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Belittling its idea of "Bosnian Bosnia," Izetbegovic claims that "the battle for Bosnian Bosnia has already been won" in the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and respectively under the control of SDA, and that is where he personally has the power in his hands.

According to Izetbegovic, the battle for power "should take place and be won in the part of Bosnia currently under the control of the Serbs and the Croats.... They want to liberate one more time the already liberated Bosnia, and the more unfortunate, occupied part of Bosnia they leave to someone else."

In the context of such an accusation, many people see the usual Izetbegovic and SDA manner of laying claim to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and having all the credit for that, and, in line with that, laying claim to all the right to the (future) authority in it. It is not the first time that Izetbegovic has demonstrated his vanity exactly on the subject of power, forgetting that the opposition and other political nonfollowers (and why not, adversaries) are not, and cannot be his party footmen.

Therefore, the answer was quick to come to Izetbegovic. First from the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, via Mustafa Pamuk, an SDA member until recently, and today one of Silajdzic's closest associates. "The people who have gathered themselves in this party do not want power at any price, but will certainly try to maintain a unified Bosnia at any price." At the same time Pamuk returned with the accusation that Izetbegovic and many others talk about the unity of Bosniak people only in order to keep their own monopoly on the political opinion of that nation.

The reaction from the SDP [Social Demoratic Party] was unusually sharp and open. Having pointed out that "the time of cheating was over," the vice president of that party, Zlatko Lagumdzija, sent a warning that "the SDA leadership is wrong if they think that they will appeal to the Bosniak nation if they give them a left shoe before the elections and, if SDA wins, the right one, too." The allusion is more than clear: Foreign currency savings books (without coverage) for the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will be able to be realized (through the famous Izetbegovic fund, and from the announced Islamic donations), only if the SDA wins the elections! And Lagumdzija did not stop at that: "The Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina for which the SDA fights is not the Bosnian Bosnia-Herzegovina for which the SDP is fighting. The territory of our Bosnia-Herzegovina is much bigger, and the spirit much wider."

At the meeting in Zenica, in front of his thoroughly chilled followers who were listening to him standing in the mud and water, he promised that he would choose "the largest meadow in Bosnia" for the preelection needs of his SDA party, and gather 1 million people on it! Perhaps it is possible to do, but that will without a doubt be a million dead, wounded, banished, displaced, missing, unemployed, hungry, dissatisfied, disappointed, many times cheated people, and thus the inhabitants of this sad country, who are in a very critical mood and can in no way be the appropriate electoral mass ready to be tricked once again.

B-H: Izetbegovic Awards Turkish President for Peace Efforts

LD2704163796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1542 GMT 27 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara, April 27 (TANJUG)—The Muslim leadership in Bosnia has awarded a prize to Turkish President Suleyman Demirel for his contribution to the establishing of peace.

The prize is given only to persons with the greatest contribution to peace.

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Ankara, however, failed to say exactly which award was in question and whether Demirel would travel to Sarajevo to receive it.

The semi-official Turkish agency ANATOLIA, however, recently reported that Demirel plans to visit Sarajevo in early summer, as well as some capitals in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Since the outbreak of the four-year war in Bosnia, Ankara has unreservedly supported Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic.

Turkey has 1,500 troops within the peace Implementation Force (IFOR), and its warplanes control Bosnian air space as part of NATO troops.

Ankara is also trying to assume the leading role in the Islamic world in gathering economic aid for Bosnia.

B-H: Army To Build Training Center Based on U.S. Model

LD2704215396 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 27 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Zenica Military Training Center of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is marking its first anniversary. A ceremony was held in Zenica, where General Rasim Delic, the chief of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, gave a speech.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] We are expected to further develop and become stronger in order to be the guarantor of peace and security in this region and a stabilizing factor for the state, Gen. Rasim Delic, said.

It is in our interest to form a federal army, on which the implementation of the Train and Equip program depends. The further training of our cadets depends on this, Gen. Delic said and added:

[Begin Delic recording] I wish to stress that this year we are planning to build, among other things, a training center modeled on U.S. centers for training units and commands, as well as a simulation center for command training, which should boost the quality of training of commands and units in their implementation of concrete tasks, as well as the method for the appraisal.

We will also receive concrete aid for the training of personnel in NATO member-countries. [end recording] [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt Holds Talks in Bijeljina on Displaced Persons

AU3004165296 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Carl Bildt, high UN representative for civilian issues in implementing the Dayton agreement, has visited Bijeljina. Here is a report by Zarko Simic:

[Simic] In the talks held in the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly that lasted one and a half hours, Bijeljina municipality representatives first informed Carl Bildt about the implementation of the Dayton agreement in the region and problems that arise in this connection. Bijeljina Mayor Dragomir Dugalic pointed out that there are about 50,000 displaced people. It is clear that our orientation is to implement the Dayton agreement. However, particular distress is caused by attempts at forceful entry by individuals and groups into the territory of the Serb Republic [RS].

Speaking about economic issues, Zeljko Mihajlovic, president of the Executive Committee of the Bijeljina Municipal Assembly, said there is readiness in Semberija to develop cooperation with the world and, in that context, also with the Muslim-Croat federation where there is both sides' interest. We are now in a period when some political and civilian issues are of extreme importance for peace. Electoral rules should represent a firm basis for holding the elections, Carl Bildt pointed out. Carl Bildt also spoke in favor of freedom of movement and appealed for allowing visits to the regions of previous residence as the significant prerequisite for reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bildt also said that economic cooperation is of help here. He particularly stressed the role played by RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic who has been constructively working in the field.

B-H: Croats Said Attacking Muslim Police in Lasva Valley

LD3004134496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0940 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Travnik, 30 Apr (SRNA)—Izet Selmanovic, a representative of Travnik police station, today accused the [Bosnian] Croat authorities of organizing attacks on Muslim police patrols in the Lasva River valley in which 15 policemen were wounded, four of them seriously, over the past few days.

"We cannot and will not tolerate such acts and we will punish all further attacks on Muslim policemen in an adequate manner," Selmanovic told Travnik radio, accusing the Croat authorities of "planning and systematically sowing distrust of the Muslims."

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According to Selmanovic, "the authorities of the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia are responsible for the fact that relations with the Muslims have reached a critical point in central Bosnia and there is a threat of widespread conflict, in the River Lasva valley in particular."

Travnik radio also carries a statement issued by the Muslim 7th Corps' association of war invalids, saying that "not a single law of the so-called Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia should be valid in central Bosnia, even at the price of a new Muslim-Croat war."

The statement notes that freedom of movement has not been secured for Muslims in parts of Vitez, Busovaca, and Novi Travnik municipalities and that Croat authorities, acting on orders from Zagreb, are trying to trick the Muslim side and the international community by ignoring all mutual agreements, including the Washington agreement.

The statement calls on the central Muslim media in Sarajevo to "stop pretending and hiding the truth about the real situation in the Zenica-Travnik canton and to warn the people about threats coming from the Croat side."

B-H: Serbs Block Road, Prevent Bosniaks From Visiting Kopaci

AU3004142496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kopaci residents today have been prevented from visiting the graves of their relatives. They were prevented from doing so by Serb civilians, who blocked the road to Kopaci. Fortunately, there were no major incidents. Here is a report by [name indistinct]:

[Correspondent] Not even the tragic events that happened yesterday, when Bosniaks tried to visit the graveyard in their hometown nor the IFOR [Implementation Force] statement that it cannot guarantee their safety, stopped some 150 residents of Kopaci from setting off at 1200 today in the direction of their homes. (?After) yesterday's events, (?three) politicians from the Serb entity tried at a meeting in Gorazde to dissuade the residents of Kopaci from their intentions. IFOR representatives behaved in their usual manner, doing everything to prevent the Bosniaks from visiting the graveyard.

Two buses and [words indistinct] were ready to take all those who wanted to visit the graveyard [words indistinct] and at least have a brief look at their centuries-old homes. No one was able to stop the Kopaci residents from setting off to Kopaci today on the third day of Bairam. At the checkpoint on the border between the two entities, we again saw the familiar gathering of people. Serb civilians, having been bussed in from Pale, Visegrad, and Rogatica, blocked the road to Kopaci. There was no way through.

IFOR soldiers, contrary to what they said yesterday, namely, that they would not be able to come, today provided the convoy of Kopaci residents with very strong security, probably in order to improve their totally eroded reputation in the eyes of these people. However, they did not want to disperse the so-called Serb people, as this, as they said, would not be in (?order).

The Bosniaks from Kopaci did not want to force their way through. Not because they are cowards, but for sensible reasons.

But they will be back. They will try to go there every week until [words indistinct] since no one in the world can take the village of Kopaci away from its residents. [passage omitted]

B-H: Muslims Try To Enter Serb Republic in Gorazde Area

LD3004144196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1341 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Serb Gorazde, 30 Apr (SRNA)—A group of about 100 Muslims from Gorazde tried to force its way into the Serb Republic in the area of Donja Sopotnica today, but was prevented by a group of about 1,000 Serbs who gathered in the area before the Muslims arrived in two buses.

IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers and international police were present in Donja Sopotnica. There were no incidents and the Muslims returned to their part of Gorazde.

B-H: Mostar Croat Radio Reports Muslim 'Provocations'

LD3004180796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of the Muslim bairam holiday, Muslims were allowed to visit their cemeteries, or mezarija [Serbo-Croat for "cemeteries"] as they say, in Zepce. But the visit was not without Muslim provocations. Here is a report by Branka Jankov:

[Jankov] The Zepce municipality, this year too, on the occasion of bairam, has seen visits by citizens of Muslim nationality; they came to visit their cemeteries. Thanks to the good organizing skills and correct attitude displayed by the Zepce police, Bosniak Muslims were

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able to perform their religious rites unimpeded in this area.

However, what is astounding and a cause for concern, according to a report by the Zepce police, was the fact that certain individuals used this visit to the cemeteries for completely different reasons, thus jeopardizing the safety of other citizens and bringing into question the real motives for the visits to this area.

According to the Zepce police report, in the Fojnica-Globarica and Lug-Brbica areas, visits to family homes instead of to cemeteries were observed. There were also threats to the local Croat populace and religious chants were also directed at Croats. Maglaj police were spotted, in civilian clothes, in the Novi Seher area, as was an official police vehicle with the wrong documents. Provocative comments were directed at a police patrol in Novi Seher. In the demilitarized zone in the Cobe-Kopice area, a fire was seen. According to the police patrol, it was caused by the visitors.

All the above, which was contained in the Zepce police report, could bring into question the normal visits to cemeteries by believers, thanks to individuals who wanted to use this event for other purposes, such as provocations, visiting houses, and the uncontrolled movement of groups of people in areas which have nothing to do with religious rites.

Thanks to the tolerance of the Zepce police and local people, who were not taken in by the provocations listed above, these visits ended without any large-scale disturbances, but the way in which they arrived, the organization of the visits, and their behavior in this area, draws one's attention to the full extent of the seriousness of such situations and, if we want to restore interethnic trust, this work needs to be attended to with much greater responsibility and seriousness.

B-H: Serb 'Extremists' Prevent Bosniaks From Visiting Koraj

AU3004190596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Report by Admir Kadric]

[FBIS Translated Text] The village of Koraj in the Celic municipality is one of those places in Bosnia-Herzegovina that was absolutely Bosniak before the war as all of its 3,000 residents were Muslims. According to the Dayton agreement, Koraj remained in the Serb entity. The expelled residents of Koraj, who are residing in neighboring Celic, today tried to visit graves in their village of Koraj. Admir Kadric has the details of this visit:

[Kadric] Although the visit had been announced earlier and agreed on with IFOR [Implementation Force]—even to such details that the three buses should not carry more than 150 expelled persons, that the men should be over 55 years of age, and women not younger than 50 years of age—the residents of Celic nevertheless failed to come anywhere near Koraj.

When the three buses left Celic at 1100, they only managed to cross the bridge on the Gnjica River, which constitutes the border line between the two entities, where they were met by a fairly large group of Serb extremists armed with batons, sticks, and stones, threatening to beat them up if they went further.

The middle-age men traveling in the buses quite understandably did not want to expose themselves to danger, and expected the Russian IFOR battalion to ensure their passage as had been agreed.

However, the Russian IFOR soldiers did not do anything to honor the agreement, but (?arrogantly) paid tribute to the residents of Koraj for their correct behavior, promising them that they would again contact the Serb side to arrange a visit to the graves of their dearest.

After that, one of the Koraj residents told the Serb side IFOR the following: We have plenty of time and patience to wait, but do not think for one moment that we will not come back to our Koraj.

B-H: Council Sends Protest to Bildt, IFOR on Serb Attack

AU3004183996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the brutal attack on the refugees who tried yesterday to visit their homes and the graves of their beloved in the territory under the Serb entity's control, the Sarajevo City Executive Council has sent a protest note to the office of Carl Bildt, UN high representative in charge of the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, and the IFOR [Implementation Force] Command.

The Executive Council considers this kind of behavior by the local Serb population, behind which, no doubt, stands the policy of Pale, as a crude violation of and a direct attack on the Dayton agreement and a threat to the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Executive Council demands that the Office of the UN high representative and the IFOR Command ensure the consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement, full freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

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B-H: Silajdzic Warns of New War Unless IFOR Aids Refugees

AU3004172796 Paris AFP in English 1712 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 30 (AFP)—Bosnia could slide back into war unless the NATO-led peace force helps refugees return to their former homes as provided for in the Dayton accord, ex-premier Haris Silajdzic warned Tuesday.

His outburst came after at least one person died and seven were injured when a group of rebel Serbs ambushed 75 Moslem men as they tried to visit former homes and family graves in the northern Bosnian village of Lukavica, just northeast of Doboj.

The Implementation Force (IFOR) has set up road blocks to prevent groups of Moslems returning to the Republika Srpska—the Bosnian Serb entity created under Dayton—fearing clashes between returning Moslems and hostile Serbs.

Silajdzic, who recently created his own political party to rival the ruling Democratic Action Party (SDA) of President Alija Izetbegovic, said IFOR's passivity was tantamount to "unproforization," in a caustic reference to the discredited UN Protection Force that IFOR replaced.

"They (the refugees) must go back to their homes and someone must take care of it, otherwise Dayton means division of Bosnia, and division of Bosnia means a big war here and the purpose of Dayton was peace not war," said Silajdzic.

"What the international community through IFOR allowed is a clear signal that the international community is not very much interested in the reunification and reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina," he added.

"We must make the best of the IFOR's presence here to try and get those people to their homes, not vice versa, because the passive role of IFOR here actually sends a very wrong signal, and the consequence is partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina de facto," he warned.

He called on IFOR to extend its projected mission in Bosnia—set to come to an end in December—but only if it took action to prevent the "violation of the basic human rights."

"They've done a good job in the separation business but if that separation means a separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, means the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the division, then the international community will fail in Bosnia and very soon," he added.

B-H: IFOR, Serbs Preventing Bosniaks From Visiting Homes

AU3004185696 Paris AFP in English 1809 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Article by Peter Cunliffe-Jones: "Serb Thugs Block Return for Moslem Refugees"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Celic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, April 30 (AFP)—Packing handguns and clubs, a menacing band of Serb thugs on Tuesday [30 April] prevented elderly Moslem refugees visiting homes lost in the war in this northern Bosnian village.

The 150 Moslem refugees, many of them women, abandoned their attempt to return on three buses to former homes in the Serb-held village of Koraj after being told no one could guarantee their safety.

On a former frontline marking the division between the Moslem-Croat federation and the Republika Srpska within Bosnia, as many as 600 Moslems gathered from early morning Tuesday to urge on the buses of refugees.

The refugees, picked out from among the 5,000 Moslems who fled the then mainly-Moslem village when war broke out in 1992, were hoping to make their first visit home since they were forced to flee.

"We're not afraid," said Cefka Musakovic, a 60-year-old peasant woman. "Our children have already been killed, so what have we to lose?" she asked, adding she was impatient to go home.

"It has been four years," Musakovic added.

The trip was not to be.

Russian and U.S. IFOR [Implementation Force] troops using tanks and light vehicles interposed themselves between the Moslems and the Serbs, who were lying in wait for the refugees on the road into the village, threatening first the Moslems and then UN aid workers who tried to negotiate a safe passage for the refugees.

"They don't want to talk to us—neither us nor the UN police," said Margarethe Prins, a field worker with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Ultimately UN police and IFOR troops abandoned the scene, making way for local police to intervene. Federation police chief Mujo Basic appealed successfully for the Moslems, outnumbering the heavily-armed Serbs, to show restraint.

Frustrated, the Moslems agreed.

"The Serbs have won again," said one UN aid worker who asked not to be named. "There is supposed to be freedom of movement, and in fact there is a border

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whenever they want there to be one. There is freedom of movement for the Serbs but not for the Moslems."

On Monday at least one Moslem was killed, shot dead by a suspected Serb civilian after breaking through a NATO checkpoint near the northern town of Doboj.

Under the Dayton peace accord, Bosnia's 2.4 million war refugees and displaced people all have the right to return to their original homes.

But authorities in the Serb republic, that makes up half of the post-war country, do not want to see Moslems and Croats returning.

The NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) has attempted to distance itself from the complex question of returning refugees, which civilian officials overseeing the peace process insist will be vital if elections are to go ahead before mid-September as planned.

IFOR announced a policy Saturday of stopping all convoys of Moslem refugees entering Serb territory if it looked like their return to the area might provoke violence.

This policy provoked an outburst from former Bosnian premier Haris Silajdzic on Tuesday, who said such action would cement a de facto partition of Bosnia and trigger a resumption of hostilities.

Amir Hadziomeragic, Bosnian minister for relations with IFOR and the United Nations, told AFP in Sarajevo meanwhile that IFOR had to do more to ensure freedom of movement was protected.

And Carl Bildt, top civilian official overseeing the peace process, said he had called officials of both federation and Serb governments together for a meeting to discuss the refugee incidents.

Other Moslem officials and international aid workers in Sarajevo said the IFOR roadblock policy gave the Serbs a veto on who can enter territory they control, in violation of the principle of freedom of movement.

Prins said Tuesday she was "fed up" with the argument that all the demonstrations were politically motivated.

The desire of the refugees to return to their homes was "genuine" she said, adding that Moslem authorities in many areas appeared to be coping well by managing to "control a difficult situation."

Visibly disappointed by the latest failure to return to visit Koraj, Sulejman Zenunovic, a representative of Koraj's council in exile, said Tuesday the refugees were not being forgotten, but that it was getting harder to control the desire to return.

"Tempers are running high and it is a question of how long we can contain the response," he warned.

Elsewhere in Bosnia, 1,000 Serbs blocked a small group of around 100 Moslems from returning to their homes in Donja Sopotnica in the east of the country, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA reported.

IFOR troops and UN police officers again prevented clashes by interposing themselves between the rival groups, the agency said.

SRNA also reported that two Serb civilians were injured Tuesday, one seriously, when Moslems threw rocks at their car on the Trnovo-Sarajevo road south of the Bosnian capital.

B-H: Bildt Demands Pale Serbs Explain Killing of Refugee

AU3004203396 Paris AFP in English 2015 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, April 30 (AFP)—Carl Bildt, the top civilian official overseeing the Bosnian peace process, asked the Bosnian Serbs Tuesday [30 April] to explain an incident in which a Moslem refugee died and several others were injured while trying to visit former homes in Serb territory.

Bildt expressed "grave concerns" over Monday's events which occurred near the northern Bosnian town of Doboj in which Serbs apparently ambushed a group of Moslems who wanted to see homes they vacated four years ago at the start of the Bosnian conflict.

At least one Moslem was killed and several were injured in minefields in the region, but Bildt said the fatality could have been caused by gunshots.

"There was gunfire reported with several injuries within the zone of the separation...within the Serb republic," the high representative said. "At least one person may have died as a result of a gunshot."

"In peacetime, use of firearms with the intent to harm is a very serious criminal act," he added.

The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) has said Monday's casualties were caused by mine explosions.

"I expect that you will promptly investigate this matter and the parties responsible will be swiftly brought to justice under the appropriate criminal laws," Bildt added.

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B-H: Investigators Confirm Doboj Clash Left 2 Dead

AU0105100296 Paris AFP in English 0950 GMT 1 May

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, May 1 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace force confirmed Wednesday the death of a second Moslem in clashes earlier in the week between Moslem refugees attempting to return home and hostile Serbs.

A group of Moslems were ambushed on Monday by Serbs after trying gain access to Serb-controlled areas near the northern town of Doboj by skirting around a NATO checkpoint.

Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Max Marinner confirmed that "a second body was recovered yesterday (Tuesday) afternoon," and said investigators from the United Nations, IFOR and the Republika Srpska on Wednesday had begun a probe into the clashes.

"The criminal investigation should be able to ascertain facts," he continued, adding that he hoped it would rapidly achieve results.

IFOR had previously confirmed only one fatality.

Marinner confirmed that the first victim was killed by mine explosions, when a group of Moslems tried to get round an IFOR road block and Serb demonstrators to enter the Serb-held region of Doboj.

Press reports and Moslem sources said the second victim was shot in the chest, however, Marinner refused to confirm the cause of death, saying "we have not seen the autopsies yet."

The use of arms in an area close to the demarcation line between the Moslem Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska would be a serious violation of the demilitarisation agreements sealed in the Dayton accords.

In recent weeks, groups of mainly Moslem refugee groups have attempted to break through the former frontline at several places to visit cemetries or their former homes in the Serb-controlled zone which they were forced to leave during the war.

An IFOR source, who asked to remain anonymous, said he doubted that investigations into Monday's incident could be completely speedily.

B-H: Serbs Say Srebrenica Refugees Settling in Ilidza, Ilijas

AU3004140796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Apr 96 p 16

[Unattributed report: "Tuzla Is Filling Serb Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tuzla refugee centers housing Srebrenica Muslims are being hastily vacated. Every evening, dozens of buses are taking refugees to Sarajevo, to districts abandoned by the Serbs.

This was disclosed yesterday by Radio Tuzla, which claimed that not even the local Tuzla authorities had been informed about the operation, carried out in semisecrecy and organized by the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government] authorities in Sarajevo and their security service.

According to Tuzla reporters, some 3,000 refugees from Srebrenica have been settled in the Sarajevo Serb districts of Ilidza and Ilijas. The Radio Tuzla reporter concludes that the rest will also be transferred to Sarajevo districts.

B-H: Serb Minister on Freedom of Movement, 'Mass Visits'

LD3004194296 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Government representatives of the two entities had talks in Sarajevo today on the freedom of movement between the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and Croat-Muslim federation.

[Begin recording] [Dragan Kijac, Bosnian Serb interior minister] The main topic of the meeting was an evaluation of the events of the past weekend when citizens of the federation attempted to make organized mass crossings into the territory of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. The view of our ministry is that last weekend, despite the incidents near Doboj, passed off fairly safely. This view is supported by the international community, because the indications were that there could have been far greater incidents and problems considering the large number of visits planned by both Muslims and Croats to the territory of the Serb Republic.

We have used the opportunity to reassert our position that these organized mass visits cannot be treated as freedom of movement, in view of the fact that the Interior Ministry of the Serb Republic possesses information that, among these persons who are attempting to cross the border between the two entities, there is a large number of those who want to provoke incidents and to blame citizens of Serb nationality for them.

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[Unidentified correspondent] The Serb side has recently warned the international community that this movement of Muslims is not permissable. However, there are reports that a large number of them will attempt to enter Brcko tomorrow.

[Kijac] Yes, we were informed at today's meeting about the attempt of the Muslims today to enter five areas of the Serb Republic, and according to the information I have so far, there were no major incidents. Tomorrow, too, IFOR [Implementation Force] informs us that the Muslims are planning to enter the region of Brcko in large numbers—the figure of 10,000 is even being mentioned.

[Correspondent] How will the Interior Ministry react if there is a mass attempt by the Muslims tomorrow to enter Brcko?

[Kijac] Several days ago we gave an order, in light of these indications on the organization of units on the ground, how they should behave in such cases. In short, the Interior Ministry will carry out its tasks, according to the constitution and law, with the aim of preventing the violation of public order and incitement of disturbances on the territory of the Serb Republic. [end recording]

B-H: New Charges Against Col Krsmanovic Raised

96P20407A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Apr 96 p 1

[Report by Zdravko Latal: "The Opposition Does Not Want Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 16 April—[Passage omitted] As reported, today the Sarajevo court expanded the charges against Bosnian Serb Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic who is again in the Sarajevo central jail. The Chief Public Prosecutor had charged him with shelling the city for three and a half years, causing over 11,000 deaths. Now he has been charged with causing the death of an additional 44 persons. Krsmanovic is accused of personally ordering the killing of 44 Bosnian Muslims from a village near Sokoc. It seems that this will end rumors of his pending release or exchange. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Party Leader Urges International Integration

LD3004173596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1707 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, April 30 (TANJUG)—Vice President of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) Bosko Perosevic voiced hope that elections in both Bosnia-Herzegovina's entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, would be won by political parties which will build democratic institutions and a civilized and humane life, rightfully expected by people at the end of this millenium.

In an interview with the Banja Luka fortnightly NEZAVISNE NOVINE, Perosevic said that the most important task lying before the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was its integration into the international community because "no one can be a political island."

We can certainly not be against the whole world and we must act wisely and sensibly at a given moment and circumstances, as President Slobodan Milosevic did, which brought about positive results, Perosevic said.

He underscored that the Dayton agreement had confirmed the principled stand of the Yugoslav negotiating delegation that the interests of the Serb people should be protected with political means and that peace was of paramount importance.

In line with its platform, the SPS has always advocated equality between all peoples in the former Yugoslavia and stood up for Serb national interests in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Perosevic said in the interview to be published by the paper on Wednesday.

B-H: SIF: Brcko Arbitration To Determine Serb Republic's Fate

LD3004163996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1550 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 30th April (SRNA)—The Banja Luka-based Serb Intellectual Forum [SIF] today appealed to state bodies of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic to intensify their activities in connection with the forthcoming arbitration in the Brcko area.

According to a statement issued by SIF, "the fate of the Serb people and the Serb Republic as a whole is being resolved in the Brcko area."

"If the international community wants the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, the area [corridor] around Brcko will be widened and the Serb Republic will have rights equal to those of the Muslim-Croat federation. Any other solution will result in conflicts and the reappearance of pro-war forces," the statement says.

SIF calls on all the political parties and the state leadership to publicly voice their standpoints on the Brcko issue so that "national unity is reached regarding this problem and a serious stance adopted by all political forces when dealing with the history and fate of the Serb nation."

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B-H: Details on Layout of Omarska Mass Graves

96BA0188B Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 7 Feb 96 p 29

[Article by Zlatko Hodzic: "The Serbs' Repeated Auschwitz: The Burning of Camp Inmates in Ore-Drying Furnaces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *At Omarska, one of the most infamous of Karadzic's camps, the bodies of murdered people, but also those who showed signs of life, were thrown into the abandoned Mamuze pit, and waste was thrown in on top of them. Like Ljubija, the Omarska and Tomasica mines cover the mass graves of Bosniaks. It will only be when these areas are investigated that we will know the scale of the crimes against the people of the Prijedor region, and the indictments from the International Court in The Hague will be supplemented with new evidence.*

The discovery of mass graves over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina—from Uborko near Mostar to Brcko, from Foca and Visegrad to Sanski Most, from Ljubija and Omarska to Srebrenica—is confirmed by the precisely defined project of genocide against the non-Serbian population in our country. All the mines under Serbian control, but also other natural or artificial excavations, have been used to the maximum extent for mass executions of the civilian population. That practice has only one name in all military and history textbooks: genocide.

Wherever there were mine shafts or strip mines, for the most part camps were opened, i.e., places of execution for the non-Serbian population, probably considering that in that way it would never be possible to obtain evidence about the Chetnik atrocities under the command of General Mladic and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. Where there were natural funnels, ravines, or gorges, as in the vicinity of Prijedor, Mostar, and Brcko, or in Konjevic-Polje, dirt was piled over lifeless bodies, often after a barrel of acid for the chemical decomposition of organic substances was first emptied.

The traces and witnesses, however, still remain....

135 Bosniaks in 24 Square Meters

The Omarska iron ore mine near Prijedor seemed to the Chetnik ideologues to be the most favorable place for a camp and place of execution for the Bosniak people from the entire Prijedor region. When the investigators of the genocide in that area uncover all the details and methods of the torture of the civilian population, it will be realized why the surviving inmates compare Omarska to Jasenovac. Life worth less than a cigarette butt, endless beatings, the severing of body parts, the spattering of brains on the floor, the burial of half-alive people under mining waste....

The mine itself covered an area seven kilometers long and about 10 kilometers wide. Organizationally, it belonged to the Ljubija mine, and used to employ about 1,000 workers. About 60 percent of the employees were Bosniaks—if that fact is important for the wartime sufferings of the people of Prijedor.

In the summer of 1990, civilians were brought here from Kozarac, Gornja and Donja Puharska, Kamicani, Kozarusa, Kevljani, and numerous other villages near Prijedor, as well as from Prijedor itself. The orgies of drunken cockade-wearers had already begun by when people were being loaded into buses, with the slaughter of those who in one way or another had "stepped on the toes" of someone with a knife in his hand on some previous occasion. It continued when the drivers turned on the heat in the crowded buses, in the middle of the summer. Many people alleviated their unbearable thirst by licking the moisture that had accumulated on the windows. The beating began upon disembarking from the bus, with baseball bats and sticks—wherever they could reach, but usually on the head and kidneys.

The Omarska mine was enclosed by a threefold wire fence, and its spaciousness made it possible for the twilight to swallow up many people without the knowledge of their fellow Bosniaks. They all had to pass through "facility 1," in which the lower part was a restaurant, and the upper part was offices. Before the restaurant, in an extension, there were two ordinary garages—six times four meters. One hundred thirty-five Bosniaks were crammed into each of them, i.e., into 24 square meters. For three days, they slept lying across each other, desperately crying for air, while the paint peeled off "in shreds" from the metal door.

Almost 5,000 Bosniaks were housed in the mine's facilities, but only after they had passed through the so-called examining commissions on the floor of "facility 1." The Serbs, after removing gold and watches and confiscating money, conducted the torture of questioning and beating. There was human blood everywhere. The walls were sprayed with blood to the ceiling, and in the corners, the survivors state, pieces of brains and bodies could be seen. The cries and howls were replaced by the sounds of excavators and the rumbling of heavy trucks. It was known that piles of lifeless bodies were being taken away.

Sexual Organs Bitten Off

"Facility 2" was also the largest—almost 100 meters long and about 30 meters wide; before the war, it was used for repairing dump trucks.

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The offices of a design bureau were once located on the first floor. Every day there were about 3,000 inmates here, while a considerable number were under the open sky on the path between the restaurant and this facility. In this enormous hall, the most atrocious tortures that a sick mind can invent were conducted, including the severing of body parts until the victim bled to death. The "specialty" of the Chetnik revelry was hanging people by heavy chains on their feet and then beating them with clubs on the spine and kidneys until the victim ceased to show signs of life. The late Ahzura Jakupovic (30 years old) had all the joints in his legs, arms, and shoulders broken with a mallet, so that he would confess for the cameras of Banja Luka TV that the "Muslim peasants" were concealing weapons, and then he was beaten to death.

The foremost in atrocities was a certain Marmat, a locksmith from the Omarska mine, who walked around spattered with blood all day long. He pulled a thick wire through many people's tongues, and a bullet was an "unexpected reward" in comparison with dying in torment over several days.

Marmat forced information out of mechanic Sakib Mujkanovic about where he had hidden money, and then strangled him with his bare hands.

The list of crimes and criminals is too long. Former professors from Prijedor suddenly became captains in the Chetnik army, and conducted pedagogy by giving orders to fire. Denunciations were carried out at night. The people denounced usually never came back.

Mass executions were carried out by opening the heavy doors on the warehouse, in front of which three or four machine guns were waiting, and they fired volleys at the prisoners in the warehouse.

One of the blackest days was the one when Chetnik leader Zoran Karlica died. Then his colleagues came with tanks and the intention of leveling all the buildings stuffed with people. Fortunately, they were not allowed to do it, but instead they received permission to enter the buildings and slaughter whomever they wanted, or beat them senseless. The inmates in the boiler room of the Omarska mine had the hardest time. Only a few of them survived being beaten with iron rods.

"Facilities 3 and 4," the so-called white and red houses, were among the biggest places of execution. It was precisely in the "white" house, the former administrative building for the managers ("facility 3") that the most horrible tortures were devised. Inmate E. J., now in Germany, had to save himself from further torture by biting off with his teeth the sexual organs of Emir Karabasic, Jasko Hrnic, and Enver Alic. All three of them died in the most terrible torment. The ones who were killed in this building were usually buried in the meadow behind the building itself (area 5), or near the water reservoir (area 6). In the "red" house ("facility 4"), previously used for cleaning machines, livestock and people were slaughtered. It will hardly ever be learned how many people were slaughtered in that facility, because no one ever returned from there. Nevertheless, inmates claim that a certain Cedo Vuleta, an electrician who performed the duty of records officer, could help a great deal in learning the number of people executed in the entire mine, as well as Vlado Kobat, the driver who took the dead and half-living bodies to the abandoned pit of the mine or even to the neighboring Tomasica mine. The remaining inmates watched those scenes through small holes in the doors or "walls" after the machine gun had "fallen silent" and the loading into the heavy truck had begun. Howls were still coming from the truck, and blood was flowing in torrents. The Bosniaks who helped to load the bodies usually left to help dump them in the pit, but their trip was also a one-way trip—to death. Dead mouths do not talk!

One of the people who helped with the loading is still alive today, and can certainly provide valuable information.

A big secret is concealed by the abandoned excavation (area 7), which is about 70 meters long. Human bodies were unloaded there day and night, many of them still alive, and then the excavators dumped waste on them. The cries of the half-alive Bosniaks were drowned out by the roar of the excavators with which tons of waste were dumped. Survivors claim that hundreds and thousands were pushed into the abyss in order to conceal the number of murder victims and hide the traces. It was not just the head of commandant Zeljko Mejakic who invented that kind of death, but instead it was actually part of the monstrous Greater-Serbian project to destroy Bosniaks, especially in places where their presence was compact.

Their "imagination" was not exhausted just at the abandoned mine pit. At night, trucks also took lifeless bodies to the Tomasica mine. There, according to statements from surviving inmates, almost 2,000 Bosniaks were thrown into a furnace for drying ore, and were converted into smoke and ashes. The exact number, as well as personal information, will hardly ever be learned. Those whom the Red Cross managed to take away from death in this camp are only part of the sufferers who escaped systematic destruction. Karadzic played a role in this by transferring the inmates from Omarska to Keraterm, and from there to Trnopolje, and to Manjaca. He was thus trying to deceive the international public and show that everyone was still alive. Camp commandant Zeljko

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Mejakic joined in this by claiming on Banja Luka TV that only two people had died, of natural causes, at the "Omarska reception center."

Caption for Diagram [not reproduced here]

1. restaurant, offices

2. the large garage for repairing dump trucks

3. the so-called white house (administrative building)

4. the so-called red house

5-6. the area where numerous murdered people were buried

7. the abandoned excavation about 70 meters long (mass grave)

Key to Diagram [approximately from left to right]

Gomjenica River water reservoir road to Tomasica belt for ore transportation; road to the Mamuze dump abandoned excavation Mamuze excavation; oil warehouse gasoline pump water pump road to the village of Mamuze; road to the Jezerc excavation road to the village of Mamuze.

B-H: Rehn's Mandate as UN Human Rights Rapporteur Extended

BR2904154096 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Rehn's Mandate Extended"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Elisabeth Rehn's mandate as UN human rights rapporteur in the former Yugoslavia has been extended. The UN Human Rights Commission has extended her mandate by one year and has also broadened its scope.

The Commission has called on Rehn to draft a human rights survey covering the whole of the conflict and a plan for how in the future human rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina can best be monitored.

Her next visit starts on Wednesday [1 May] when Rehn travels to Kosovo. From there she will travel via Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Doboj to Zagreb. Rehn will return to Finland on 8 May.

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Croatia: Serbs Condemn Plan for Memorial, Renaming of Town

LD3004170996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1637 GMT 30 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, April 30 (TANJUG)—The alliance of Serb organizations in Zagreb maintains the transformation the Jasenovac Memorial Centre would not contribute to reconciliation in Croatia but would only deepen rifts and pose new obstacles between the Croats and Serbs.

In a statement made public on Tuesday, the alliance sharply condemned the desecration, destruction and transformation of memorial centres and the renaming of towns, streets and institutions which are important to Serbs in Croatia.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has repeatedly said that the remains of Croat fascists who put to death over 700,000 Serbs, Romanies and Jews in Jasenovac during World War Two, would also be buried in the Jasenovac Memorial Centre.

Moreover, the alliance protested against the renaming of the town of Vrginmost to Gvozd.

The Serbs had lived in Vrginmost since the 16th century and were the majority population in the area until spring 1995 when they were driven away from their homes by the Croatian Army.

The town and the entire area are particularly important to the Serbs because of their anti-fascist struggle in World War Two and we strongly oppose its renaming, which we consider a direct attack against our national identity and national feelings, the alliance said.

Croatia: Kinkel Criticized for Inviting Opposition to Bonn

AU3004175496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr 96 p 3

[Commentary by Ivo Lovric: "Unusual Invitation From Bonn"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bonn, 29 Apr (from VJESNIK correspondent)—The German Federal Government, that is, its service organization of Inter Nationes [as published], invited the leaders of eight Croatian opposition parties to attend consultations that are planned for 6-9 May in Bonn. The German Foreign Ministry forwarded the invitation and will itself take part in the talks; one of its diplomats confirmed this to a VJESNIK correspondent on 29 April. The German Foreign Ministry is interested in talks with the Croatian opposition, as well as with opposition parties in other states, the diplomat said.

It is difficult to find a similar example of cooperation, that is, gathering representatives of all opposition parties of some state in Bonn for talks, which is what will happen if the Croatian opposition accepts this invitation. By this invitation, Kinkel, being the one who de facto invited them to this meeting, which has been unofficially confirmed by his cabinet, attaches extreme importance to the Croatian opposition in German-Croatian relations, while at the same time diminishes the role of the Croatian Government within those relations.

Rules of Game

These days the German Foreign Ministry has not been willing to provide too much information about the invitation, the aim of which, according to German diplomats, is to talk about issues of importance for both countries. This assertion, however, can be interpreted in several ways, which again means a number of speculations, unnecessary and useless for both countries. This also applies to an assertion brought out by NOVI LIST, according to which the German foreign minister recently offered to the Croatian opposition "political and material help." Kinkel's aides say they cannot comment on the issue now, which perhaps means that they will be able to talk about it one day.

For Croatia, however, the issue is too important to be ignored. This invitation, certainly unusual, may have its understandable reasons, although it is difficult for us to discern them, but it also may cause unnecessary problems in relations between the two friendly countries due to speculation and rumors. Whenever he is reproached for overly severe treatment of Croatia, Kinkel rightfully points to his extreme efforts and valuable intercession in favor of Croatia with international partners, which cannot be denied, to the contrary. However, this must not be an obstacle to the Croatian authorities to behave to their partners with a lot of self-confidence.

Any democratic state has in itself complex structures of cooperation with foreign countries, in which part of the tasks within this cooperation is performed by the opposition as well. In this game certain rules are normally observed, which came about as a consequence of various processes, or are even specified by state constitutions. This usually means that the head of state, or the government, or both of them together, have priority in foreign policy. The task of the opposition usually reduces to contacts with congenial parties, exchange of opinions, and participation in various international projects. The opposition's contacts with foreign governments are certainly the most sensitive

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part of those relations, but they again have to do with some written or unwritten rules, according to which the opposition, active in a democratic system, avoids lengthy talks about its relations with the government.

To Please the German Public

If representatives of the Croatian opposition parties accept the invitation for talks in Bonn, the subject of their talks with Kinkel will be primarily topical issues, which in this case means precisely the relationship between the government and the opposition in Croatia. The matter is all the more strange because all of them would go to Bonn together.

No one can bar the Croatian opposition from attending such talks with foreign officials, for it alone must make decisions, whether they are constructive or not. This is because the Croatian opposition, as part of a democratic political system, represents the entire state. However, it is obliged to render accounts for its contacts with foreign countries, as well as for the way in which those contacts are established and maintained, just like the government, or any other institution or individual, is. Likewise, any foreign minister, including Kinkel, ought to be cautious about the way he conducts talks with the opposition of a friendly, democratic state, and within which limits. This is because the announced meeting, regardless of good intentions on the part of all the participants, creates many misunderstandings.

First of all, this should be viewed in the context of the attitude held by the German public toward the Croatian leadership, that is burdened by the views of some very influential media. So the German public, as a rule, demands that German policy on Croatia exert pressure on Zagreb, no matter what the issue. What image Croatia has in Germany can be seen from DER SPIEGEL weekly, which carries in its latest issue, along with a short report on Tudjman's idea of a collective monument in Jasenovac and the reburial of all the deceased Croatian politicians in Croatia (by the way, this is one of much misinformation typical of DER SPIEGEL), a popular picture of the Croatian president in a military uniform. Much of the German public sees the Croatian authorities as a very negative occurrence, to put it mildly. Therefore Kinkel's meeting with the Croatian opposition, organized in such a way, will most probably meet with approval from the German public, as a move aimed to weaken Tudjman's dark regime.

Therefore, it is hard to believe that Kinkel will accomplish the desired goal of strengthening friendly relations between Germany and Croatia by furthering cooperation, that is quite necessary and useful for both countries, in such a way.

Croatia: Beli Manastir Assembly Debates Settlement, Evictions

AU3004130896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Apr 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 17th session of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly focused on the results and plans for the realization of the settlement of refugees from western parts of Krajina to Baranja. We told you about the debate at great length and now we bring you concrete decisions regarding the settlement program. Malicious individuals have been pointing to some negative phenomena. [sentence as heard]

[Begin recording] At the proposal of the special committee, municipal representatives concluded that all available government potentials must be engaged in the program for the realization of settlement and evictions as soon as possible. It was also decided that there must be no exemptions in evicting those who occupy houses or apartments without permission. Furthermore, the locals moving out of the houses of the Croats, Hungarians, or other people who left the district after 17 August 1991 and who occupy or were assigned those houses by neighborhood communities or other Beli Manastir authorities—cannot move into apartments used earlier, on the basis of legal identification papers, by persons who left the district. The locals must be given help to repair their own homes, be assigned business premises, be given tax benefits for businesses and property, as well as other kinds of material and every other aid, if they really need help. All municipal institutions must take action to urgently populate all empty houses in Baranja in keeping with the Erdut Agreement. The same standard needs to be applied for persons and property leaving the territory of Baranja. The representatives present at the session were adamant that all persons who moved their property out of Baranja must immediately quit their jobs and move out of state-owned apartments. In addition to the first agenda item, the municipal representatives made a decision forbidding the moving of house contents when houses and apartments are being exchanged. Those decisions came into effect immediately, i.e. on 26 April, when the session of the municipal parliament was held in Beli Manastir. [end recording]

Croatia: Outgoing Zagreb President Criticizes Lack of Democracy

LD3004184296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We are now broadcasting parts of interviews given to Zagreb's Panorama program by Zdravko Tomac, outgoing president of the Zagreb

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city assembly, and Stjepan Brolich, the newly appointed government commissioner.

[Begin Tomac recording] I believe this is another situation in which Mr. Brolich and his colleagues are transforming themselves into part of the assembly so that they, instead of the assembly, might be able to elect two leaderships [for Zagreb county and Zagreb city assembly] and in this way realize a strange form of democracy that does not exist anywhere else in the world.

Over the past six months we have tried to see that everything was done to realize the will of citizens by legal and legitimate means. I believe we have defended their interests and that we have not disappointed them, and it is now up to them to oppose these measures to restrict democracy, or ultimately approve them. [end recording]

[Begin Brolich recording] The government commissioner replaces the Zagreb city assembly and—in this concrete example, in view of the fact that we are also in Zagreb county—the county assembly, pending the next elections. This is perhaps the first time that we have had such a case. The mayor of Zagreb remains and she will present members of the leadership to me in the next few days. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Croatia: Zagreb Appoints Commissioner for Primorje-Gorani County

LD3004185296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian Government has examined problems in the functioning of Zagreb and Primorje-Gorani counties. [passage omitted]

After examining the functioning of the Primorje-Gorani county [Rijeka region], the Croatian Government concluded that for this unit of local administration and self-administration, it was necessary to appoint a government commissioner in place of the county assembly; it appointed Mr. Zlatko Pavelic as government commissioner in place of the Primorje-Gorani county assembly.

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FYROM: Positive Achievements Related to Name Cited

AU2904133296 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 27 Apr 96 p 13

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "The Circle Is Slowly Completed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the initial shock that was created when Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] explicitly stated that there would be no compromise on the name of the state, and that the international negotiations on this subject have been worn down, it seems that Greece has understood that this is not a new course in our foreign policy, a momentary fiction, or a verbal excursion by the new Macedonian foreign minister, but that it is a constant determination that has been present since the first days of the dispute. The loud messages to Athens that only direct negotiation on the dispute can be conducted, without moderators on an international level; Macedonian diplomacy's supposed disinterest in the future role (and mandate) of moderator Cyrus Vance; and the announcements of Minister Ljubomir Frckovski that the "discussions in New York will definitely disappear," as well as that in the "near future we will try to reopen the question of the name in the United Nations," were reasons for endless questions and dilemmas in Athens and an initial assessment that it had to do with an intensification of the Macedonian position.

It has to be noted here that so far this principled standpoint of ours on the name had not been uttered so loudly nor so openly, which had given the Greek side hope that there was room for compromise. It remains to be seen which style—restrained or "transparent"—will be more beneficial for the desired goals. Incidentally or not, the example of our diplomacy was also followed by the head of the U.S. Embassy in Skopje, Victor Comras, who in an interview for Athens's News Agency also "intensified" the U.S. position by saying that "Washington does not intend to play an active role any further in the Macedonian-Greek dispute over the name, and the two sides will have to solve their disputes through direct dialogue." Although this statement surprised Athens and provoked reaction, the practical U.S. dissociation from the dispute dated from the withdrawal of Matthew Niemitz from mediation. The way in which the U.S. view was articulated, through the usually restrained Comras, is simply more evidence that the dispute is no longer interesting or—what is even more important—very dangerous to the destabilization of the region. However, it is probably still some time off before the question of the name is put on the Security Council. Although our foreign minister has announced this for "the near future," this should not be understood verbally, as such a step implies that Macedonia's request will be 99 percent accepted.

At the same time, we must not forget that this would also collide with the spirit of the Interim Accord that was signed in New York seven months ago. However, now that Minister Frckovski emphasizes that we are not in a position to think about a change in the name, and now that he reiterates President Kiro Gligorov's offer in the sense that "Greece may call us anything it pleases, but we are the Republic of Macedonia to the whole world," adding that this is in itself a big compromise that our side is offering, it becomes clear that the dispute is now entering a new phase. Its main characteristic is the general promotion of relations between the two countries on the political and economic plan—particularly in the filed of economics, in which Greece and Macedonia are showing great enthusiasm. The contacts that were only sporadic a couple of months ago, and were treated as a curiosity, have now become normal behavior. The fact that Macedonia and Greece easily agreed on reducing the fees for visas and on issuing them on the border, for the sake of avoiding the maltreatment of our and Greek citizens in the diplomatic offices, and additional checks on the border, speak of a relaxed atmosphere, initial confidence and, finally, perhaps of a direction that has to be fostered and used.

The regulation of relations with the FRY, which in a certain sense is "also defining the political map of the south Balkans," is another new and important moment in relations with Greece. It is of the utmost importance that Macedonia was recognized under its constitutional name by the hitherto most faithful of Greek friends and allies—Serbia—and not only because of the traditional friendship between Belgrade and Athens. If we consider that here in the Balkans every new event greatly affects a number of sides, then the reflection of the agreement with the FRY on the future fate of the Greek problem is doubtlessly enormous. Now that their Serbian friends do not have a problem with the name any longer—and it is obvious that they never did, but were just trying to please Greece—who else remains? The circle of neighboring countries without a problem with our name is slowly completed, and Greece remains lonely in the closest surroundings, once again.

The fact that two-thirds of the countries that have recognized us have done so under our constitutional name, while the others are looking for different ways to evade the prefix "former," speaks for itself about the direction in which all matters are moving. There should be no illusions that the offer to Greece "to call us as it pleases" will be immediately understood and accepted by Greece, because the atmosphere that

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has been cultivated there for years cannot be changed overnight, and the Greek Government cannot make such a change in a short time. However, it is clear that the general climate of relaxation of relations in this part of the Balkans, and the intensification of the economic component, will nail down stability in the region and slowly create an awareness that the problems that looked as big as a mountain at the beginning can be overcome after all.

FYROM: Police Said To Threaten Tetovo Students

AU0105102396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] police continue to provoke Tetovo University students and teachers. Here is a telephone report by our correspondent Imer Ismaili from Tetovo:

[Ismaili] Along with activities successfully held within and outside Tetovo University, a phenomenon has frequently occurred lately by Interior Ministry representatives, such as summoning several students for so-called informative talks because, during various routine inspections, they were found with ID cards from Tetovo University.

On the basis of statements from the Tetovo University rector's office, there have been frequent cases of Tetovo University lecturers becoming the object of mental abuse by the Macedonian police, while those who support education and are, in various forms, engaged in assisting this institution, are verbally threatened by the same people that they and their families will suffer serious consequences if they continue their work supporting Tetovo University.

In her latest report on Macedonia, UN Special Envoy Elizabeth Rehn speaks about this phenomenon—this intervention by Macedonian police toward people who are related to Tetovo University in various forms. Mrs. Rehn considers these Macedonian police acts as negative phenomena. In reality, these forms of action may have an effect only in the sense of venting their rage with the aim of obstructing Tetovo University, which in fact is a reality that cannot be denied. On the other hand, these actions have no lasting effect on those who are mistreated, as all are determined to support Tetovo University and continue to carry out their obligations even after being summoned for so-called informative talks.

FYROM: Investigators of Assassination Attempt Criticized

AU3004150196 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 30 Apr 96 p 4

[MAKFAX report: "Slipups in the Investigation of the Assassination Attempt Against Gligorov"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The investigation into the assassination attempt against head of state Kiro Gligorov on 3 October 1995 was conducted with many errors and slipups, concludes a Radio Skopje commentary that was broadcast during the weekend. [passage omitted]

The Radio Skopje commentary indicates as a serious error the fact that some people in the president's security entourage and the cabinet have not yet been interrogated, although the president himself was questioned by the police once verbally and another time in writing.

This was revealed, as Radio Skopje claims, in the context of the existence of another car bomb that was planted on 2 October in front of "another institution" in Skopje, but it was removed after the president had canceled discussions in this institution because he suddenly left for Belgrade to talk to Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

The radio asks who has at their disposal such precise information on the president's daily activities and makes allusions to some people who are close to him. At the same time, the radio suggests that the assassins had probably waited for the outcome of the discussions in Belgrade because the car bomb that exploded on 3 October was at the same place also on 2 October. The police have a strong evidence of this—a photograph of the place that was taken on 2 October.

Pointing to other errors in the investigation, the commentary puts the blame on the Macedonian police itself, explaining that inexperienced and younger investigators have been entrusted with the investigation, and not the State Security Service.

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Poland: Hostile Reception for May Day Parade

LD0105100896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 1 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A May Day parade organized by the National Trade Union Alliance [OPZZ], the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], and the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] started in Warsaw this morning. SdRP Chairman Jozef Oleksy, Piotr Ikonowicz from the PPS, and OPZZ Chairwoman Ewa Spychalska are taking part in it. The parade started in front of the OPZZ headquarters and moved along Krakowskie Przedmiescie street toward Grzybowski Square [in the center of Warsaw].

[Correspondent Bozena Falkowska] Near the Holy Cross Church, the participants were greeted with unfriendly slogans: "Commies to Moscow!," "Down with Oleksy!" Several meters farther along the street, skirmishes took place between the left-wing parade participants and counterdemonstrators—students from the NZS [Independent Association of Students] and the anticommunist Republican League. [Crowd shouts: "Down with the commies!" "SLD—KGB!"

The parade was showered with rotten eggs, firecrackers, and portraits of revolutionary leaders painted on red cardboard. Police intervened. The most active counterdemonstrators were taken into police vans.

Poland: National Security Office Head on Defense, NATO

WS3004130196 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 26-28 Apr 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Minister Jerzy Milewski, head of the Polish National Security Office, by Antoni Witkowski and Andrzej Medykowski; place and date not given: "Security Does Not Come in Installments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLSKA ZBROJNA] State security and its administration is a very important issue. Responsibility for it rests with constitutional state organs, but not all have been established yet. The small constitution provides for a National Security Council. How advanced is the work on forming it?

[Milewski] It is enough to reach for the small constitution to learn that the National Security Council is to serve as an advisory body to the president. Thus, you cannot classify it as a constitutional administrative organ and suggest that the fact it does not yet exist undercuts state security. As for its establishment, I can say that the president is devoting much of his time and attention to have the process completed as soon as possible.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] A coherent system of administering state defense and democratic control of state organs, structures and forces responsible for security has to be developed. How do you view this problem from the point of view of the National Security Office [BBN]?

[Milewski] The system of administering state defense unquestionably requires amendments to the law. The small constitution, for example, does not even mention the National Defense Committee, which is provided for within the Law on Obligatory Military Service.

The system has changed, and nonstate companies are beginning to play an ever more important role. Their defense obligations are not provided for by any law. There are no laws regulating the activities of state administration and local government organs in this field.

These are only a few examples of the huge amount of legislative work ahead. Fortunately, we finally have the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister. Further issues should be provided for by the competence law, and the provisions of the new constitution will be even more important.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] We want to join the most important structures in the West, among them NATO. We applied for membership at the very same moment we announced our defense doctrine. Several years have passed since then. Which of the objectives defined at the time have been attained and which still remain to be reached?

[Milewski] I do not know whether we can count this as our success, but we are undoubtedly very happy that a formal and material debate has been launched on NATO enlargement and the date of an announcement of the decision to accept new members to the alliance.

It is also extremely important to foster social approval for our attempts to join NATO. The pro-NATO option is approved by a staggering majority of Poles, regardless of their political sympathies. Neither the parliamentary nor the presidential elections have caused the state's stance on the issue to change. Participation in the Partnership for Peace project and the NATO mission in Bosnia are an undeniable success.

The slow pace of transformation within the Armed Forces is worrying. We lost too much time here.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] The decision on launching the process of NATO enlargement is to be made by the end of this year, and the next year might prove decisive for our defense for dozens of years to come. What sort of activities should be intensified (on the international arena and at home) so that we will not have to repent for negligence in a year or two?

[Milewski] We must remember that the decision of accepting our country into NATO will be made at many

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levels. The stand of the parliaments of the particular member states will be decisive for its ratification. We must do everything possible to persuade our future partners that it is not only worthwhile to help us, but that it is also worthwhile to enter a political and military alliance with us.

In terms of internal state policies, this means we need a coherent system of administering state defense, which would be compatible with NATO standards, and well-organized, highly trained Armed Forces. I wish to stress the latter point because I fear that even despite a favorable development of political events, it might turn out that, from a military point of view, we will be incapable of fully integrating with NATO.

This is not so much a question of money, as of indispensable structural changes: A qualitative and quantitative strengthening of frontline units possible thanks to means saved by dissolving part of the home front units and some of the infrastructure. There is also the issue of reforming the command procedures in our Armed Forces to conform with those of NATO.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] It seems there are two external threats that might delay our entry into NATO. First, the 16 member states have to accept our candidacy. There are reasons to be optimistic in this respect. Yet there is a 17th state—Russia, which can delay our membership by its obstinate veto. Will the activities of the president and his administration, in particular those of the BBN, be the most important?

[Milewski] The BBN does not carry out any own activities which could accelerate or delay our membership into NATO. We are a backdrop for the president of the Polish Republic, and follow, as best we can, the instructions he and the National Defense Committee give us.

I think that President Aleksander Kwasniewski's most recent visit to Moscow, during which I had the honor of accompanying him, leaves no doubt whatsoever as to the trend of our foreign policy. The NATO decision was clearly remembered both in Moscow and in Warsaw. Treating Russia as the 17th member state, which holds the right to veto NATO enlargement, is a misunderstanding.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] Some politicians and representatives of the military advocate the opinion that, regardless of whether we cross the Rubicon and formally find our way into NATO or not, we should establish a high standard of state defense. What should the state authorities and the administration do over the next two or three years to enhance the level of state security and defense?

[Milewski] Your question falsely implies that NATO membership sanctions less interest in defense issues. The opposite is true: Membership in NATO demands high interest in the defense system on the part of the state. The truth is that once we do become members of the alliance, we will not have to treat defense as an issue for our state alone. This is a great advantage because guaranteeing state security autonomously, outside the alliance, would be far more expensive and practically unfeasable.

As for the most important things to be done for defense over the next two or three years, the answer is concise: Outlays for defense should be raised to at least 2.5 percent of GNP, and further increased to 3 percent in the longer term. Funds have to be spent wisely. The Army should be reduced to no more than 180,000 men. Frontline units have to be strengthened, better equipped, and trained so that they can be truly capable of cooperating with the armed forces of our future allies in international operations and in various situations. I have already mentioned the necessary legislative measures; therefore, I will not repeat myself.

[POLSKA ZBROJNA] Thus far we have been speaking about threats to the security of the state as a whole. The citizens, however, particularly local communities, fear threats other than war. Which of them (environmental hazards, migrations, organized crime, drugs, etc.) are most likely to intensify at an alarming rate? Would you agree with the view that our future security depends on our activity on the international arena, especially on our ability to support European cooperation?

[Milewski] No state, even the most affluent, neither is nor ever will be an isolated area free of the dangers the development of civilization brings. Over the next few years extramilitary threats will compel states and nations to cooperate. Thus, we must not only take an active part in European initiatives, but also initiate regional projects.

It is difficult to say during peacetime which threats are most dangerous. Everything should be kept in mind when creating a legal system which would minimize their effects and guarantee effective rescue measures. Environmentalists call this process balanced development. I think this term illustrates the entire problem well—also with regard to nonenvironmental hazards.

Poland: Country's Efforts To Gain OECD Membership Profiled

96EP0045A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 9 Mar 96 No 10, pp 66-67

[Interview with Professor Jerzy Hausner, national coordinator for Poland's cooperation with the OECD, by

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Pawel Tarnowski; place and date not given: "Let Us Do Our Thing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tarnowski] In recent months the issue of our future membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has gained considerable publicity. Why is it so important to Poland?

[Hausner] On the premise that the European Union is our strict school of market economy, membership in the OECD could be called attending the preschool. It used to be a closed club of the world's 24 richest countries, a forum for discussion and informal reciprocal pressures on various social and economic issues. At the turn of the current decade, however, it was decided to open the organization to the world. First, at a rather infelicitous moment, on the eve of its financial crisis, Mexico was admitted. Later it was resolved that the next serious candidates—from Europe—are the countries of the Visegrad Group. OECD representatives judged that, once certain requirements are met, these countries could be admitted by the end of 1996. That is still a realistic objective. But why are we so keen on joining the OECD?

This is important to us not just out of considerations of prestige; after all, everybody likes to be in good company. Membership in the OECD has also a very practical dimension, and it counts in negotiations on expanding the European Union. Please consider that nowadays many more countries than just those of the Visegrad Group aspire to join the EU. Membership in the OECD can be a convenient and readily evaluated criterion according to which candidates will be divided into more suitable and less suitable groups. From this standpoint, it does not matter greatly whether we will be admitted in mid-1996 or at the end of this year. What will matter, and very much at that, is the fact itself, and as for the specific date of admission, that is secondary.

[Tarnowski] Early this year the OECD admitted the Czech Republic. Poland, which we would like to see as the leader of economic transformations in Eastern Europe, is unfortunately lagging behind.

[Hausner] My opinion is such: It is not Poland that is tardy but the Czech Republic that is hurrying. The Prague government did everything to outpace the other countries of the Visegrad Group and show the world, and primarily its own public, that its economy fits the Western European model best. Such is the policy, extremely consistent besides, of Vaclav Klaus, who exploits every occasion to emphasize that the Czech Republic is the best in this respect. Hence also, after the agreement was signed, the Czech foreign minister could declare in all seriousness that this was the biggest success of his country's diplomacy in 50 years. A comment like that, if made by his Polish counterpart on such an occasion, would only meet with laughter and shoulder shrugging.

[Tarnowski] What does this signify?

[Hausner] The Czech politicians are, as regards joining the European Union, exceptionally united, consistent, determined, and ready to pay a high price for achieving that goal. Besides, they already signed the first promissory notes by assuming; during negotiations with the OECD, far-reaching liberalization pledges. High EU officials have been cautioning the governments of Poland and Hungary that the Czechs made too great concessions and following in their tracks could be dangerous. Underlying these warnings is not some concern about the interests of our friends on the Vltava but about the bargaining position of the European Union in economic negotiations with the United States, Canada, and Japan. It is simply that following the admission of the Czech Republic to the OECD, all the pledges assumed by that country will have to be emulated by the other countries belonging to that grouping, but it is not at all certain whether they will be willing to do so.

[Tarnowski] It looks like, in addition to the Czechs, the Hungarians, too, will be given a "membership card" in the club ahead of us.

[Hausner] For the time being this is not so certain. But even if it happens, let me reiterate that sequence of admission is purely a matter of prestige rather than of substance. What is important is to join the OECD together with the group whose admission is currently under way and which, in addition to the European countries, includes South Korea, whose membership is strongly championed by the Japanese and Americans.

[Tarnowski] Does this mean that we will have to give up expecting to be admitted at a time which we designated ourselves, namely, in mid-1996?

[Hausner] On the contrary, now that this date has been designated, we shall do everything to avoid its postponement. There exists a detailed timetable, nearly down to hours, for negotiations with the OECD committees which deal with issues of taxation, international investments, and capital flow. Each day Grzegorz Kolodko keeps asking me about the progress of the negotiations. Our efforts are supported by partners from the OECD. On our request, an additional meeting of two committees will be convened, which points to a far-reaching forthcoming attitude.

[Tarnowski] Quite recently it had seemed that Poland is well prepared for membership in the Organization for

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Economic Cooperation and Development. How did it happen that difficulties have suddenly begun to pile up?

[Hausner] It is true that the outcomes of the last few meetings were an unpleasant surprise to us. Nothing had indicated earlier that our reports would be declined or sent back for correction. Our offer of economic liberalization and restrictions on various financial sanctions was not, to be sure, as far-reaching as that of the Czechs, but it had seemed that it would be accepted. Besides, the Czechs themselves did not introduce all the liberalizing measures overnight, and instead presented a program for changes, their own "path for reaching" the goal. Everything had indicated that we would meet with the same response.

[Tarnowski] And yet, we flunked the preliminary examination, so to speak.

[Hausner] That is a good way of putting it. Candidates for OECD membership are obligated to present their plan of measures for liberalizing specific sectors of the economy. They do so in the form of reports which are transmitted in advance to experts and committee members. Some time afterward, there is a hearing at which additional questions are asked and doubts clarified. Ultimately, committee members, now at a closed hearing, grade the candidate. In a nutshell, these are not typical negotiations but rather something like an examination procedure. In principle, no one passes that examination the first time. But I believe that in two cases our reports were returned for corrections not because they were bad. They did meet the criteria, as we were unofficially told. But we submitted them in the presence of a political situation extremely difficult for Poland, during an acute government crisis. In such a situation it is hardly surprising that the examiner became more strict. We were told circumspectly that words are not enough and deeds are needed.

[Tarnowski] Does this mean that in this case we were treated differently than the Czechs and Hungarians?

[Hausner] Partially yes. But that is understandable. Early this year the political situation in Poland was too unstable. This was bound to affect the negotiations. In the last few years our governments changed much more frequently than those of our neighbors. This led to, in my opinion, unnecessary frequent personnel shifts at lower administrative levels. That also was adverse to us. We have been cooperating with the OECD since 1991, and I am now the fifth person in a row to hold the position of coordinator. My predecessors and I have had to learn everything from the ground up. Such frequent personnel changes have not, of course, affected the pace of work decisively, but they have made it no easier, and sometimes they simply unsettled our partners. Moreover, different ministries interpreted differently the need for urgent adaptation to OECD requirements. Until quite recently the pace of preparing our position had to be adapted to the "goodwill" of the most resistant minister. Hence the occasional snail's pace of progress.

[Tarnowski] Is this stage behind us by now?

[Hausner] As far as discrete ministries are concerned, probably yes. Now, much will depend on the progress that will be made by Sejm in passing drafts, labeled "Urgent," of amendments to laws governing the sale of land to foreigners as well as to laws on foreign companies. Also needed are revisions of tax laws. In addition, to avert any eventual sizable uncontrolled money transfers, the scope of the concept of bank secrecy has to be restricted and access to information on the bank accounts and financial operations of individuals and companies has be broadened. Sejm is working on two laws on environmental protection. Note, however, that there is no guarantee that all these laws will have smooth passage in Sejm. For example, PSL [Polish Peasant Party] deputies want the notation of urgency to be deleted from some drafts of law amendments, and that would immediately derail the entire timetable. In Poland, unlike in the Czech Republic, not everyone is aware of the importance of catching that "train." But I still believe that it can be done, and without upsetting the train timetable at that.

[Tarnowski] What specifically remains to be done by us?

[Hausner] We have not reached an agreement with the OECD's Tax Committee, which insists on preventing international holding companies from juggling profits and avoiding taxes. To make such manipulations more difficult, the finance minister shall soon issue appropriate instructions to tax offices, and in the future the applicable laws will be revised correspondingly. The Tax Committee also insists on limiting the scope of bank secrecy, and two other OECD committees, Capital Flow and Joint Ventures, expect of us that we liberalize banking transactions, permit the free sale of land to foreigners, and agree to the opening of branches of joint ventures in the insurance and finance sector.

[Tarnowski] All in all, these are big demands.

[Hausner] But certainly they are acceptable. We were going to take most of these measures on our own anyhow, but somewhat later, so the advantage is that we will thus sooner get rid of several problems. But what is not so acceptable is that certain OECD member countries are trying, on the occasion as it were, to nudge us on other, more marginal issues, such as the possibility

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of opening casinos in Poland by foreigners or the amount of the so-called user fees for public television, intended to protect domestic producers of television programs. In the last few weeks, during our regular meetings, OECD countries have often been making new suggestions, sometimes informally, which are, after all, difficult to ignore. That, too, of course, delays the entire negotiating process, but I believe that all these problems can be surmounted.

The lesson we have been learning is not yet over, and this leads to yet another conclusion. After all, the negotiations with the OECD are just a short run compared with the marathon run awaiting us in the future with the European Union. The attendant bureaucratic inertia and political differences, which have not yet been fully overcome, may effectively block our road to the EU.

[Tarnowski] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Cimoszewicz: Foreign Activity at Unprecedented Level

LD3004195096 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government has adopted the assumptions of Polish foreign policy that envisage Poland's quickest possible entry to NATO and the European Union and the maintenance of friendly contacts with its neighbors. For the first time, President Aleksander Kwasniewski took part in a session of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's Cabinet.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Marek Kupis] Both the president and the prime minister emphasized that the main objectives of Polish foreign policy were being implemented in a particularly dynamic fashion.

[Cimoszewicz] What we have been seeing over the past few months is an unprecedented campaign of Poland's political activity, and it would be hard to find even one significant instance of some dissonance, where it turned out that we were not finding complete understanding with our partners.

[Kupis] As examples of Poland's activity in the international arena, the president recalled his meetings with several heads of state and the prime minister's foreign trips. According to Aleksander Kwasniewski, cooperation in the field of foreign policy between the president, the prime minister, and the heads of individual departments proceeds very well.

[Kwasniewski] Because today foreign policy is not just activities of the MSZ [Foreign Affairs Ministry], foreign policy is much more than that. The world is so small that today everyone has international contacts, whether they deal with telecommunications, construction, sport, culture, or anything else, and all of this adds up to Poland's image and Poland's foreign policy.

[Kupis] Aleksander Kwasniewski announced that Poland would strive for close cooperation with Ukraine. Asked about an appraisal of the latest events in Belarus, the president replied that Poland was interested in a sovereign Belarus and was in favor of defense of human rights and the creation of a fully democratic state.

The government foreign policy assumptions will be presented to the Sejm by the head of the foreign service [Dariusz Rosati] in 10 days. [end recording]

Poland: Kwasniewski on Role, Basic Law, Church, Oleksy

WS0105103096 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 30 Apr-3 May 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Oliwia Malecka, Roman Brzozowski, and Jakub Rzekanowski; place and date not given: "The President Is a Midfield Player"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [TRYBUNA] Do you not think that work on the new constitution has been slowed down?

[Kwasniewski] Yes, I believe it has been slowed, in a way. The presidential campaign dominated our political life to a great extent. In the [Sejm Constitutional] commission itself there have been personnel changes. This commission turned out to be a real creator of cadres. I was elected president, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz was appointed prime minister. Marek Mazurkiewicz, who chairs the commission right now, assures me solemnly that he is not aspiring to an office higher than that of the chairman...

The commission is currently working on difficult, novel chapters of the constitution, regarding such issues as finances and the budget. Never before has so much been written in a constitution about the position of the central bank. The commission still has to prepare the introductory regulations. This work requires a great deal of precision. The summer will be devoted to editorial work, to the "elimination" of certain repetitions. After the summer holidays, the parliament will be able to proceed to the second reading of the bill, which will add momentum to the legislative process.

[TRYBUNA] You have declared yourself to be an advocate of liberalizing the antiabortion law. So far, however, we have not seen any presidential initiative on this issue.

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[Kwasniewski] Still, an initiative has been launched by a group of deputies. My views on the issue of liberalizing this law do not differ from what the deputies are proposing. I believe that this initiative has been launched by a group of very competent deputies. For this reason, I believe that any additional initiatives are simply unnecessary. I expect the Sejm to liberalize the law, and I will certainly sign it.

[TRYBUNA] Aside from abortion, another problem which disturbs the left-wing electorate is the concordat. How exactly does your stand on the concordat differ from the stance taken by the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]?

[Kwasniewski] Within the SLD itself views on this issue vary—from very uncompromising to more moderate opinions, which I have expressed myself. My position on this problem remains unchanged. I believe that it is necessary to seek solutions which will prevent a conflict between the state and the church in Poland at the end of the 20th century. Such a conflict would be a terrible misfortune as well as a waste of time. The concordat is the tip of the iceberg, as it were. A considerable part of society is watching some of the practices of the representatives of the church hierarchy with concern. Hence the fear of those people; they do not know whether vaguely formulated provisions of the concordat will not make their lives more difficult. They fear that one of the Polish churches may receive greater privileges than others.

The problem is that from the formal point of view, the concordat has been signed by the Polish authorities and the parliament ought to decide whether it is in favor of or against its ratification. If it turns out that there exists a possibility of clarifying the doubts, this must be done publicly, with the curtain raised. Certain talks are already under way, but it is still too early to say whether they will yield any results. [passage omitted]

I hope that my visit to the Vatican will take place. I realize, however, that it is very difficult to go there when the issue of the concordat remains in suspension. If we had not ratified a bilateral agreement with another country over a period of three years, there would also be difficulties in paying official visits there.

[TRYBUNA] Has your vision of holding the presidential office come true?

[Kwasniewski] I am not experiencing any surprises or disappointments. The last three months have been full of meetings, contacts, events. In this respect, this office demands a lot. The most difficult thing to accept is this special kind of loneliness. As a result of the tight calendar, protocol, and the personal protection, even my closest friends find it difficult to meet and talk with me.

[TRYBUNA] So far you have been saying that the presidential model in Poland should be something in between the chancellorship system and the presidential system. Do you still think so, or perhaps your position has altered your view?

[Kwasniewski] My position has not changed my view. The Polish president should be a guard for balance, a stabilization factor between the parliament and the government. Of course, there is more to it than merely legal regulations; a lot depends on individual people. Therefore, I am satisfied to be able to say that over the last three months we have managed to create a system of cooperation between the government and the president in which there is no friction. In my opinion, this proves the maturity of the democratic institutions and the people who are holding public offices. Some are even complaining, saying that there is too much boredom, and inventing artificial problems.

[TRYBUNA] Should the president be only a mediator, or should he also be an initiator of political actions?

[Kwasniewski] He should combine the two. If need be, because a serious dispute has arisen, the president should act as a mediator wherever it is necessary to protect the key state institutions; in such cases he should present his own initiatives. Recently, I launched an initiative to put an end to the problem of the [communist] Security Services files, which began before 1989 and has been dragging on for years. Now I am working on another draft which supports the independence of the central bank.

[TRYBUNA] Do you not fear that the president's powers may be reduced? What about the idea of subordinating the Office of State Protection [UOP] to the prime minister? Such a regulation would strengthen the position of the prime minister.

[Kwasniewski] So far the head of the UOP has been appointed by the prime minister on the motion of the internal affairs minister. In this case, the role of the president is rather limited. The new idea envisions establishment of a collegium for the security services; one place at this collegium would be reserved for a representative of the president. I support such a solution. The UOP will operate efficiently when its tasks are specified by those who bear constitutional responsibility for the country and for its security. Therefore, I do not look upon this as a reduction of my powers. [passage omitted]

[TRYBUNA] However, politicians keep giving us sensational news. For a few months, they leveled charges

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at Jozef Oleksy. What are your reflections on the whole issue now that the prosecutor's office has announced its decision?

[Kwasniewski] I am glad that Jozef Oleksy has been exonerated from the charges. I appreciate the fact that the entire case was handled democratically, in line with generally accepted rules and with the declarations which I made after assuming office: I am glad that it was handled by an independent and nonpolitical prosecutor's office and by a special Sejm commission. This proves the stability and maturity of Polish democratic institutions.

I am embarrassed to hear remarks that are being made, now that the prosecutor's office has made its decision. Professor Kubicki, a prominent lawyer, evaluated these ideas quite unequivocally. In a democratic, legal state people are not brought before a court of law unless an indictment has been issued. This must not be changed, neither as an experiment nor for the sake of enhancing the credibility of the state, because this would in fact prove the opposite: lack of legal principles, not their observance.

[TRYBUNA] What are Mrs. Jolanta Kwasniewski's plans for the immediate future? Does she intend to follow in the footsteps of the previous president's wife and engage in charity activities?

[Kwasniewski] She has begun doing that already. She also is planning to organize a foundation to help people who turn to the president's office, to me, to my wife, for help. This is a huge number of people. [passage omitted]

Poland: Commission Deputy Chief on Oleksy Case

WS0105104096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 26 Apr 96 p 6

[Interview with Bogdan Borusewicz, deputy of the Freedom Union and deputy head of a special parliamentary commission for the Jozef Oleksy case, by correspondent Jaroslaw Kurski in Warsaw; date not given: "A Prosecutor Like an Attorney"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *[Borusewicz] Public Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz has pointed out only those elements that support the theory that Oleksy is innocent. He has, however, totally dismissed everything that could lead to the conclusion that he is guilty.*

[Kurski] Jozef Oleksy maintains that "justice has been done." Well, has it?

[Borusewicz] Jozef Oleksy can say that it has, but he is a party to this case. And the case is going to burden Polish political life for many years to come.

[Kurski] Why is that so? Doesn't the decision to *discontinue the investigation close* the case once and for all?

[Borusewicz] This decision could be questioned by a higher ranking prosecutor who would review the case. Nonetheless, I do not expect it to happen. From the legal point of view, the case has been closed.

[Kurski] And is it closed from the political point of view?

[Borusewicz] No, it is not. Controversies over it will remain. The legal course of the case has been discontinued by a prosecutor, who is a member of the state administration, and not by an independent court of justice.

[Kurski] Does it mean that it would be better if Oleksy had been judged by a court of justice?

[Borusewicz] If he is innocent, as he says he is, it would be better for him to be acquitted by a court and not by a prosecutor.

[Kurski] Still, to bring somebody to justice, the prosecutor has to be assured of substantiating the charges.

[Borusewicz] Indeed, Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz is not assured of substantiated charges. During the commission hearings I asked him a number of questions. Unfortunately, the answers have not dispelled my doubts.

[Kurski] Yes, what kind of doubts?

[Borusewicz] Those connected to the fact that passing the judgment on Milczanowski the prosecutor has gone beyond his competence and usurped some of the commission's work. That he has slighted General Zacharski, writing that, in his statements, the general "reached an unintended humorous effect." That he has questioned the authenticity of the report blaming Oleksy, and, in the next sentence he has given a critical analysis of this document. This is a logical error. What is the use of analyzing a document which one is assured is entirely false?

The prosecutor, rightfully, does not consider a tape recording to be [potential] evidence in a case. At the same time, he questions Zacharski's testimony about the meeting [between Oleksy and Alganov] at Majorca, arguing that Zacharski is unable to support it with a tape recording.

Also the fact that the prosecutor does not mention that Alganov has threatened Polish officers raises doubts. I know about it from the commission inquiries.

Finally, I do not think that disclosing so many precise pieces of information in the justification statement was necessary.

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I have asked about these and many other things. The answers have not been satisfactory.

[Kurski] Do not you like the verdict?

[Borusewicz] I do not. The prosecutor points out only those elements that support the theory that Oleksy is innocent. He, however, totally dismisses everything that could lead to the conclusion that he is guilty.

[Kurski] Have any circumstances indicating Oleksy's guilt appeared during the commission hearings?

[Borusewicz] Yes, they have, in the witnesses' testimonies. Please, remember that the investigation has been discontinued because of the lack of characteristics of a crime, and not because evidence was lacking. The prosecutor has, simply, come to the conclusion that no crime was committed at all.

[Kurski] And why hasn't Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz familiarized himself with shorthand reports of the commission's work?

[Borusewicz] He made such a request and the commission agreed [to provide the reports]. But everything was stopped by Minister Siemiatkowski, who is the person in the position to render "secret materials of special importance" accessible. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] did not make that decision, maintaining that he had not managed yet to go through the materials himself.

[Kurski] Is it possible that had Gorzkiewicz read the shorthand materials, they would have influenced his decision?

[Borusewicz] I do not know. But I consider the fact that he did not read them as being a case of serious neglect.

[Kurski] Andrzej Milczanowski has said that the prosecutor's statement is more like a speech by an Oleksy attorney.

[Borusewicz] The justification [of the verdict] does contain a proper balance between "for" and "against."

[Kurski] What does it point to?

[Borusewicz] ... (silence) [as published]

[Kurski] Did the prosecutor's office act independently?

[Borusewicz] The commission has asked the prosecutors about that. The answers have been affirmative. Those who have been asked have not revealed any cases of political interference in their work. If there have been such cases and they are disclosed in the future, they are going to be fully responsible for that.

[Kurski] The prosecutor maintains that Zacharski applied for the post of head of Prime Minister Oleksy's office and was rebuffed. Now, according to Gorzkiewicz, this is why the motive of personal revenge has directed *some of the general's actions.*

[Borusewicz] This motive never appeared in Oleksy's testimony. For me, this is something completely new. Although the prosecutor has not made it explicit, this is blaming Zacharski and questioning the reliability of his testimony.

[Kurski] On the one hand, the prosecutor states that the Office of State Protection [UOP] has acted in accordance with the law, and, on the other, that Zacharski has been driven by personal motives. Is there no inconsistency to that?

[Borusewicz] There is some. The prosecutor also questions the reliability of one of the intelligence informers. He lists material interests, low incentives, and alcohol. Just as if he did not know that services from all over the world use such methods, which absolutely does not mean that the information gathered in this way is of lower value.

[Kurski] Are there grounds to bring Milczanowski before the State Tribunal, as the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SDRP] would like to do?

[Borusewicz] There is no legal basis for that, although political motives were, undoubtedly, important in the Oleksy case. Notifying the prosecutor's office about the case a week before the swearing-in ceremony of the new president was a politically based decision.

[Kurski] What does it mean?

[Borusewicz] It means that the lost presidential elections and the perspective of Walesa's leaving office stood behind the decision.

[Kurski] Are you be saying that the case was not well enough prepared, from the evidence and operational points of view.

[Borusewicz] The fact that the prosecutor was able to discontinue the investigation is an argument for that. Still, when the prosecutor starts an investigation in cases of spying, usually, detention and inspection come immediately, and operational activities, such as listening and observation are applied. Because of the political realities—Oleksy was still a ruling prime minister—it was impossible to use those means.

[Kurski] What is your opinion on Milczanowski's role in the whole case?

[Borusewicz] For me, he acted unreasonably. He should not have submitted his resignation after he disclosed publicly the whole case. His duty was to protect those

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who were directly involved in the investigation. After all, he must have expected a counterattack from that side. That he, anyway, would have been removed from the MSW, does not justify his decision at all. That he left office together with the president, shows that he was more of a Lech Walesa man than a statesman.

[Kurski] This is, precisely, what the SDRP is saying. Maybe, then, he should be brought before the Tribunal.

[Borusewicz] The SDRP maintains that Milczanowski broke the law. But he did not. The SDRP maintains that it was a provocation. I consider the thesis about the provocation to be totally groundless. That is simply an allegation against those services.

[Kurski] And how should Milczanowski have behaved if, as you say, he were not Walesa's man but a statesman?

[Borusewicz] I have already said that he should have remained in office.

[Kurski] The Presidium of the SDRP Supreme Council has stated: "The prosecutor's decision reveals the whole mechanism of the political provocation directed against the democratic state. Lech Walesa's camp attempted to change the layout of power created as the result of the electoral decision of millions of the Poles."

[Borusewicz] This is the language of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] statements of the 1950's. Do the authors of the statement not realize that the commission, which includes representatives of the Left Democratic Alliance [SLD, the SDRP is a part of the alliance], has reached different conclusions. One can come to the conclusion that, for the SDRP, the work of the commission means nothing.

[Kurski] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is of the opinion that the officers who led the investigation against Oleksy should be suspended from their duties.

[Borusewicz] This is a scandal. Cimoszewicz has acquired for himself the name of a man of restraint and good judgment in the SLD. Saying that a purge is necessary in the special services, even if it could impair the services, destroys that reputation. The security of the state is not important. The important thing is to take one's revenge. This is something completely surprising. The state apparatus is not the property of one political group. The employees of the special services, who are officials of the state, must be aware that if they fulfill their duties, no matter who may be hurt by their findings—the prime minister, the president, or a deputy—they are not going to suffer any consequences of that.

The commission has stated that the UOP has been acting in accordance with the law, which has, anyway, been admitted by Prosecutor Gorzkiewicz. At a commission hearing, Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has distanced himself from Cimoszewicz's idea. I am afraid that this has only been a verbal statement.

[Kurski] The prime minister is suggesting that all the materials connected to the Oleksy case should be made available to the public.

[Borusewicz] Very well, I could welcome such a proposal, but only if it is put forward at the behest of the prime minister. I am an opposition deputy and I do not have to put myself in a position worse than that of the prime minister. He demands opening the files, not taking into account the well-being of the state. Being on the opposition's side, I have to oppose that. If the prime minister wants to make such a decision, he may do so.

[Kurski] What will happen if he does?

[Borusewicz] For a couple of years the [special] services cooperating with the east will be paralyzed. Poland will be opened to operations by foreign intelligence services. But then the authors of the idea of indiscriminately disclosing the documents of the case will have to answer for jeopardizing the security of Poland. I advise everyone to think twice before making such decisions.

[Kurski] Why has the prosecutor discontinued the investigation of Alganov and (Jakimishin), the KGB residents in Warsaw?

[Borusewicz] Because the proceedings against them were connected to the Oleksy case. Discontinuing the investigation of the Oleksy case automatically results in dismissing the cases of the two officers.

[Kurski] Should not the prosecutor's office initiate, on the basis of its own prerogatives, an investigation of the two residents?

[Borusewicz] Undoubtedly, Alganow and (Jakimishin) were regular officers of the KGB and they were not sent to Poland to read the press.

[Kurski] And should Polish diplomacy and the Polish prosecutor's office just overlook that?

[Borusewicz] To formally accuse someone, it is necessary to prove that their activities were against the law; that they were involved in spying. The fact alone that someone introduces himself during a press conference as a KGB resident in Warsaw is not enough. It rarely happens that charges are made against regular officers employed as diplomats. The job of intelligence

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and counterintelligence is to trail and control such visitors. If the services are paralyzed, then, certainly, all these residencies will be exempt from punishment and out of any control.

[Kurski] Is this the end of the "Oleksy case?"

[Borusewicz] I do not think that this case should be returned to after each political upheaval. This for purely humane reasons, too. The case may be returned to if there appears new circumstances connected to it, and not if the coalition changes.

[Kurski] Despite all these doubts?

[Borusewicz] Despite them ...

Poland: UW Views Oleksy Case, Right-Wing Political Ties

WS3004123996 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 Apr 96 p 3

[Article by "EM, WZ": "The Coalition Steps on the Brakes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The coalition is hand-steering the economy and increasing the dominance of the two coalition parties in the structures of the state; Oleksy bears both political and moral responsibility; the Office of State Protection [UOP] should not fall victim to revenge. These are the results of yesterday's session of the Council of the Freedom Union [UW].*

The UW Council agreed that it is necessary for Solidarity parties to arrive at an agreement before the elections. This agreement should be reached with the support of Lech Walesa and should be based on a previously discussed platform. According to UW leader Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland is not a regular Western democracy, where the country can be administered by the government only. "The coalition is using blockades: It has not begun reforming the social security system, a reform of the education system has been halted in the Sejm by the Polish Teachers Union, the self-governmental reform has been abandoned, and privatization of banks has been replaced by a program of their consolidation," Balcerowicz stated. "What the prime minister is managing is inaction," said Aleksander Smolar.

"A years-long, close friendship with an agent of a state on which Poland was dependent is reprehensible," Balcerowicz said. According to him, there are no grounds for saying that it was a political provocation. He warned that the Oleksy case would become an "area of manipulation" for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

The resolution adopted by UW mentions the moral and political responsibility of Jozef Oleksy and cautions against any attempt to take revenge on the UOP functionaries who "protected Poland from being penetrated by a foreign intelligence service." UW discussed the subject of making public the files on the Oleksy case. Only Jacek Taylor warned: Disclosure of the work methods used by the Polish security services spells an exposure of those services. "Then we will find that an offense has been committed, and we will demand that those who are guilty of it should be punished," he said.

"Right now we cannot afford egoistic individualism," Balcerowicz said. UW should be a close-knit party capable of forming a reform-oriented post-August coalition. He distanced himself from Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland: "A threat to reforms is posed not only by the coalition, but also by the socialist right wing. Its recipes are no better than what is being carried out right now."

Jan Litynski, who is responsible for the talks of the UW leadership with Solidarity, declared that he is a moderate optimist in estimating the chances of success of those talks. "In Solidarity, there is a growing conviction that it is no longer possible to be only a reclaiming movement, so, if Solidarity is elected to the parliament, it will be capable of governing." Litynski pointed out that UW wants to reach agreements on specific branches (education, health, social security) with Solidarity. Bronislaw Komorowski decided that Balcerowicz's declarations were too cautious. "To take power away from the SLD, we need a great post-Solidarity bloc 'from one wall to the other.'" He listed such parties as the Movement of One Hundred, the Party of Christian Democrats, the Center Accord, and the Christian-National Union. He proposed that such a coalition should ask Walesa to support it. Skeptics claimed that formation of such a great coalition would be rather unlikely. Syryjczyk warned against uniting the right wing "on the principles of communicating with individual circles"—that is, instead of reaching agreements with parties, making alliances with groups within those parties. He said that an agreement with the parties that say that nothing has been done since 1989 is impossible. "I was a minister in a Solidarity government. What do you expect? I should take part in the elections, saying that I have not done anything?"

The most radical views were voiced by Stanislaw Stomma (one of the founders of the Forum of the Democratic Right Wing in 1990, which then joined the Democratic Union). He became one of the members of the UW Council yesterday. According to Stomma, UW should run in the elections on its own: "This party is needed because it is neither on the left nor on the right; it is not burdened with any ideological disputes between the left wing and the right wing."

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Poland: Ex-Chief Critical of UOP Leadership Change

96EP0046A Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 10 Mar 96 No 10, p 5

[Article by Krzysztof Kozlowski, former UOP chief: "Something Bad Has Happened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's acceptance of the resignation of Gromoslaw Czempinski means that his declarations about treating the political opposition as a partner on issues concerning the suprapartisan interests of Poland diverge from the facts. Cimoszewicz and other SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] politicians politely listen to the arguments of the opposition and then a moment later do what they want.*

The arguments against Czempinski's dismissal were self-evident. The republic cannot afford to get rid of good nonpartisan civil servants and functionaries, not just because of their professional expertise. I consider General Czempinski to be one of the ablest officers of the UOP (Office for State Protection). Several years ago I had been one of those who advocated his appointment as the head of the UOP, despite the reservations raised from various directions, including the Western services cooperating with the UOP. After a while our Western partners, too, realized that it was a good choice.

As is known, in their contacts with the as yet not fully stabilized countries of Central-East Europe, the westerners trust not only the institutions—which change considerably from moment to moment—but also particular individuals whom they know and with whom they cooperate. Nowadays the number of such individuals in the power structures, and not just at the Ministry of Internal Affairs at that, is steadily diminishing. This is bound to affect adversely Poland's image in the Western world.

Another reason why I was opposed to Czempinski's resignation is because I fear the return of the old PRL-era [Polish People's Republic] principle that competence counts less than "trust." That precisely was the locution uttered by the governing elite, "political trust." Nowadays this is to be the paramount criterion for staffing public posts. Besides, this is reflected not just in Czempinski's recall but also, for example, in the appointment of the new Krakow Voivode (Professor Jacek Machrowski, linked to the SLD, a respected Jagiellonian University professor but one hardly known to have administrative experience; moreover, the voivodship dietine did not approve of him).

Striking here is that the individuals leaving the UOP nowadays include not only those who had come to the Ministry of Internal Affairs after 1989, but also those who had worked at that ministry before 1989. Properly speaking, they are not leaving it but are being sacked, or, to put it tactfully, forced to resign. The issue of leaks from the UOP merely provided Prime Minister Cimoszewicz with a convenient pretext. I attended a meeting of the ministry's advisory committee which considered Czempinski's resignation. Also present were General Czempinski himself and Minister Siemiatkowski. It was obvious to everyone that had the minister made the least gesture toward the general, Czempinski would have withdrawn his resignation. But from the outset Siemiatkowski acted as if the matter were preordained.

What will be the long-term consequences of this situation to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the UOP?

First, we are seeing that the ministry is becoming increasingly dominated by the party. The resignation of the head of the UOP was preceded by the departure of the director of counterintelligence, Konstanty Miodowicz. Even earlier, Prime Minister Oleksy had fired Deputy Minister Henryk Jasik. Intelligence Chief General Bogdan Libera found himself in a difficult situation, since intelligence is to the SLD the principal "culprit" in having brought to light the Oleksy affair (by contributing to the discovery of contacts between the former prime minister and Russian intelligence). This also applies to General Wiktor Fonfara, the chief of the Directorate of Investigation. In this situation, Deputy Minister Jerzy Zimowski intends to resign. As is already known, he will be replaced by someone from the PSL [Polish Peasant Party]. In addition, there already are two deputy ministers of internal affairs who are linked to the SLD—Zbigniew Sobotka and Andrzej Anklewicz, until recently senior adviser to Oleksy.

Secondly, it is unprecedented for Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski to be appointed merely "Acting Director" of the UOP for a period of several months. Not because of his personal qualities (I consider Colonel Kapkowski to be a good officer), but because anyone who is an "acting director" cannot effectively direct the affairs of the UOP. That office is a structure of a military nature. The subordinates, whether soldiers or functionaries of the UOP, have to know who gives the orders and bears responsibility for them. An "acting director" will find it very difficult to make any major decisions. Yet at the UOP such decisions are continually being made, since that office continually takes part in the "intelligence war" so as to protect national security. The temporary nature of such appointment may result in impeding the work of the UOP.

Thirdly, why has the SLD decided to recall General Czempinski and appoint an "acting director"? It seems that the reason is to "muffle" the UOP's intelligence

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and, principally, counterintelligence activities, which have become a threat to certain members of the SLD's leadership. It has thus turned out that, to the SLD, partisan considerations—protecting its own people at any price and staffing every possible position with them—are more important than national security.

Several days ago the Sejm investigating committee discovered that the UOP still has not provided the procurature with all the material on Oleksy. The committee chairperson, Deputy Lucyna Pietrzyk, and her vice chairperson, Deputy Bogdan Borusewicz, stated in this connection that they felt troubled by Czempinski's recall. In such an atmosphere I consider it hardly likely for the Oleksy affair to come to trial. SLD members are even now saying this plainly—of course off-stage, in private conversations.

The partisan domination of the UOP creates yet another threat. In 1990, when I was the first director of the UOP, and subsequently the minister of internal affairs, one of my main objectives was to integrate within the same institution the "old men" from the former Ministry of Internal Affairs and SB [Security Service], those who passed their vetting, with the "young" post-1989 men. I wanted their evaluation and advancement to be based chiefly on performance. That aim was largely accomplished. But nowadays as I look on the maneuvers of the SLD around the UOP and observe that party's signals that it needs people in executive posts who understand its own interests, my impression is that this may destroy the concept, adopted in 1990, of the Office for State Protection as an institution serving the state and consisting of "old" and "new" men who accepted certain goals and ideas.

Something bad has happened. When the Office for State Protection began to operate effectively and score successes in combatting foreign intelligence services, it hurt the interests of one party, the SLD, which felt itself threatened. So now the UOP is being punished for its activities, which served and serve national interests.

Poland: Opposition Voices Concern Over New Government Policies

96EP0040B Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish 3 Mar 96 No 9, p 3

[Article by Aleksander Hall, Conservative Party leader: "Declarations and Deeds"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The formation of the Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz government places the opposition in a clear-cut situation. Everything indicates that parliamentary elections will be held next year. Until then, the PSL/SLD [Polish Peasant Party-Democratic Left Alliance] coalition not only will remain in power but also, exploiting the alignment of forces in the parliament, will be able to carry out any political decision and any legislative initiative. The center-right opposition (in which I also include Freedom Union) could, instead of giving in to illusions about a return to power, given the current parliamentary alignment, focus on its paramount objective: preparing for voters an alternative to the governing bloc. It has gained time. Will it know how to utilize it?

Unfortunately, that is not at all certain. The months that have elapsed since the presidential elections have largely been wasted. It had seemed that Kwasniewski's victory would mobilize us. Even more so considering that the more than 48 percent of the vote gained by Lech Walesa in the runoff elections meant that Poland is politically divided in half. Organizing a bloc of Post-August Poland has become an evident goal, the more so considering that our opponents were, and are, well organized and politically strong and efficient. Yet, the leaders of the principal opposition parties have not even been able to meet in order to express a desire to cooperate. This is all the more surprising considering the recent Oleksy affair which caused an almost unanimous charge of the opposition that a national crisis existed and the postcommunists should be removed from power.

A yawning abyss has opened between words and deeds. Freedom Union, that largest opposition grouping in the parliament, moved for the formation of a government for rebuilding the credibility of the state, to be headed by Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. The idea was good in theory, but divorced from reality. In his turn, Ryszard Czarnecki, the leader of the Christian-National Union (Zchn) claimed that the prime minister of the new government that would have to be formed without the participation of the SLD would have to be a PSL politician, apparently recognizing that it is precisely the PSL that is most motivated to rebuild the credibility of the government. A common feature of these ideas, voiced at a time of political crisis, has been counting on the cooperation and good will of one of the governing groupings, especially the PSL, or of President Kwasniewski. Essentially, that was an admission of impotence.

Also doomed to failure was the attempt to extort from the governing coalition a change in its privatization policy, undertaken on the initiative of Lech Walesa by NSZZ Solidarity. That was a test of strength between the opposition and the governing coalition, but I believe the time and place of the confrontation were poorly chosen.

Consolidation or Marginalization

The truth has to be looked in the eye: In the present parliamentary alignment the opposition originating from the Solidarity movement is, and shall remain, impotent.

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Its future will be decided outside that parliament, however. That will depend on the ability of the forces of Post-August Poland to reach a consensus in the face of the existing divisions. Public opinion surveys leave no doubt: Unless the post-Solidarity camp consolidates itself, the next elections will be decisively won by the SLD, which may gain more than 50 percent of the seats in the next Sejm. Such is the logic of the electoral rules. The polls also indicate that a united stand in the election would afford a realistic chance of electoral victory to the Post-August Poland camp.

Of course, creating it will not come easily. I am not ignoring the differences in party programs, and especially the baggage of personal and partisan conflicts inherited from the successive divisions that took place after 1989. Recreating the ability to cooperate is possible only in an extraordinary situation, such as has arisen following Kwasniewski's victory in the presidential elections. The opposition has become marginalized, and, unless we open our eyes and act, it will not regain its influence on governance and national issues.

An electoral bloc of Post-August Poland should not mean any artificial union or obliteration of differences. The principal currents and groupings that emerged from the former democratic opposition and the Solidarity movement will retain their ideological and programmatic identity. An accord would concern common program planks to be agreed upon.

SLD Threats

An attempt to reach such an accord may fail, but then not even making such an attempt will demonstrate both a loss of the instinct for self-preservation and the failure to treat seriously the admonitions of opposition leaders about the threats to Poland implicit in SLD government. I believe that these threats should be viewed very seriously. The four principal such threats are as follows:

1. The uncertainty as to hewing to the line of Polish foreign policy in a worsening international situation.

The Polish *raison d'etat* and historic opportunity afforded by the collapse of the Soviet empire consist in a change in our geopolitical position, in sinking Poland's roots permanently in the West. This can be accomplished through joining the European Union and NATO. The principal political forces in Poland, including the SLD, are in agreement on this. I am not questioning the sincerity of the declarations of SLD leaders. But I doubt whether the views they express are representative of their political support base, including the SdRP [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland] activists. Among these people, anti-Western phobias have been kept alive, along with an inclination to take a studiously balanced view of the potential threats from the West and the East.

The SLD leaders who at present exert a decisive influence on the policy of the Polish state are declaring fidelity to the line of Polish foreign policy laid down in the years 1989-92. However, the international situation is changing to our disadvantage. In Russia the imperial tendency is becoming increasingly pronounced, with its spokesmen reserving the right to restrict Poland's room for maneuvering on the international scene, and especially on the issue of our country's aspiration to join NATO. The West is increasingly taking into consideration the Russian position. And yet there are very great indications that following the presidential elections in Russia the situation may worsen even more drastically. What would then be the response of SLD leaders, who have become the helmsmen of Polish policy? One thing is certain: Neither the history of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party], the lineal ancestor of the SdRP, nor their political biographies afford sufficient guarantees that the course of Polish foreign policy will be upheld determinedly in a time of trial.

2. The spoiling of the economy by institutionalized corruption and political "favoritism."

Such words, precisely, were used recently in an article in POLITYKA by Professor Jan Winiecki to characterize the economic practices of the SLD/PSL governing coalition. I agree with his assessment. The subsidies, rebates, and various kinds of services provided to the political clientele of the SLD and PSL in the long run not only may threaten the current growth trends in the Polish economy, but also will perpetuate the relics of socialism in the economy and social structure; moreover, they are contributing to the formation of a model of party-state capitalism under which a company's market position depends largely on its political ties and benefits to the governing coalition.

3. The danger of a "Mexicanization" of the political system.

Even in the most deeply rooted democratic system a situation of permanent disequilibrium between the governing camp and the opposition leads to adverse consequences. A strong opposition that preserves a realistic chance of winning the next elections guarantees the viability of the democratic system and serves as a check on those in power. Our democracy—its institutions, standards, and customs—is, as yet, only taking shape. Thus, an explicit imbalance between the government and the opposition is particularly dangerous, especially when the present government originates in a direct line from parties which had until quite recently treated the country

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as the domain of their own exclusive, ideologically assured, influence and when political power is combined with economic power.

There is a real danger of the emergence in Poland of a system under which freedom of public opinion and democratic liberties exist but in practice there exists no alternative of removing the rulers from power. Precisely such a system has existed for decades in Mexico under the governments of the Revolutionary-Institutional Party.

4. The negative role of authoritative public figures in shaping public morale.

There is no doubt that the conduct of the political class—which is anyhow negatively viewed by public opinion, as every poll indicates—has been shaped by the poor image presented by public figures. It would be hypocritical to blame the politicians of the currently governing camp alone for this situation. The political class deriving from Solidarity also has many sins on its conscience, especially those committed while it governed the country: inability to combine forces for the common good, obstinacy in fratricidal political disputes, and arrogance and lack of imagination. This discouraged participation in public life and repelled potential voters. Our mistakes harmed us first of all, while the steps taken by the SLD camp contributed to demoralizing society. The SLD is not only a formation united by a common past but also one espousing a particular relativistic view of the past and obliterating the picture of historical truth. In the domain of values, it interprets freedom as liberation from adherence to many traditional and fundamental norms and praise of a pragmatism based on the principle, "the end justifies the means." This view of an easier life has been accepted by many Poles, as demonstrated by the election of Aleksander Kwasniewski to the Polish presidency, the election of a man who is highly representative of not only the SLD as a political force but also that views it espouses as mentioned above.

I firmly believe that in the long run such views are at least as dangerous to Poland as the SLD's actions in the domain of sheer politics and the economy.

The reasons why steps should be taken to create a political force capable of competing with the SLD are simply too numerous. At present, such a force should principally include all those parties which have emerged from the former democratic opposition and the Solidarity movement. Thus it would be a coalition. It is highly important that a modern rightist formation should be a major part of that coalition. But that has yet to be built. And that is a horse of a different color.

Poland: Minister Views Threats, Obstacles to Privatization

WS0105094096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Apr-3 May 96 p 9

[Article by Adam Maciejewski: "Prospects of Privatization; a Springboard for Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Wieslaw Kaczmarek, threats to privatization in Poland can be found not only in politics, but also in the legal and economic spheres. Privatization constitutes a political springboard used by many politicians. Quite often they became visible on the political scene only thanks to their total criticism of the privatization processes, the minister said yesterday [29 April] during the two-day Forum Finances 1996 meeting, organized by GAZETA BANKOWA and the Securities Commission.

Kaczmarek expressed the hope that, even before the new election campaign, it would be possible to get off the ground a project of retirement pension funds that would include far better companies than those that have been incorporated in the National Investment Funds program.

The minister recalled that, early in the 1990's, it was planned that half of the Polish state-run companies would be privatized within three years. He believes that the great discrepancy between the declarations and the actual results was a consequence of the insufficient powers of the Privatization Ministry, bad legal instruments, and a lack of money. Incidentally, the Polish budget regulations still do not correspond to the needs of the Privatization Ministry. The ministry is obtaining revenues from privatization; these revenues depend on many unpredictable factors, such as the situation on world markets. This cannot be allowed for in the budget law. In Kaczmarek's opinion, delays in the privatization of the power industry, for example, result primarily from lack of a modern power industry law that would take into consideration all of the EU regulations, among other things. Talking about privatization of the pharmaceutical sector, he mentioned that right now we are witnessing a process of consolidation among world firms. Meanwhile, the basic task that most Polfa [Polish pharmaceutical plants] are facing at the moment is adjusting to the requirements of the GMP [not further identified] by 1998. Satisfaction of these norms requires a lot of money, but it is absolutely necessary if Polish pharmaceutical plants want to survive in the conditions of European competition.

One of the legal problems is the fact that the regulation specifying the right of the work force to purchase up to 20 percent of a given company's shares remains unchanged. This provision is beginning to halt privati-

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zation of companies that have been transformed into firms operating under commercial law [spolki prawa handlowego] because the employees are entitled to buy shares for the equivalent of a year's wages the day the company is commercialized. Also, only the work force, not the Privatization Ministry, is entitled to initiate the privatization process. Even serious investors will not succeed if it proves impossible to encourage "initiative among the employees."

According to the privatization minister, an obstacle to quick privatization is not only the imposition of high standards, such as in the case of the companies quoted on the Stock Exchange. In many cases it is the directors of companies that oppose privatization. For many of them, introduction of an investor spells a great change in the established order in the companies they are running. The minister revealed that, in several plants, he had to dismiss the directors, who torpedoed privatization by inciting the work force to protest; the only reason for such action was the fact that the strategic investors were not companies the directors knew earlier.

Investors are also discouraged by the high risk of going into business in Poland, which is caused by lack of appropriate legal regulations. At the same time, foreign partners are also taking into account issues related to protection of the environment. They demand that the State Treasury commit itself to providing money for any possible damages in the future. However, the Privatization Ministry is unable to build up reserves for this purpose from the money it obtains from the sale of companies. [passage omitted]

Poland: Lack of Uniform Tax Regulation Criticized

96EP0044A Krakow TYGODNIK MALOPOLSKA in Polish 7 Mar 96 No 10, p 4

[Article by Andrzej Patula: "Socialism Remains a Bogey"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The average man in Poland cannot avail himself of his rights without risking trouble and verbal abuse. But some others act lawlessly, and not a hair will fall from their heads. In our country we are not equal under the law.

The recent tax confusion is a clinical example of the games that thoroughly socialism-saturated officials and politicians can play with the law. The law on the personal income tax permits tax deductions for charitable purposes. This allowance, which benefits many people, and which is exceptional for the Polish tax system, enables individuals to dispose of their hard-earned money on their own and as they wish. Previously, for years we had been inured by the authorities to let sullen officials wearing sleeve protectors decide on our personal incomes and expenditures.

Under real socialism, tax deductions for charitable purposes were simply out of the question. If an individual nevertheless dared to admit his benefaction, he was dragged through government offices and exposed to fines, surcharges, and accusations. All such persons, without exception, were viewed by the authorities as criminals, embezzlers, and crooks. It had seemed that in recent years such things had changed. But Minister Kolodko's behavior shows that nothing has changed.

The representatives of the SLD-PSL (Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party) governing coalition have apparently not forgotten the lectures on "financial policy" at evening courses on Marxism, as well as their own longtime experience in exercising power. The first to comment was Prime Minister Cimoszewicz. Feeling "concerned" because, owing to such charitable deductions, the state budget will "lose" several trillion old zlotys, Cimoszewicz at the same time claimed that fictitious agreements for charitable donations are being concluded on a mass scale. But the award for insolence belongs to Finance Minister Kolodko who in several public comments rudely called persons availing themselves of such deductions crooked manipulators and scoundrels. He criticized those who intended to avail themselves of lawful deductions, while at the same time refusing them the right to avail themselves of this law. Grzegorz Kolodko at the same time threatened undefined financial sanctions, predicting a close scrutiny of tax returns. He was immediately seconded by Deputy Minister of Finance Waldemar Manugiewicz, who described a speedily issued instruction on donations. That instruction recommends to Treasury officials that they give priority to auditing the tax returns of persons who deducted donations from their incomes. Under that instruction, tax offices are, moreover, to summon donors, and even the recipients as well, for interviews. "Every such tax return will be audited," declared Manugiewicz.

It may be then that for the next few months, and even year, the 50,000-strong army of tax officials will, according to the assurances of the Finance Ministry, preoccupy themselves solely with auditing the tax returns of such donors. The fiscal authorities may thus not only insult but also intimidate, and on occasion stupefy. That is because the ministry's officials attempt to, e.g., argue that the fiscal apparatus is capable of demonstrating the fictitious nature of charitable donations on assuming in advance that most such donations are fictitious. Yet in reality, as Leszek Balcerowicz stressed, there exist no legal foundations permitting tax officials to check on the authenticity of the donations which taxpayers deduct from their returns.

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That we are dealing with an obvious legal loophole has been noticed by everyone, chiefly by government officials. But Minister Kolodko is blaming the taxpayers for exploiting it, without accepting any responsibility himself. "I don't in any way feel responsible," declared Kolodko at a meeting. The minister is right to the extent that the framer of the law which has caused all this confusion is not only the Finance Ministry. The loophole was also caused by the deputies, committee members, and the entire parliament, which, by the vote of the SLD-PSL coalition, passed the law in its entirety.

But this is not the only example of incompetent handling of the delicate fabric of public finance. That is because recently the unemployed have learned that they will have to... make extra payments to the Treasury. It turns out that last year a 15-percent income tax deduction was collected from every unemployment benefit paid. So now at least some individuals receiving unemployment benefits will be forced to make extra tax payments to bring up their tax levy to 21 percent. Several dozen thousand, and perhaps several hundred thousand, persons will have to obediently bring 120-150 new zlotys each to the tax offices. As in the case of the donations, here too the public will have to pay for the mess made by the rulers.

Pensioners and annuitants too may feel themselves deceived. Following last year's change in the indexing of pensions and annuities, Minister Miller declared that no one would be the loser owing to the new regulations. Yet, according to the National Secretariat of Pensioners, NSZZ Solidarity, the new law has resulted in causing the cost-of-living adjustment of pensions to the wage increases that occurred in the last three months of 1995 to somehow fall through the cracks. That also is the view of lawyers—of course, not of those who are employed by the Ministry of Labor. Much indicates that pensioners will not receive the benefits due them under the previous law.

The SLD-PSL coalition takes away from some but does not give to others, and it scares others still, so that everyone remains totally defenseless in the face of these actions. The apparatus of state has enough power to come out on top. But not always and not toward everyone. For several years now the Gdansk liquidator of the assets of the former PZPR has been unable to get the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland] to pay its debt of 2.5 million zlotys—despite eight valid court verdicts. The SdRP as the heir to the PZPR has inherited some of the assets of its predecessor and subsequently sold or, interestingly enough, donated them to its members and their friends.

Now the SdRP cannot pay its debt to the Treasury because, as its officials claim, the party has no assets—the same party whose presidential candidate set aside several dozen billion old zlotys for his electoral campaign. Here the Treasury and the fiscal apparatus are strangely powerless, and neither has Minister Kolodko been heard to say even a word about this fraud.

Poland: Poll: SLD To Get Stiff Competition in Future

96EP0045B Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 10 Mar 96 No 10, p 4

[Unattributed article: "Who Will Win With the SLD? A Demoskop Poll"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Pie Chart]

—PSL: 9 percent

—Labor Union: 6 percent

—Post-August Poland bloc: 30 percent

—SLD: 28 percent

—Others: 27 percent

The appearance on the political scene of the Post-August Poland bloc, rallying all the center and rightist parties, beginning with Freedom Union and ending with the ROP [Movement for Rebuilding Poland] and Solidarity, around Lech Walesa, would offer "serious competition" to the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] in the coming parliamentary elections, according to a February poll by Demoskop.

Thirty percent of adult voters would be ready to vote for that bloc, and in such a political situation the SLD would be supported by 28 percent of the electorate. Once a broad Post-August Poland bloc emerges, 9 percent of the respondents would vote for the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] and 6 percent for Labor Union.

Demoskop also asked the respondents whether they would support the Post-August Poland bloc if Freedom Union and the Movement for Rebuilding Poland were not part of that bloc. "Yes," 28 percent of the respondents answered. If Freedom Union stands for the elections on its own, it would, according to Demoskop, receive 6 percent of the votes, that is, much less than in all the previous polls.

Likewise, Jan Olszewski's ROP would not benefit by staying outside the bloc, as then it would receive 5 percent of the votes. Demoskop reported that if Freedom Union and the ROP stay outside that center-right bloc,

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that would not affect the SLD and PSL electorates, but Labor Union would lose part of its electorate to Freedom Union.

Poland: Army Daily Questions Adequacy of Military Reserves

LD3004120796 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0346 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 30 Apr—Today's food reserves would last the Polish Army an average of 14 days in wartime. As regards some products—for example, powdered milk—there are sufficient reserves for barely one and a half days, Deputy Prime Minister Roman Jagielinski reveals in POLSKA ZBROJNA. In his view, we ought to try to ensure over the next few years that the reserves are sufficient to last 60, any maybe even 90, days. This would match the standards of wealthy states. The reason for the reduction in our reserves is the lack of money. The deputy prime minister says that we cannot grumble about a shortage of foodstuffs. The Agricultural Market Agency [ARR], whose tasks include the collection of foodstuff reserves for the Army, does not, however, have the necessary amounts available.

"A decisive majority of members of the government assume that, because Poland is in a good geopolitical situation and no conflict threatens us at present, we do not particularly have to build up these reserves. This is what they think. They are convinced that it would make no sense to tie up money in stored goods. Discussions of this kind also apply to other purchases for the Army—for instance, weaponry," says Jagielinski in his interview with Jan Forowicz.

Poland: Daily Reports on Bidding To Equip Military Helicopter

WS0105065896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Apr 96 p 6

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "Hellfire; What Should the Polish Huzar Helicopters Be Equipped With?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Why does Poland not want to invite bids from a consortium of companies from NATO countries that is offering us one of the most modern weapons of the 20th century? Why is it supporting an Israeli company that has already been discredited in a bribe scandal in the Czech Republic?

Modernization of the Sokol helicopter, which is to be used by the military under the name Huzar, has been part of a governmental strategic program for two years now. The Huzar is to be an attack helicopter equipped with an antitank missile, a gun, and modern avionics. The core of the dispute lies in who should supply such equipment and under what conditions this supplier should be chosen.

The entire issue is surrounded in utmost secrecy; representatives of the National Defense Ministry [MON], which is supervising the bidding, refuse to officially comment on this subject.

We have determined that, until recently, a special team (made up of representatives of MON, the Industry Ministry, and the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry) considered several companies as possible equipment suppliers. The French offered their own missile, whereas the Israelis offered—through two companies—the avionics (the Elbit company) and the missile (the Raphael company).

In the beginning, the United States did not submit an offer because the policy pursued by the U.S. Administration at that time did not envision sale of such modern technologies to the countries of Central and East Europe. However, after discussions that took many months, last December the U.S. Administration made a vital decision: It agreed to offer us the famous Hellfire-2 missile, made by Rockwell. [passage omitted]

However, Poland did not express an interest in this proposal. MON head Stanislaw Dobrzanski wrote to the U.S. manufacturer in the first days of April that the offer had not even reached his ministry. "In the current situation, because of the tight schedule of implementing the Huzar strategic governmental program as well as the delays that might result from inclusion of the Hellfire offer, the Defense Issues Committee of the Council of Ministers decided to close the list of bidders, which is tantamount to excluding your proposal from further proceedings in the bidding," Dobrzanski declared.

"If we are to be seen as a serious and credible partner, we must treat deadlines seriously," says one of our interlocutors, who supports this decision.

We have found out unofficially that, following a heated discussion, the government committee chose the offer of the Israeli companies and recommended it to the government for approval. The final decision rests with the government.

The Israeli Missile Does Not Exist

The American side protested. "If we assume that the rules of the bidding were clear all along, then our proposal indeed came too late. However, our missiles are ready, and they can be bought right away, whereas the missile offered by the Israelis has not even been made; this fact will really delay the Polish program," we learned from a person linked to the consortium. [passage omitted]

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We have determined that the issue of providing equipment to the Huzar helicopter divided members of the Polish Government. The American offer was wholeheartedly backed by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, which says that purchase of U.S. weapons will link us to NATO far more tightly than official declarations made by politicians. Memos presenting such a stand were reportedly submitted to the prime minister by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Mroziewicz. However, Mroziewicz himself would not discuss the issue with us, saying that it was secret. A similar view was reportedly expressed by Deputy National Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka, but he refused to comment on this as well.

Different opinions were expressed by Jan Czaja, deputy minister of foreign economic cooperation (linked to the Polish Peasant Party—PSL), Deputy Industry Minister Roman Czerwinski, and National Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski (PSL).

The issue reached the Presidential Chancellery, which did not take an unequivocal stand on it. "Not everything is decided by bidding procedures and the attractiveness of a given offer," we were told by a person closely linked to this institution.

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Romania: Judge Protests Procedure for Setting Up BEC

AU3004161796 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 24 Apr 96 p 12

[Article by Luiza Cristina: "Judge Onica Believes Election of the Central Electoral Bureau Was Rigged"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday the Supreme Court of Justice [CSJ] rejected the protest lodged by Leontie-Dimitrie Onica, one of the judges of the CSJ Civil Section, against the way in which the Central Electoral Bureau [BEC] had been set up. Judge Onica believes the method used to select the seven members of the BEC allowed CSJ President Gheorghe Uglean to rig the election. Article 29 of Law 70 precisely and imperatively stipulates that the seven judges are to be designated by a draw to be performed by the CSJ president from among all the judges of the highest court. However, on 20 April, when they designated the seven members of the BEC, they merely introduced the names of 42 judges in the ballot box, although at the time the CSJ consisted of 51 judges. Thus five section presidents, as well as the CSJ vice president and president were exempted from the draw [figures as published].

Just before the draw, CSJ President Uglean publicly explained that the seven aforementioned judges belonging to the CSJ leadership should not become BEC members, because this could lead to the intolerable situation of the CSJ remaining without leaders, which would impede its smooth running. In Judge Onica's opinion this reasoning is not valid, as there are "numerous magistrates whose professional competence equals, to say the least, the one of the seven leaders, so they could have temporarily taken over the command of the institution."

Referring to the method in which the draw proper was made, Judge Onica asserted that "instead of a single ballot box, whose color should have been dark, they preferred to use five huge transparent glass bowls." After having read out the name of the judges, Uglean took each of the pieces of paper on which the names had been written, folded them, and fastened them with a paper clip, after which he introduced them in the bowls. "Could, perhaps, the way in which the paper clips were fastened offer the possibility to identify the persons who had to be selected?" Judge Onica wonders.

In connection with the designation of the BEC president Judge Onica asserted: "The election of Judge Adrian Nitoiu, the least representative judge of the CSJ is strange, to say the least. He is famous for his lamentable performance in the trial of the 'CPEx [Romanian Communist Party Political Executive Committee] lot' and it is also known that in his capacity as tenant of a nationalized building he initiated the alteration of the juridical procedures in the domain of nationalized dwellings." Despite all this, his appeal was rejected.

Romania: PNTCD Leader Interviewed on Electoral Issue

AU3004135996 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 24 Apr 96 pp 15-17

[Interview with Ion Diaconescu, president of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party, by Florin Condurateanu; place and date not given: "Some Refrained From Talking to Me, Others Thought I Was a Fool Not To Bend With the Wind"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Condurateanu] Mr. Ion Diaconescu, you are the president of the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD], the strongest opposition party. However, I used to know you differently. It was a winter afternoon in 1992, the streets were full of snow, and I met you on the pavement dashing through the snow. In those days you were number two in the party, after Mr. Coposu [Corneliu, former PNTCD president], but you were nevertheless fighting the snow, like any other person. Do you like to be a pedestrian, lost in the crowd? How does this fit your position?

[Diaconescu] Like every other retired person until the [1989 December] revolution, and after the revolution, when I was less known, I was standing in line for bread and milk. In the meantime, people got to know me, and while standing in the bread line, some time in 1991, some people told me to go to the front of the line. I refused the favor, but then I thought: How are people going to react to this gesture, favorably or not? Certainly, there are people with a more developed moral sense who believe that staying in line like any ordinary person is the correct attitude. So what if you climbed a social step higher? You have to be granted favors and demand favors? But I noticed that others judged you with a miserable mentality. If they see you that you behave like a strong man they say: "Well, this is a heavyweight, he is a man with abilities." And they grant you greater importance than to the modest person who stays in line. After all, you do not know what the better attitude is from an electoral viewpoint. [passage omitted]

[Condurateanu] Mr. President Ion Diaconescu, do you believe that the sympathy enjoyed by the PNTCD among people has increased in the past two to three years?

[Diaconescu] Yes, certainly! PNTCD has ascended slowly from the viewpoint of popularity, but it has had a steady ascent. Certainly, not so much as I was

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dreaming about in the years I spent in prison and even afterwards. I was hoping that when the climate changes, when we are going to escape from communism, a big bang will take place and the whole country will come to us because all of them will be aware of the communist disaster. However, I had a great disappointment. When I came out of prison, most people were avoiding me because any cooperation with me made them suspect. Others were telling me: "Mister, I see you are a clever, reasonable man, how could do make such a mistake? Why did you not conform to the situation? How is it possible to stay 17 years in prison when you could do something, adapt to those in power?" They were feeling sorry for me because I was not conforming, and said that I should have realized how the wind blew. When I was expecting to be received with open arms and admiration for all I had done, instead I was received with compassion, at most for being a fool. After the revolution people were no longer afraid and were saying at street corners: "Hey, when are we going to get rid of these?" However, there was no rush toward the PNTCD. [passage omitted]

[Condurateanu] Mr. Ion Diaconescu, how do you envisage the ruling after the elections?

[Diaconescu] Everything will depend on the results of the elections, and the ruling will have to mirror the structure of the parliament. I hope that our party and the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] will obtain a relative majority, and then it will be our duty to organize the future government. We will look around and start with those who are closest in mentality to us in the family of the current opposition, such as Manolescu [Nicolae, Civic Alliance Party leader], the other liberals, or [Petre] Roman's Democratic Party, and we will work toward turning this into an absolute majority, because this is necessary to the act of ruling. In no way will we accept cooperation with the extremist parties, regardless of which party it is, although I find some of its members nice as people. I say that the greatest mistake is the lack of capacity by the current ruling regime, which brought about the loss of international credibility. The current regime has promoted an erroneous, clumsy policy, and the world still does not know whether we are honestly advancing on this road of democracy and reform or are just doing something according to the circumstances. All these half measures that have been taken have not been convincing. In this classification that is being made at international level we are at the rear end. Even the Albanians and Bulgarians are more credible than us, although they have communist or former communist regimes. This is incomprehensible. A major reason for the current situation has been the participation of the extremist parties in the government. Thus, in no way can one cooperate with such an extremist party, no matter what Mr. Vacaroiu or Iliescu or anybody else are saying about what has been achieved, and that everything is fine, when the opposite is obvious. How can things be fine when we are at the bottom of the precipice?

[Condurateanu] Is cooperation with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] in the new government possible?

[Diaconescu] If we come to power and wish to bring something new, it will be very difficult to cooperate with those whom we see as guilty of bringing the country to its current situation. Even Mr. Roman, who also contributed about two years to this situation together with the current leaders, will have to give some explanations and will have to apologize before we can cooperate with him. With regard to the rumors that the PNTCD and the Convention might cooperate with the PADS, these are also fueled from their camp, because they wish this to happen. Certainly, we would be very useful to them; we would bring them the credibility that they need. However, the PDSR and the public Opinion must understand us—there are some psychological barriers that cannot be overcome. In the same way, it would be very difficult for us to cooperate with former communist leaders, no matter how honest some of them are, especially when you know that you suffered so much during the communist regime. We thus wish to win the elections alone and rule alone. This would be the best solution for us and for the country. Democracy is not unfolding properly in our country, also because of this state of confusion that is prevailing and a government made up of fractions is ruling. The result is a neutral government that is confronted with all kinds of internal friction instead of being concerned about how to rule better. It would be ideal if we all alone win the power and rule the way we think fit. We will probably not succeed in achieving this.

Thus, if we win, we will look to the right and to the left, until we reach the admissible limits for us. When we realize that in order to achieve the majority we must resort to a big compromise, we will capitulate and say: "Gentlemen, it is not possible under such circumstances." Otherwise we would lose our identity and our principle. If the PDSR wins the elections with a relative majority, then it will be their duty to set up a government. Then they will also turn to the left and to the right. However, if their offer to the Convention means setting up a government in which they would have the majority and be the virtual leaders, and we would be an annex, just so as to say that we are also ruling, we are not interested in such an offer. We have been frequently offered such an auxiliary role. We always set the condition: "We cannot join a government

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that is dominated by one party." It is difficult to make forecasts now; everything depends on the elections. There are thousand of variations.

[Condurateanu] If you were to form a government, what would be the imperative measures that you would take at once?

[Diaconescu] There are so many and such big problems that there is no way I can tell you about them in a few words. I say that our policy must strive to reestablish this credibility of our country in the world. We are currently in a serious situation in every aspect. Everything is determined by the deplorable state of our economy. Therefore, in order to rebuild the economy, which currently has reached a critical point, an influx of capital is greatly needed. Ceausescu was boasting that he had no debts. What kind of glory is that? To sit in misery and not to make debts! You make debts, put money in investment, you pay back the debt, and people live like human beings. This is not the right way of reasoning: I do not have debts but I am starving. Our policy's objective is to reestablish Romania's credibility in the world so that the gates of foreign capital influx open up for us. All the measures that we must take should therefore start from the reasons that stopped foreign investors from coming closer to us. We will have to eliminate those. We will introduce in the legislation a number of measures that will lead to a change of our country's image, and will bring investors. Then we will put order into the problem of privatization. So far privatization has been carried out according to some arrangements based on corruption. A number of factories and hotels have been privatized, but somehow all of them are based on corrupt arrangements. We have not seen an act of correct and legal privatization in six years. This allowed for so much robbery. That is, the economy was in fact state owned, but administered as a free economy. All areas have been subjected to robbery, and we have to restore things, and in order to revive the situation we have to restore credibility. As a general orientation, our policy will follow this course.

[Condurateanu] Mr. PNTCD President Ion Diaconescu, the parties that are currently ruling make the accusation that your programs have something Don Quixotic in them, and that everything in fact is smoke and mirrors. Is this true?

[Diaconescu] The technical part of the program is not a big deal. That is, to start with the banking system and interest rates, these are just details, and today's professionals are not really to be blamed for the current situation. The political leadership of the regime that has preserved this climate of insecurity, which led to the loss of credibility and caused all this disaster, is to be blamed. What do I care that the minister of finance comes to show me what he has done according to the law, when in reality all the country's income is a disaster? And in no way can the budget repair it. The general policy of the country also led to disorganization and economic collapse. It is not the fault of the microeconomy, of the technical part, but of the political orientation. What did the country look like at the outbreak of the 1989 revolution? It had a lot of credibility, everybody wanted to help. Then, a few months later, everybody started boycotting us and regarding us as a cryptocommunist country. All these are reflected in the negative attitude of foreign countries toward us. A technician cannot improve this serious situation no matter how clever he is; he cannot correct some strictly administrative measures. The country's policy has been faulty. Therefore, when we talk about this change of political climate, some people accuse us that we are talking only about principles. Well, those principles brought about this state of chaos!

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Slovenia: Parliament's Progress on Property Law Examined

AU3004122996 Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene 24 Apr 96 p 4

[Report by S.H.V.: "Overcoming Obstruction Is the Main Thing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 24 April—We had the opportunity to hear various explanations by the deputies in the parliament yesterday as to how and why—also with the assistance of both coalition parties—they adopted a proposal of the law on ownership and property rights in the first reading that essentially does not integrate the Spanish initiative into the section pertaining to the foreigners' right to real estate. The government drafted a proposal of the law, which is bad, according to the opposition, prior to the adoption of the Spanish initiative and did not integrate the provisions undertaken with the Spanish initiative into it by itself.

Some deputies attempted to do so, and the consequence of this was obstruction. Many people were assuring us yesterday that the overcoming of the obstruction without a further escalation was an achievement in itself. Slovenia can, thus, boast before Europe that the law is already under parliamentary debate. It could also be heard that since the formation of the new (center-left) government in Italy, we no longer needed to rush with the adoption of—especially for the opposition—unacceptable demands.

What next? Although, yesterday, the deputies did not task the government with the preparation of clear provisions connected to the foreigners' right to real estate for the second reading, the government will nevertheless have to do this (in the form of appendices or by incorporating it into the basic text) because the conclusions of the extraordinary State Chamber session, at which the Spanish initiative was adopted, bind it to doing so. However, it is difficult to say when the government will do this, that is, when the State Chamber will discuss this law again. They are definitely not in a hurry (they could also prepare the protection legislation in parallel) and some anticipate that the second reading will not materialize all that soon, definitely not before this fall. Most likely it will be the next, post electoral makeup of the parliament, that will receive the above law for discussion.

Slovenia: Government To Repatriate Over 18,000 Bosnian Refugees

LD2804113196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1022 GMT 28 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, Apr 28 (TANJUG)—Over 18,500 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, nearly 90 percent of them Muslims, will have to leave Slovenia by the end of next year, the Slovenian Government has decided.

Repatriation will start on July 1, and all refugees will be enabled first to visit their former homes and take part in elections in the Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska next September as scheduled in line with the Dayton Accord.

Nearly 60 percent of Bosnian refugees in Slovenia have stated they did not wish to go back as their homes had either been destroyed or now belong to the RS or to Croats, refugee associations in Slovenia said.

Slovenia: Repatriation of B-H Refugees To Start 1 Jun

AU3004180496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovene Government has adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the repatriation of the temporary asylum holders to their homeland. The government stressed that in agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina our country will, as of 1 June, start nullifying the temporary asylum rulings and begin the repatriation of the refugees. The Republic of Slovenia Bureau for Immigration and Refugees announced this decision today.

The bureau stressed that the process of repatriating the Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees should be completed by 31 December 1997. The Slovene Government decided for the repatriation because the circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina have improved, following the signing of the Dayton accord.

Slovenia: NATO's Solana To Meet Leaders, Opposition's Jansa

AU3004151696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The aircraft with NATO Secretary General Solana should be landing at Brnik [Ljubljana] Airport during this newscast. This important guest will be greeted by Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek, with whom Solana will hold initial political talks.

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It is envisaged that Secretary General Solana will be received by President Milan Kucan. Talks with Slovene Foreign Minister Thaler and Defense Minister Kacin, as well as the ambassadors of NATO countries to Slovenia, are also scheduled for the afternoon and evening.

Apart from the representatives of the authorities, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana is also to receive Janez Jansa, a representative of the opposition and president of the Social Democratic Party, in Brdo near Kranj tomorrow. According to Jansa, they will be meeting at mutual request.

It is important that Solana is meeting with a representative of the opposition, because the European institutions have the false impression that all Slovene parties have supported Slovenia's membership of NATO from the very outset. In the opinion of the president of the Social Democratic Party, the government is not capable of presenting the advantages of Slovenia joining NATO. He stresses economic development, the candidacy for EU membership, and the participation in the Partnership for Peace program. We also should not ignore the fact that Slovenia, like Yugoslavia, has not been a member of the Warsaw Pact and so our military, unlike that of east Europe, did not train in the Soviet Union. Slovenia is also setting up its defense system anew in line with NATO standards.

Slovenia: Solana Stresses NATO Principle of Solidarity

AU3004145696 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Within the framework of preparations for NATO expansion to the east, Slovenia, as the first partner state, started an intensified bilateral dialogue with NATO in mid-April of this year. In connection with this issue, [NATO Secretary General] Javier Solana said to our Brussels correspondent Edo Zitnik:

[Begin recording] [Solana, in English fading into superimposed translation into Slovene] To be a part of NATO means obligations, responsibility, and also benefits. The most important thing is to be ready for both. You cannot get the benefits without giving something, too. The people of your country should understand that NATO is an organization that is based on the principle of solidarity, and solidarity means giving and receiving. We can offer security to your country, however, you must cooperate in the spirit of solidarity also, for the security of other members.

[Zitnik] Secretary General Solana stressed among other things stressed that an important task was accomplished this year that facilitated a better mutual understanding between NATO and Slovenia. This process, according to him, also pointed at the adjustments that Slovenia and the North Atlantic Alliance need to carry out in order to live together, and as a consequence Slovenia, which is currently a member of the Partnership for Peace, if invited, would also become a member of this military alliance.

[Solana] Every country is different. The dialogue that we have started is individual because each country has its specific traits. We would like to learn about them, understand them, study them, and ultimately, we would like to help. [end recording]

Slovenia: Drnovsek, Solana Meet, Discuss NATO Membership

AU3004184096 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Within his tour of some of the countries that are candidates for NATO membership, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana arrived for a two-day visit to our country today. He held talks today with President Milan Kucan, Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, and Defense Minister Jelko Kacin. He also held lengthy talks with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek. Following the talks, both politicians made statements. Here is a report by Igor Juric:

[Begin recording] [Juric] NATO Secretary General Solana first said he was pleased with the visit to our country which he unfortunately could not visit while he was EU chairman. He assessed today's talks with Drnovsek as fruitful. He also thanked Slovenia for allowing the passage of the Implementation Force [IFOR] troops bound for Bosnia-Herzegovina. This also helped to get the peace process in this country started. As for the talks, Solana said:

[Solana, in English fading into superimposed Slovene translation] We discussed the main challenges facing NATO, namely, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the role of IFOR, and NATO enlargement. We were very satisfied with the documents presented by your country as a part of the individual program of the Partnership for Peace. I briefed your prime minister on the procedure and the timetable of the future bilateral talks between Slovenia and NATO. We also discussed our future plans regarding the admission of the new members and the ways in which we are trying to create the possibilities for the creation of a European defense identity within the alliance.

[Juric] Solana then also added that he hoped the relations between NATO and Slovenia would become even deeper and more versatile after this visit.

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Prime Minister Drnovsek said that he briefed Secretary General Solana on the conclusions of the government and the State Chamber that clearly indicate that Slovenia sees its future within NATO, which is the guarantor for our collective security. Drnovsek said:

[Drnovsek] It is our wish and expectation to be one of the first, new NATO pact members.

[Juric] Slovenia wishes to be a part of the stable world which is organized on democratic principles, can defend itself, and contributes to international stability.

The prime minister emphasized that we had signed the Partnership for Peace plan two years ago and that the program was progressing very well. The activities of this year's program will further deepen the relations and will form a sound basis for our future talks on NATO membership.

Of course, our country is aware that membership also means some obligations. This, too, was the topic of today's talks.

To a specific question about the no-confidence vote in Foreign Minister Thaler Prime Minister Drnovsek replied that this was unnecessary and that he hoped it would fail. [end recording]

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Federal

FRY: Seselj Accuses U.S. of Machinations Against Serbs

LD3004162596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 30 Apr (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, said today it is obvious that "the United States is preparing to provoke armed clashes in Kosovo-Metohija."

"They are doing this mercilessly, and according to our information everything is being organized by the CIA, which has decided to strip the Serbs of remaining Serb territory and bring about the separation of Montenegro," Seselj said at a special news conference in Belgrade.

According to him, "there are numerous indications of a deterioration in relations between Serbia and Montenegro: Milo Djukanovic's trip to the United States, enhanced customs checks at the border, checks on goods traffic crossing the border..."

"In all this the Belgrade regime has proved to be inconsistent and incapable of getting to grips with the problems provoked by the United States, and Slobodan Milosevic is not capable of preserving Kosovo-Metohija and preventing the separation of Montenegro in the long term," Seselj says. [passage omitted]

FRY: Government Committee Discusses Succession Issues

LD3004160096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1451 GMT 30 Apr 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 30 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government committee for monitoring the international conference on the former Yugoslavia discussed on Tuesday [30 April] several issues of importance for regulating the effects of the secession of the former Yugoslav republics, the federal information secretariat said.

The committee, chaired by Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, focused on current succession issues, the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement on the resolution of humanitarian issues, and the legal possibilities for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to become a member of the World Trade Organization.

The committee concluded it is necessary to undertake speedy measures for renewing relations with the former GATT, i.e. to prepare concrete normative documents for joining the World Trade Organization.

The committee was informed about the forthcoming talks with the representatives of the group for succession of the Council for the Application of Peace from Brussels, who are due to arrive in Belgrade shortly.

It was concluded that a platform for the Yugoslav succession group should be prepared for the talks.

The committee also discussed the information about the payment of old-age and disability pensions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav republics. The conclusion was that until Yugoslavia and the ex-Yugoslav republics regulate relations in this sphere on the basis of reciprocity, these issues should be resolved between the corresponding pension funds.

Based on the fact that the institutional role of the European Union and the United Nations, as the mediators in regulating the problems created by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, has been changed by transferring a part of the duties from the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to the Council for the Application of Peace, the committee proposed that its name be changed to the Yugoslav Government Committee for Monitoring the Working Groups of the Council for the Application of Peace, the statement said.

FRY: Hints of Change in Belgrade's Succession Stance

AU3004184996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1700 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Report by Igor Juric from Belgrade]

[FBIS Translated Text] The official statement on the session of the succession commission, which operates within the framework of the FRY Government, only states that a new negotiating platform must be drafted for the imminent negotiations with the representatives of the Council for Realization of the Dayton Accord, who are among other things also in charge of the separating balance of accounts [delitvena bilanca] of the former joint state. We have learned unofficially, however, that Belgrade is supposed to change its position on the continuity and the division of the assets in certain points. The details are not known, but it pays to draw attention to the statement by a member of this commission, Oskar Kovac. Kovac noted that the continuity issue should never be dragged into the talks on the FRY's reintegration into the international financial organizations. According to Oskar Kovac, the federal government should change its decisions; however, this should be done quietly.

Another indicator of a possible change in the Yugoslav stance is the complete stalemate in the negotiations with the foreign creditors, which is naturally undermining the country's economic and monetary policy.

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The new negotiator Jovan Zebic, who replaced [National Bank] Governor Avramovic in this post, to the great surprise of all, also canceled the negotiations with the London Club on the division and repayment of the commercial debts of the former SFRY. Belgrade's negotiations with the commercial creditors and the IMF are mutually connected. As is known, the talks with the IMF collapsed because Yugoslavia insisted on the exclusive state continuity right.

Whether or not the government will actually change its platform will probably become more apparent after the meeting with the representatives of the Council for Realization of the Dayton Accord, who are expected to visit Belgrade shortly.

Serbia

Serbia: Additional Social Democratic Party Registers

AU3004134096 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr-2 May 96 p 12

[Article by V. Vujic: "Yet Another Social Democratic Party"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yet another party is to enter Serbia's political life. Members of the Serbian Civic Alliance [GSS], headed by Dr. Zarko Korac, who remained in the minority at the party's last assembly, yesterday submitted a request for registering a social democratic party. We have unofficially learned that the name Social Democratic Union is also an option if another party is already registered under the name Social Democratic Party [SDP].

We could only get unofficial information from people in the Initiative Council for the founding of the SDP, some of whom were part of the top GSS leadership. The party will probably be presented to the public in mid-May, by which time it is expected that the Justice Ministry will have given an official answer regarding registration.

According to reliable sources, the mainstay of the new party is the former GSS youth. The people in Korac's fraction claim that 46 members have left the GSS, while the GSS headquarters mention some 20 people. Dr. Korac himself has not turned in his membership card. Korac's team claims that this is only tactical.

In addition to former GSS members, we have had unofficial confirmation that the SDP will comprise people who were formerly never affiliated with any party. The party will also comprise members of trade unions and nongovermental organizations; for example, people from the Belgrade Circle, the Helsinki Committee, the Women in Black, the Committee for Support to Democratic Processes headed by Dr. Zaga Golubovic, and others. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic Assesses Results of U.S. Visit

AU3004205296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 30 Apr 96 p 6

["Exclusive" interview with Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic by Slobodan Pavlovic in Washington; date not given: "We Are Moving Forward and Are Not Waiting for Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] It seems as though the two units of the FRY have gone their separate ways. While envoys of the larger one are touring the eastern part of Europe and Asia, the Montenegrins have turned toward the other direction—Prime Minister Djukanovic has not still returned from his one-week visit to the United States, and President Momir Bulatovic has arrived in London for talks with British officials. This has been going on for quite a while, and as far as we can see and hear, this trend of Podgorica will not change in the future. On the contrary.

We talked recently on this subject (and many others as well) with Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic in Washington. He visited the U.S. capital for the second time in the past six months and left a trace there, which is a habit we had abandoned a long time ago, at least as far as representatives of Yugoslavia are concerned. For reasons that nobody needs to be reminded of any longer, unfortunately, the delegation of Montenegro (in addition to the prime minister there were Minister of Finance Predrag Goranovic and Ratko Knezevic, a businessman from London and the prime minister's special advisor) paid a semiofficial, working visit last week. During this visit, business was absolutely the premier topic discussed, while politics was reduced to an unavoidable minimum. The delegation negotiated its way toward a period when the rest of Yugoslavia will definitely get rid of the status of an international outcast.

Judging from the reception, the business deals agreed upon, and the overall impression with which the Montenegrin delegation returned from Washington and New York, the United States showed by the example of Podgorica how much it cares to restore relations with both federal units of the FRY to the former normal level. For this, however, Belgrade is required to fulfill some significant preconditions, which we have reported on for God knows how many times so far, so in this text no particular attention will be paid to them. This is exclusively a report on Djukanovic's impressions after his

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one-week visit to Washington and New York, which he commented on in an exclusive interview for NASA BORBA, a paper that the Montenegrin prime minister has praised quite a lot these days, pointing out that he is also one of its regular readers.

[Pavlovic] When you were here in the United States for the first time late last year, you were just checking out the situation and trying to feel its pulse, after a very difficult period we went through, when we had many hardships to endure and even experienced the total breakup of relations with the United States. The second visit, however, has obviously broken the ice, so what is your view of the two visits to Washington and New York?

[Djukanovic] What was happening in the meantime, between the two visits, was a very positive development in terms of attitudes in official circles in the United States. The most significant difference is in the fact that, during the first visit, I had a very hard time explaining things and providing firsthand information on Montenegro and its current policy. However, a major characteristic of my second visit was that, in the circles with which I had already established contacts, people knew about Montenegro, and were themselves stressing certain particularities of it and of its policy. Considering this fact, this time my job was a lot easier, although I have to stress that this visit had a different character from the previous one. Last year's visit aimed at collecting information and promoting Montenegro, while this one was less a continuation of that promotion and more a sort of building of superstructure in terms of concretization of certain results and Montenegro's cooperation with the United States, on the basis of the already performed promotion.

[Pavlovic] The impression is that you have returned very satisfied. What do you consider to be the most significant results of this visit?

[Djukanovic] We should not be fostering illusions that we have corrected all the wrong views of Montenegro and Yugoslavia present in the U.S. public over the past several years of our absence from here. Still, I have to say that I am myself surprised at a positive evolution in the U.S. official circles with regard to the policy pursued by Montenegro.

[Pavlovic] Concretely—although we, as a country, have not managed to get rid of the sanctions definitely—a number of potential business deals are being mentioned. For instance, an agreement on considerable investments in Montenegrin tourism, Budweiser's establishing cooperation with the Niksic brewery, and a world giant, Kaiser Aluminum—this is coming in the same package as well. These are great results in view of our position at home.

[Djukanovic] The main results of our visit will be felt only later. For all the talks I had here—with financial and political circles—the main motive was to enable Montenegro to access international financial institutions, while with U.S. partners the motive was to extend support to the process of privatization which we are carrying out in Montenegro, as well as to our development projects, the aim of which is to make Montenegro an industrialized country in a relatively short time.

Of course, once more the local political circles have made it clear that any sort of cooperation, either financial or economic, is out of the question until the general political attitude toward our state is changed, that is, until we receive positive green signals from the U.S. Administration, the Congress, and financial institutions. In all the talks I insisted on this topic, and I think I offered quite convincing arguments for such a new, more open approach of the United States toward Montenegro, so that I expect real effects of this visit to come about only in the months to come.

[Pavlovic] Sources from the IMF and the World Bank indicate concern about the course that Belgrade is pursuing, which also caused the failure of the Paris negotiations, and which is obviously continuing. Now, additional concern is caused by the shift of [National Bank of Yugoslavia's governor] Avramovic and [FRY Deputy Prime Minister] Zebic.

[Djukanovic] Answering this question we stated our attitude that no capital conclusions should be drawn from that event; that is, it is basically not important who will lead the Yugoslavia delegation in further negotiations; more important is the fact that the platform for renewal of relations, which representatives of IMF proposed at the last meeting in Paris, is eventually accepted. On that occasion, we expressed our impression that in Belgrade a gradual process is under way, as a result of our pressure that such unnecessary and irrational dilemmas in international organizations regarding succession to the former SFRY, which are obviously present in the federal government and part of the public and the leadership in Belgrade as well, should be abandoned. We told them about our impression that things in Belgrade are nonetheless developing in a positive direction, and that the federal government is more and more accepting the stance of IMF proposed in Paris. [passage omitted]

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Montenegro: Djukanovic Seeks Normal Ties With IMF

LD0105092996 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1929 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 30 Apr (FONET)—Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic has expressed the hope that relations between the FRY and the IMF will soon be normalized, MONTENA fax agency reports.

"I have learned with pleasure that the position of the federal government has begun to show a positive change and that a platform has been drawn up which will have many points of agreement with what the IMF offered in Paris. I hope, therefore, that conditions will be created for the rapid normalization of our relations with the IMF," Djukanovic said in an interview to Montenegro radio and television at the end of his visit to the United States.

"With regard to the World Bank and IMF, everything depends on our membership of the IMF, and this means that it is necessary, first of all, to resolve all legal aspects and dilemmas within the state in order to create a platform of the federal government which will correspond with the basic approach of the IMF put forward in Paris," the Montenegrin prime minister said, stressing that "the IMF is in no hurry, but it is we who must hurry, because we are in an unenviable position and we have to show a greater degree of cooperation."

"For us, the basic existential question is how to connect with sources of international capital so that we can at last begin to revitalize our economy and industrial capacities, our development potential which we have identified and which is the basis for our optimism that in the foreseeable future we will be a developed state," he stressed.

Replying to a question about speculation that Montenegro and the federal state are in dispute over the fact that Montenegro does not want to be "swamped" by 36 percent of the foreign debt which the FRY has taken over and which amounts to about $7 billion, he said:

"That is not correct because, prior to the introduction of sanctions, Montenegro bought up $170 million of debt to international financial associations. Now it owes $340 million which is a tolerable debt for this economy. It should also be noted that within the Yugoslav debt package there are quite specific debtors and these are the commercial banks and beneficiaries, or enterprises."

Asked about the termination of the external wall of sanctions, which he was told in the U.S. Exim Bank would not be lifted in the area of relations with international financial organizations until the questions of Kosovo, cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the full realization of human rights, and freedom of the press are resolved, Djukanovic said:

"Exim Bank is a bank which closely follows U.S. policy. Therefore, any financing of projects by Exim Bank in Montenegro will depend exclusively on the political will of the United States."

During his stay in New York, Djukanovic signed an agreement on development in the sphere of tourism envisaging the beginning of hotel-building by foreign partners on the Montenegrin coast.

Asked how it will be possible to implement this as well as the introduction of a mobile telephone network in Montenegro, when the federal constitutional court recently overturned the republican law on granting franchises to foreigners—which means that decisions on the granting of franchises to foreigners cannot be made in Montenegro—he said:

"The mobile telephone project in Montenegro is being realized under the republican law on franchises and the project is already fairly advanced... This project will not be halted, regardless of the position of the federal constitutional court."

The Montenegrin prime minister added that the equipment has already been delivered and that the mobile telephone network is expected to be operational in Podgorica and on the Montenegrin coast at the end of June.

As for the tourist development project, it does not rely on the law on franchise, but on some other laws which have not been disputed, and legally speaking there should be no problems for the realization of this project.

In connection with the dispute regarding ownership of airports in Golubovac an Tivat, the Montenegrin prime minister said that lawyers and relevant institutions should have the final say.

"However, even without any legal expertise it can be seen that one cannot find a legal basis for the law of the Republic of Serbia by which it has proclaimed the airports in Montenegro as being a part of its public enterprise, including the property of these airports being proclaimed state property," Djukanovic said explaining that there are at least two reasons for this:

"First, both the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Montenegrin constitution say that the right to ownership is a basic and inalienable right. There is no dilemma as to the fact that at least as far as the ownership of land of airports in Podgorica and Tivat is concerned [words indistinct] let me put it

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so, a property variegation," he added, explaining that "one owner is the Republic of Montenegro, another is Yugoslav Airlines, a third is the Yugoslav Army, a fourth are private businessmen... Therefore, nobody can say that this property belongs to someone else, including the state of Serbia."

"Another contentious issue is the fact that it is completely out of keeping with the usual practice that one country should declare its public interest as existing on the territory of another. Montenegro is a state, part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and public interest on the territory of Montenegro can only be declared by the Montenegrin Government or, possibly, by the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, if Yugoslav Airlines were set up as a Yugoslav public enterprise," Djukanovic said.

"There is absolutely no difference in the positions of President Momir Bulatovic and my own," the Montenegrin prime minister said adding that Bulatovic and he have consulted with each other "on all important political issues, particularly regarding development issues of Montenegro," and that he believes they "are advocating the same political platform." [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: Forces Ready for Use Against Possible Rebellion

AU3004205796 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Apr 96 p 8

[Article by Vladimir Jovanovic: "The Scenario of Hell and Scorched Earth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bloody incidents in Kosovo are an ominous sign that the long-simmering political tension—which has occasionally been sprinkled with human victims and waves of violation—could escalate into a Serbian-Albanian armed conflict on a broad scale. For a decade and a half Kosovo has been a possible focus of war, and the status quo is being maintained through the fear of repressions, international diplomatic pressure, and the exhausting mutual policy of "waiting."

An armed Albanian rebellion was announced as "quite certain" on several occasions during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. After the territorial defense of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo was abolished in 1989 it became obvious that a possible Albanian rebellion could be reduced to guerrilla fighting only, which—because of the mild geographic configuration of Kosovo—could not even in the short run produce significant effects to the advantage of the rebels. The Yugoslav People's Army, which performed combat activities in Kosovo as far back as 1981, had a very detailed plan of operations, which included energetic actions for the isolation of places, bases, and areas of rebellion; the interdiction of possible supply lines from Albania; cruel retaliatory measures; the punishing of the rebellious Albanian movement, etc.

The activities of the Yugoslav People's Army would have been carried out on the Kosovo front according to the "scorched earth" model, and there is not a single indication that this model is—in its basic part—not in force today.

The Yugoslav Army covers Kosovo with exceptionally strong forces now. At the strategic level, the land forces are composed of the units of the 3d Nis Army, whereas the operative Kosovo land forces are grouped in the Pristina Corps.

This corps is one of the strongest in the Yugoslav Army and it consists of high-mobility brigades. It is the basic mission of the Pristina Corps to break and disorganize a possible armed conflict with strong initial activities, fire, and movement during its first stage. This should enable the Supreme Command to assess the character, the scope, and the intentions of rebellious formations. It is therefore assumed that the next steps of the Belgrade military leadership will include the reinforcement of its units with units from the Serbian provinces and from Montenegro, which will have to be preceded by mobilization and concentration of forces in meeting areas.

The Pristina Corps is composed of the following basic units: Armed brigades, mechanized brigades, motorized and light-motorized brigades, a mixed artillery-rocket regiment, and an antitank artillery-rocket brigade.

The troops for the reinforcement of the Serbian armed forces in Kosovo would come from three directions: The garrisons in southern and eastern Kosovo (Djakovica, Prizren, Urosevac, Gnjilane) would be reinforced by forces from the Nis and the Leskovac Corps; the Kragujevac Corps forces would act along the Ibar Gorge from the north to Kosovsko Mitrovica, via Vucitrn to Pristina and further south; the units of the Podgorica and Uzice Corps (parts of the 2d Army) would group on the Pestar Plateau in order to break road communications between western Kosovo and Novi Pazar; they would proceed toward Pec and Kosovska Mitrovica, developing activities in the Metohija Plain.

The operations of the Serbian-Montengrin land forces would be accompanied by a demonstration of power and by combat activities of aircraft and helicopter forces. Forces comparable to a "Mig-21" fighter regiment are being stationed at the military air base in the vicinity of Pristina, which should develop into assault units in order to support the local land force units. Control,

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reinforcement, and combat activities from the air would also be performed by the forces from the Nis airport (the transport brigade of the 63d Parachute Brigade, and the "Gama" helicopter squadron), from the Kraljevo airport ("Orao" squadron, "Gama" squadron, "G-4" assault squadron), whereas the aircraft from the Podgorica airport would possibly perform their activities from the runway for reserve deployments in the vicinity of Beran, in northeastern Montengro.

In the event that the Albanian rebellion remains on a small scale and in isolated areas, priority would be given to the engagement of special-purpose forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (which are also armed with "Bofors" and "Praga" antiaircraft guns, heavy machine guns, mortars, and armed transporters) and to the units of the Yugoslav Army Special Purpose Corps (the Guard Motorized Brigade from Topcider, 63d Parachute Brigade, 72d Sabotage Brigade from Pancevo), which would be supported by military police units and the support regiment of the Pristina Corps.

According to the Law on Defense, the operational commander of these units should be General Lieutenant Dusan Samardzic, the commander of the southeastern region of the Yugoslav Army, whereas the Supreme Military Council would lead the operations on the strategic level from the war bunker near Belgrade.

There are no serious indicators that the Albanian population of Kosovo possesses large quantities of weapons. Apart from light weapons, which have either been imported illegally from abroad or purchased, also illegally, from Serbian military and police forces (some of these transactions have become known in various scandals), the Albanians probably do not have significant quantities of heavy weapons, whereas the possession of light antiaircraft and especially antitank weapons is not excluded by the Serbian military.

It is considered that the Albanian resistance would be strong along the border in Kosovo. They would have the support of the Republic of Albania, but a significant help of its armed forces to their co-nationals in Kosovo is not possible unless it is followed or preceded by an international military intervention against targets in Serbia and perhaps Montenegro.

Because of the population density and the hatred between the nations, any form of armed conflict in Kosovo would cause unforeseeable civilian suffering and waves of refugees. An intervention by Serbian and Montenegrin reserve and volunteer units according to the model already seen in 1991 and 1992 would be difficult to control—discipline also includes respecting of laws and customs of war.

On the other hand, a war conflict in Kosovo seen from the military aspect would make a military intervention by a third party possible and, consequently, a general conflict in the Balkans certain.

Kosovo: Bukosi Writes EU's Agnelli About Serb Attacks

LD3004164296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1539 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 30 Apr (SRNA)—In a letter sent today to president of the EU, Susanna Agnelli, Bujar Bukosi, leader of the self-declared "republic of Kosovo", expresses his concern at the "dramatic situation in Kosovo" and calls for the "right to self-determination" for Albanians.

"The latest events are proof that the status quo in Kosovo cannot continue," Bukosi says and warns that in this region "anything can happen."

Bukosi accuses the Serbs of "openly using weapons against unarmed Albanians, who have been forced to take appropriate measures to defend themselves."

The letter, published in the secessionist paper BUJKU, calls on Belgrade to show an interest in talks under the supervision of a "third party" because, as Bukosi maintains, "now is the most favorable moment."

So far, the EU has stated several times that Kosovo and Metohija are a constituent part of Serbia and the FRY, but at its latest session the European Parliament called for a solution to the problem of the Albanians in Kosovo as a condition for the normalization of relations with Belgrade.

Kosovo: Albanian Parties Urge U.S. To Prevent Conflict

AU0105120996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 30 Apr 96

[Telephone report by correspondent Mehmet Haziri from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The terrorist act that occurred in Lume i Madh in Vushtrri [Vucitrn], in which one Albanian child was killed and three others wounded, has caused a new shock to the Albanian population in Kosova. The Albanian political parties and institutions further advise being on alert and avoiding provocations, despite the pain caused over the past days.

The Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova [PShDKK] considers the killing of the children extreme barbarism and commands its members and the populace not to fall prey to provocations by Serbian ultranationalists, whose strategy is to create a new focus of war in

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the Balkans and undermine the peaceful option for the solution of the Kosova issue, which has been chosen by the leadership of the Albanian people of Kosova since the war stopped in the former Yugoslav areas.

The PShDKK demands that the international community and particularly the United States commit themselves to the utmost to prevent the escalation of the conflict, thus enabling Kosovar Albanians to give life to their will on the basis of the 1991 referendum. This party demands that European Christian Democratic parties exert pressure on Belgrade to give up its terror and expeditiously start a dialogue with Prishtina.

The Liberal Party of Kosova [PLK] considers the latest killings, particularly that of the 13-year-old child, Nexhat Hetemi, an open provocation by dark ultranationalist, chauvinist, and terrorist forces. The Serbian leadership bears responsibility for the events that may follow and that may have a tragic epilogue, the PLK remarks, inviting the political parties, associations, and the people of Kosova to show self-restraint toward any action that influences escalation of the tense situation in Kosova. This party invites the United States and the European community to directly intervene in Kosova and impose the Albanian-Serbian dialogue to resolve the Kosova issue with political means. [passage omitted]

Prishtina's newspaper BUJKU devotes a special commentary, according to which this and other acts that have occurred this week in Kosova may have been committed by the Serbian extremist forces that aim at substituting the current Albanian-Serbian dialogue on a solution for the Kosova issue with talks on halting the killings and calming the situation.

Kosovo: Serbian Communists Call For Closure of BUJKU

AU2704192796 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 27 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by A.D.: "Closure of BUJKU Demanded"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council for Kosova of the Serbian party League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia, at a news conference held in Prishtina yesterday, demanded an immediate ban on BUJKU, the sole daily newspaper of more than 2 million Albanians in Kosova. This news was carried yesterday evening by Serbian Television in Prishtina and was also published in the Serbian newspaper JEDINSTVO published in the capital city of Kosova. The Belgrade occupation regime forcibly closed the Albanian-language radio and television in Prishtina seven years ago and also prohibited the newspaper RILINDJA 45 years after it was first published in Kosova.

The Albanian paper BUJKU appears under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and is faced with pressure, repressive measures, and incessant blackmail from the Serbian regime. It survives and finances itself solely through the sacrifices of its journalists and staff. It is understandable why there should be demands to close BUJKU at a time when tension has increased to dangerous levels in recent days following the firearm incidents. Even during these developments, which represent a real danger for the outbreak of open conflict, the Albanian paper BUJKU has consistently emphasized the moderate and peaceful standpoints of Albanian policy, calling on all the citizens of Kosova to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile, the Serbian newspaper JEDINSTVO, which is financed by the Serbian state, has called for even harsher measures against the Albanians, and has warned of immediate and drastic steps to be taken by Serbia.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Hungarians Seek Aid for Autonomy Model

LD3004205096 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 30 Apr 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] held talks with members of the parliamentary group of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [Fidesz-MPP] this afternoon. Before the meeting, our reporters asked the Vojvodina Hungarians' representatives about the purpose of their visit.

[Begin recording] [Mihaly Szecsei, UVM deputy chairman] We would like to establish an autonomous Hungarian region on an area of about 3,000 square kilometers, which has 358,000 inhabitants and nine local governments with a Hungarian majority. We think it is possible to operate this region, which has a homogeneous economy and appropriate human and material resources.

We would also like to achieve that during their talks with the Yugoslav or Serbian governments and parliamentary circles, the democratic parties of Hungary support this model—the idea that the Hungarian community of Vojvodina is able to organize itself and create the conditions necessary for the preservation of its identity. [end recording]

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Vojvodina: Perosevic Says Battle for Dinar's Stability Won

LD3004134196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1147 GMT 30 Apr 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, April 30 (TANJUG)—Premier of the north Serbian province of Vojvodina Bosko Perosevic said that the battle for the stability of the dinar has been won, which is of special importance for the stability of the national economy.

In the sector of prices, stability has been secured and hikes prevented. No price increases have been registered following the January and February price hikes, according to end of first quarter data. There were even some price reductions in April, he said in an interview to the Novi Sad daily DNEVNIK, published Tuesday.

Perosevic said that the most important prerequisite of further Yugoslav economic development was integration into world economic trends and the international economic and financial order.

He said there was total agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the National Bank of Yugoslavia (central bank) that contacts and talks with world financial organizations, especially the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, be held as soon as possible.

Membership in those organizations will mean access to the world market of capital and possibilities to obtain financial support for the recovery and stabilization of the domestic economy, Perosevic said.

In his view, the issue of privatization in Yugoslavia has been over-accentuated and politicized. He said that any form of ownership, if economically efficient, should exist as the most viable and be stimulated by appropriate measures of economic policy.

Firms that are not profitable should be eliminated from competition by economic measures, Perosevic said.

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